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RUSSIA AND ENGLAND
IN
CENTRAL ASIA.

M. A. TERENTYEF.

ST. PETERSBURG:

1875.

Translated from the Russian

BY

F. C. DAUKES, B.C.S.,

ATTACHÉ TO THE FOREIGN DEPT. OF THE GOVT. OF INDIA.

VOL. I.

CALCUTTA:

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE extreme poverty of our literature on Central Asian matters as regards the works of Russian authors renders such writings additionally valuable and interesting, although they may not contain many new particulars for the geographer or the historian.

The present work is, the translator ventures to think, of interest, firstly, as showing the tone which the Russians adopt in their communications with the various Khans of Central Asia, and the method in which their successive conquests have been brought about, and secondly, as having been written not for those interested in scientific researches, but for the benefit of the general public of Russia.

With the exception of a few notes which were kindly supplied by Mr. R. B. Shaw, the translator has not attempted to criticize the opinions expressed by the author, nor has he endeavored to correct misstatements of fact, except in a very few cases where they are notoriously incorrect—as for instance the statement that one of the stipulations made by the late Lord Mayo with the Ameer Shere Ali at the Umballa Conference in 1869 was, that such Sirdars as might be opposed to the interests of the British, should be deported from Cabul to British India, and there placed under surveillance.

The first volume is chiefly devoted to a description of the communications which have passed between the chief Russian authority in Central Asia and the various Khans or petty Chiefs, the last Chapter being particularly interesting, as showing the view taken by an educated Russian of the position of affairs in Afghanistan and the results of English policy there. The second volume, with the exception of the first Chapter which gives a somewhat amusing account of the rise of British power in India, is devoted to the political aspect of the question, including an enquiry into the financial condition of Russian Turkistan.

The translator lays no claim to literary merit for the work, his object having been simply to reproduce, as faithfully as might be, the ideas expressed by the author.

CALCUTTA, }
February 1876. }

TO THE READER.

THE recent successes of Russia in Central Asia have been made the subject of voluminous discussions in Western Europe. In England every unexpected move on the part of Russia, and every step which she takes in advance, produces without fail almost a panic. Gazettes and journals of every description are filled with articles, discussing the Central Asian question, not only in its past and present aspects, but also as to the contingencies of the future, which the English regard with a vague shadowy sense of danger.

The richness of the literature of Western Europe on a question which so nearly concerns Russia, renders our poverty in this respect the more noticeable. In Russia no publicity whatever is given to diplomatic correspondence, and the blank, which is thus caused, cannot fail to be noticed by every student of the subject.

Some Foreign Governments publish officially periodical collections of political documents (called Blue Books, &c.), and since the Russian despatches are included in them, these books form our only source of information regarding the diplomatic correspondence of the Russian Government.

Having been engaged, since the year 1870, on a work entitled "The History of Russian Conquests in Central Asia" (which will shortly be ready for the Press), I had collected a number of materials bearing on

the diplomatic intercourse, especially of late years, between Russia and the Khans of Central Asia, and the desire to fill up the blank, above noticed, has induced me to work up these materials into a connected narrative.

The late war with Khiva, and the Russian occupation of the mouths of the Amu-Darya, have produced the usual excitement amongst the English. On this occasion, however, the discussions have not been confined to newspaper articles, but have resulted in the publication of some very elaborate works, of which the most noticeable are two published in London during the present year, one entitled "Central Asia, from the Aryan to the Cossack," by James Hutton, and the other "England and Russia in the East," by Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson. Each of these works is a complement to the other, that is, while Mr. Hutton has especially worked out the history of the Khans of Central Asia, Sir Henry Rawlinson has chiefly confined himself to the political aspect of the question. The present book was already in type when these two English publications were received at St. Petersburg, but I hastened to avail myself of the data therein given, so far as they contained new information, and have incorporated them herein.

Thus the reader will find in this book not only particulars regarding the recent political intercourse of Russia with the Khans of Central Asia, but also an account of the comments of foreigners on the movement of Russia in Central Asia, and of their surmises as to the possible objects of the Russian Government.

There is no secrecy in the Russian Central Asian policy, and every syllable, which has ever been addressed by the Russian authorities to the Khans, may be openly divulged to the public without reservation.

ST. PETERSBURG,

M. TERENTYEF.

July 1875.

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RUSSIA AND ENGLAND

IN

CENTRAL ASIA.

CHAPTER I.

THE EASTWARD MOVEMENT OF RUSSIA.

Commencement of the movement—Taking of Sarai, Kazan, and Astrakhan—The Strogonofs—Yermak subdues the kingdom of Siberia—Historical necessity of occupying Central Asia—The Bashkirs, Kirgiz and Calmucks—The Orenburg and Siberian lines—Designs on the Syr Darya—Flying detachments—Permanent fortifications—Occupation of the mouths of the Syr by General Obruchëf—Want of unanimity between the Governors of Orenburg—Plan of connecting the Siberian and Orenburg lines—Capture of Ak-Musjid—Exploit of Captain Shkupa on the 28th December 1853—Movement from the Siberian side—Taking of Pishpek—The affair at Uzun-Agach conducted by Sub-Colonel Kolpakofski—Occupation of Auliata, Turkistan, Chemkent and Tashkent—Despatch of a Russian Embassy to Bokhara and the treachery of the Ameer—Movement of Cherniayef against Jizzakh—Appointment of a new Governor—Taking of Khodjent, Oratippe and Jizzakh—Formation of the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan—Full powers given by the Emperor to the Governor-General.

THE Eastward movement of Russia dates as far back as the supremacy of the Tartars.

2 *Russia and England in Central Asia.*

The mighty consolidator of the possessions of Russia, Ivan III. (1462-1505), who laid the corner-stone for the present greatness of the Russian Empire, was the first to initiate the movement to the east. During his reign, in the year 1472, Perm* was conquered and afterwards Viatka and the "Yugorskaya Zemlya" (North-Western Siberia).

Although visibly decaying in the reign of Vasili, surnamed the "Dull," the "Golden" horde still arrogated to themselves the right of exacting tribute and the possession of supreme power, but their rivalry with the Tartars of Kazan and the Crimea enabled the Russians to act in combination with the latter powers and to paralyze their strength.

With the determination to annihilate every semblance of this ignominious yoke, Ivan III. concluded an alliance with Mengli Gherai, of

* Probably Perm is identical with Biarmia of the ancients. Some historians understand by Biarmia the present Governorships of Archangel and Vologda.

The Scandinavian annals, it is true, indicate the subjection of Biarmia (by which they mean especially the northern regions) by the people of Novgorod, but the works of foreigners even now are not pre-eminent for any special accuracy regarding Russia, and formerly they were probably still less to be relied upon. Besides this, there is the analogy of the name—Biarmia, whence are probably derived Barmia, Parmia, Permia—which supports our

the Crimea, tore up his written agreement with Ahmed Khan of Sarai and forcibly ejected his ambassadors. Ahmed endeavoured to secure himself by an alliance with Kasimir IV. of Lithuania, but the people of the Crimea attacked Lithuania and prevented it from co-operating with the Tartars, while at the same time the Russian yeomanry, assisted by another body of the Crimeans, made an attack on Sarai and rased it to the ground.

The main bodies of the Russian and Tartar forces at last confronted each other on the banks of the River Ugra, and so remained until late in the autumn, neither caring to risk an attempt to cross the river in the teeth of the enemy. At last on the 7th November 1480 both armies broke up without fighting: and from that day the rule of the barbarians may be said to have ceased.

hypothesis. Lastly since even in the present day the Governorship of Archangel is very thinly populated (the average being four souls to every ten square versts while that of Moscow is five hundred and seventy-four), there can be no doubt that four hundred years ago the population was still more sparse, and hence it is improbable that Biarmia would have formed the subject of dispute between Novgorod and Moscow. It is entirely different with Perm which supplied not only valuable skins but also silver by means of which exchanges were effected in the "Yugorskaya Zemlya."

4 *Russia and England in Central Asia.*

The final blow to the Kiptchak Empire was struck in the year 1502 by the hands of our ally, Mengli Gherai.

Thus ended the rule of the Tartars; but this event led to a change in our relations with Kazan and the Crimea, which Khanates being relieved from apprehensions for their own security, perpetrated without ceasing predatory raids on our neighbouring possessions.

Although the military leaders of Ivan III. brought Kazan into dependence on Moscow, the Kazanians availed themselves of every convenient opportunity to deny their subjection. For example, in the year 1518 the throne of Kazan became vacant and Vasili nominated as King one of the so-called "serving" * Princes (Moorzas) named Shekh Ali, but the faction of the Crimeans made common cause with Mahomed Gherai, who in 1521 attacked Russia and penetrated as far as Moscow.

After this Kazan fell a victim to party strife, and some thirty years afterwards a second time

* In the 14th and 15th centuries some distinguished Princes (Moorzas) of the Tartars emigrated with their retainers into our territories and entered into the service of one or other of the Russian Grand Dukes. The Dukes of Moscow began to form colonies of these Tartars in the south-eastern tracts, imposing on them the obligation of defending themselves against invasion. Thus on the Oka was organized the Khanate of Kassym.

became subject to Russia. Again the Russian authorities endeavoured to force the Kazanians to accept Shekh Ali for their King and again they revolted, placing upon the throne a Crimean Prince named Edegar.

It was at this period that Ivan IV. resolved once and for all to subjugate Kazan. The time was a favorable one, for Russia, by the incorporation of Moscow, Novgorod (1478), Tver (1485), Smolensk (1514), and Rezan (1517), formed a powerful united whole, and it would have been worse than folly to tolerate any longer the incursions and overbearing conduct of the Tartars. Accordingly in 1552 Ivan the "Terrible" with 150,000 Russians (amongst whom were some bowmen,* composing the newly established standing army) laid siege to Kazan and took the city on the 2nd October, having breached the walls by what was at that time the novel expedient of a mine containing forty-eight barrels of gunpowder.

Four years afterwards, in 1556, the powerless Khanate of Astrakhan, which had sprung up on the ruins of the empire of the Tartars, was incorporated in the dominions of Russia.

* Streltsi.

6 *Russia and England in Central Asia.*

Notwithstanding, however, the fact of these annexations, the Khans of the Crimea still persisted in advancing claims to Kazan and Astrakhan, which resulted in a series of incursions and petty wars for two hundred and thirty years up to 1783, when the Crimea was finally annexed to Russia.

Towards the end of the reign of Ivan the "Terrible," Russia made her first advance across the Ural Mountains, then known by the name of the "Stony belt."

In the wild and barren region of Perm Russian settlements were at that time quite in their infancy. A rich merchant, named Strogonof, was fortunate enough to procure from the Emperor a title-deed which gave him the possession of certain uninhabited lands lying between the Rivers Kama and Chusa, and comprising nearly a half of the present Governorship of Perm.

The Strogonofs having bound themselves to colonise these lands, established salt works, and in order to ensure the protection of the tract from neighbouring marauders, were granted the right of building forts, possessing fire-arms, and maintaining an army. Thus it came about that these merchant princes developed

into feudal Governors of an extensive tract of country. Their army of mercenaries consisted of a mixed rabble formed of Russians, Tartars, captive Germans and Lithuanians, barely of sufficient strength to withstand the attacks of the Trans-Ural Tartars, who had founded an independent kingdom along the River Irtysh with its chief towns of Isker and Siberia. The Strogonofs soon discovered what later experience proved to be the fact, that, in order to act effectually against the turbulent Siberians, it was necessary to cross the intermediate range of mountains and to penetrate into the heart of their country, for which purpose they invited into their service a band of robbers who had taken refuge on the River Kama from the Emperor's troops.

This was the famous band of Yermak composed of outlaws from the Don who, after having been engaged in a course of indiscriminate robbery along the Volga, had at last crowned their misdeeds by attacking the Persian and Bokharian Ambassadors while sailing up the Volga to Moscow, and had thereby incurred the wrath of the Emperor, Ivan IV. Decided measures were taken against them, and several of the robbers were captured,

8 *Russia and England in Central Asia.*

hanged or drowned, while the remnant took to flight.

The eagerness with which the outlaws, who had been condemned to death by the Emperor, accepted the offer of the Strogonofs, and the zeal with which they served their benefactors, are clearly shown by the fact that not only did they protect the small settlements from the incursions of the Vagulians, Voteks and Pelimians (Trans-Ural Tartars), but also made incursions into the country of their enemies. Thus matters went on until 1581, in which year the Strogonofs proposed to Yermak that he should cross the Ural Mountains and chastise Khan Kuchum—an undertaking which, inaugurated as it was without the cognizance or permission of the ruling power at Moscow, was undoubtedly characterized by greater boldness than prudence. At that time an exaggerated idea of the strength and importance of the Trans-Ural tribes prevailed at Moscow, where even such personages as the Tartar Moorzas (Princes) were regarded as Grand Dukes, and Kuchum, the Trans-Ural Khan, as the Emperor of Siberia.

By a strange coincidence the very day, the 1st September 1581, on which Yermak

with a body of 840 men (amongst whom were 300 captive Lithuanians, Germans and Tartars) moved towards Siberia, an immense band of Vagulian savages, collected by the Grand Duke of Pelim, attacked Cherdyn and the lands of the Strogonofs.

Ivan the "Terrible," as might have been expected, regarded the undertaking against the Trans-Ural tribes with extreme disfavour. "This has taken place," wrote the Emperor to the Strogonofs, "through your treachery. You have driven off from my pay* the Vagulians, the Voteks and the Pelimians, and have ill-treated them..... You have moreover invited to yourselves the Atamans from the Volga, and have received them into your strongholds without my ukas."

Having condemned strongly every forward movement, and having peremptorily directed the Strogonofs to confine themselves to the protection of their lands and not to advance beyond them, the Emperor concluded—"If you do not dismiss from your service the band of Volga Cossacks, namely Yermak, the robber Chief, and his followers, or if you show negligence

* This probably means that Ivan paid these Tartar tribes for keeping the peace.

in protecting Perm and indulge in a repetition of this treacherous conduct, a severe chastisement will be visited upon you, and the robber Chiefs and Cossacks who have obeyed and served you, while they have left my territory unprotected, shall be put to death." Ivan the "Terrible," as we know, was a man of few words, and it may readily be imagined that the Strogonofs incurred no slight danger by falling under the suspicion of treasonable behaviour.

The undertaking, however, was accomplished with success. Yermak crossed the Ural range and, making his way on rafts from river to river (the Chusa, the Serebrennaya (silver), the Jharof and the Tur), penetrated to the very centre of the Siberian kingdom. Fire-arms, at that time unknown to the Siberian Tartars, struck them with a panic, and Kuchum, the Khan, being defeated in several skirmishes, fled to the steppe. Thus it happened that on the 26th October 1581 the Cossacks entered the town of Siberia, deserted by its inhabitants, and in the following spring completed the conquest of the country.

Kolso, one of the robber chieftains (Atamans) was despatched to Moscow to tender the

submission of the Siberian kingdom to the Emperor, where he was received in State by Ivan, while the robbers over whose heads the sentence of death still hung presented themselves before the "Terrible" Emperor, after having crowned their former misdemeanours by the self-imposed task of conquering a neighbouring kingdom.

It was only natural that after their successes they should not be otherwise than well treated at the hands of the Emperor, but Ivan went far beyond this, for not only did he pardon their former transgressions, but also loaded them with rewards. Undoubtedly reports of the unprecedented exploits of a handful of fearless robbers, of the indescribable wealth of Siberia, and of its richness in the precious metals, had preceded the deputation. The community moreover had pardoned the Cossacks and had received them with a hearty welcome: but these facts alone are not sufficient to explain the unusual treatment which they received at the hands of an Emperor, who was the sternest of disciplinarians. The probability is that there was some Imperial signification in the Emperor's unusual leniency, such as in after years prompted that celebrated saying of Catherine II. "Success

justifies itself," and hence perhaps it may have been that Ivan consented for once to waive the requirements of strict discipline.

The death of Ivan IV. and of Yermak occurred in the same year. In the case of the latter a stormy night, combined with the carelessness of the Cossacks, enabled Kuchum, the Siberian Khan, to make his way into the encampment of the Russians. The Cossacks, taken by surprise, were driven back, and Yermak, overpowered by his chain mail (the ponderous gift of the Emperor), perished in the attempt to swim across the River Irtysh.

This catastrophe was followed by a general rising of the neighbouring tribes, and the Cossacks were compelled for the time to retreat to Russia, where they united themselves with the Imperial Generals and afterwards again succeeded in capturing Isker.

In the course of time the Russian Government, in order to secure its newly acquired possessions, erected the forts of Tobolsk, Tomsk, Nerchinsk, and Irkutsk. By degrees their territories were extended, and about fifty years after their first appearance on the further side of the Ural range, the whole of Northern Asia was incorporated in the Russian Empire as

far as Kamchatka itself, which, however, was not annexed until the year 1697.

Nevertheless although our advance in Northern Asia had been so rapid, in Central Asia matters were very different. We had, it is true, occupied Siberia by a *coup de main*, but we persistently refused to advance on to the Central Asian steppes. The hand of fate beckoned us to the Sea of Aral, but we were stubborn and refused to follow its guidance, and it was not until we had endured for centuries the incursions and raids of savage hordes that at last our patience became exhausted, and we were compelled to move forward and to give up the passive part which we had hitherto played. Our progress was at first marked by uncertainty, for we were, so to speak, groping in the dark, and left our old abodes only with the greatest reluctance. Sheer necessity, however, forced us to plant settlements on the furthest limits of our possessions, and indeed experience has abundantly proved that the natural path to the security of our eastern frontier lies forward. History has ordained that we should advance, although in so doing we have invariably acted with reluctance, and the incursions of the nomad tribes have been the immediate cause.

In this contest with the historical necessity of a perpetual advance is contained the whole interest of our Central Asian movement. Let us trace briefly what that movement has been.

Soon after the subjugation of Kazan, the Bashkirs (or Besergs), who had formerly been tributaries of the Kazanians, tendered their submission to Russia, but nevertheless did not desist from making incursions into our territory: and thus it happened that at last we were forced to advance a cordon of forts round our frontier settlements and to make an uninterrupted line of earth-works from village to village.

In this way Russia, the moment that one enemy was subdued, became inevitably occupied with another; for example, the subjugation of the Golden Horde was followed by that of Kazan, and Kazan by that of the Bashkirs and other tribes. Such seems to be the ultimate vocation of Russia. Horde after horde show themselves upon her frontiers, knock, as it were, at the doors of Europe but are turned away, as uninvited guests, by the ruthless watchman.

The Kiptchaks, Bashkirs, Calmucks and Kirgiz, all in their turn were conquered by the

steadily progressing power of the Russian nation which had not only liberated Russia herself, but also freed Europe from the terrors of the incursions of the barbaric hordes.

The history of our eastward movement is generally marked by the same characteristics. Proximity with savage tribes who recognized no international or other laws, except only the law of might, has compelled us to erect along our frontier a line of forts. Then in the progress of time tribes of barbarians, overpowered by superior forces from elsewhere, begged to be taken under Russian protection and to be granted the rights of citizenship. As subjects, however, their hostility remained unchanged, and hence we were ultimately compelled either to crush them entirely or to drive them away to a distance from Russian territory. In either case it was impossible to avoid encircling their territory by a cordon of new fortifications.

Thus it has happened that the advance of Russia in the east has been a hopeless search after a secure frontier, and such a position she will never find until her territories are coterminous with those of a nation which respects treaties, which is sufficiently civilized not to

live on plunder and pillage, and sufficiently powerful to restrain its subjects from predatory incursions across our frontiers.

Such a programme, necessitated by the steppes and by the savage hordes inhabiting them (*i.e.*, by the geographical and historical conditions of the country), was accepted by us as unavoidable, and the Bashkir tribe was the first to come under its operation. When we found that the fortifications round our own settlements and the uninterrupted line of earth-works were wholly insufficient to restrain them from incursions and robbery, we resolved to encircle them by a line of forts, and it was in this way that in the reign of Anna Ivanovna the Orenburg line of fortifications sprung into existence on the River Ural (Yaik) and its tributaries, and from that time the Bashkirs were cut off from the steppes and confined to their present state of subjection.

On the other side of the Ural lived the roaming Cossacks, commonly called **Kirgiz** or in official language Kirgiz-Kaisaks. Overpowered by the Zungors (otherwise called the Zungars or Calmucks) the Kirgiz as early as the year 1718 sought the protection of Russia, and begged that they might be allowed to

become her subjects. To aid them was at that time beyond our power, and hence began that transplantation of the various tribes which has since extended over the whole of Central Asia. The Zungars occupied Turkistan and the valley of the Syr Daria, while the small horde scattered themselves to the north-west in the direction of the Rivers Emba and Ural, the foremost explorers penetrating beyond the latter river and conveying to their fellow tribesmen the good tidings of the fertility and abundance of pasturage to be found in the extensive plains of the Volga.

A part of the Kirgiz under the command of Khan Abul Khair penetrated to Novoshemshinsk (in the present Governorship of Kazan) which town they rased to the ground, and from which they were not expelled until they had succeeded in carrying off many Russians into captivity. Thus it happened that Russia found herself threatened by another invasion of the barbarians, but under changed conditions, for our frontiers were not so unprotected as in former days, and the Ural line of forts was able to withstand the pressure of the numberless horde.

Returning raid for raid the bold Cossacks of

the Ural defended their fields from plunder, their villages from ruin, and their families from slavery, and in so doing protected Russia from many calamities.

One of the Zungarian tribes—the Torgouts—separated from the rest as early as the year 1621, and after a variety of trials, settled in the steppes* of south eastern Russia between the Rivers Ural, Volga, and Don. The Russian Government readily received the new comers, thinking that they would serve as a barrier against the hordes which were still unsubdued, but in the first instance it was necessary to administer many a lesson to them before they would regard with proper consideration the Government which had given them refuge. These are the Calmucks who aided us during the attacks of the Kirgiz, and who, in defending their own lands from forcible partition amongst the new comers, as well as the Bashkirs, who were similarly situated, rendered us considerable service.

Clouds, however, were gathering over the Kirgiz, for the Cossacks of the Ural, and the Calmucks and Bashkirs of the Volga, expelled

The steppes in European Russia are not necessarily deserts. The word conveys simply the idea of a wide plain corresponding with the American prairie.—(*Trs.*)

them from their pasture lands, while the Zungars incessantly drove them from one camping ground to another, ultimately forcing them close on to our boundaries. The small horde advanced in a body as far as the River Ural, and the Middle Horde to the Rivers Or and Ui, while the Great Horde was forced to become subject to the Zungars. Thus the Orenburg line of forts did its work.

It was not however the same with the Siberian line. In selecting spots for forts, it is of course necessary to satisfy many conditions. Various considerations of strategical and political advantage must give way to the geographical circumstances of the region, and of all conditions the existence of water is the most essential. All the rivers in Siberia have a tendency to flow towards the basin of the Arctic Ocean, their course being usually from north to south with deviations from this general direction only in particular parts. This [redacted] has necessitated a certain disposition of our forts in Central Asia, for the fortresses, stretching along the river courses into the heart of the steppes, formed a series of parallel lines, leaving the intermediate spaces wholly without protection. The Siberian lines

of forts being connected with the central points of administration were longitudinally strong but latitudinally weak, for the forts of the parallel lines had no transversal connection on account of the want of water in the intervening steppes. Into these intermediate intervals bands of robbers incessantly penetrated and devastated our settlements. From the southern extremity of the Siberian line on the River Ui, an affluent of the Tobol, to the north-east extremity of the Orenburg line on the Or, a tributary of the Ural, a large vacant space intervened, which rendered it impossible to keep up communication between the two lines.

Flying detachments sent out into the steppes were of no avail in protecting these intermediate waterless spaces, and hence in the third decade of the present century an attempt was made to carry out an idea, which had occurred to Perovski, the Governor-General of Orenburg, namely, to erect an uninterrupted ~~earth-work~~ along the whole of that part of the boundary which was not protected by any physical bulwarks—a work more fitted for the palmiest days of the Chinese or Roman Empires.*

* For a fuller description see page 55 of the Russian Expedition to Khiva, 1839, translated by Michell.—(*Trs.*)

In 1836 the formation of this earth-work, six feet in height, had extended to a distance of eighteen versts, the Bashkirs executing it by contract, but ultimately the undertaking was for some reason or other abandoned.

It thus became clear that so long as our territories did not possess some definite line of boundary formed by nature (such as mountains, rivers, &c.), it would be useless to expect a secure frontier; but so far from this being the case, there were no mountains in front of the Siberian and Orenburg lines, and the only adjacent rivers were the Syr Daria and the Chu.

For a long time past the Kirgiz themselves had invited us to advance to the Syr Daria. They desired to have a point of support in the heart of their own camping grounds against the incursions of their neighbours, while at the same time they eagerly looked for a market where they might be able to purchase manufactured goods and dispose of their own raw produce. The first Khan, who tendered submission (the well known Abul Khair), begged us over and over again to build a Russian Fort at the mouths of the Syr Daria, and to place guns there, by means of which he hoped,

as occasion might arise, to support his own authority.

In 1740 a Russian detachment was despatched under the command of Gladyshef, a Lieutenant of the Dragoons, to examine the country and to seek for a spot suitable for the erection of a fortress. With this inspection, however, the matter ended: for to carry our fortifications a thousand versts in advance of the regular line would have necessitated the erection of a series of forts which could not have been sufficiently protected by the small Russian element that then existed on the Orenburg tract.

The Russian Governors of Orenburg, who were not unfrequently selected from persons but little fitted for the post, looked at the matter altogether in a wrong light. With few exceptions they held the opinion that the barbarous hordes could be best subdued by their own weapons, *i.e.*, by means of dashing attacks made by flying detachments. Let us take the following example to show the effects of this system. The Chumeks break in amongst our Bashkirs and return with their booty to their own haunts. We interfere and send a detachment into the steppe. In such a case the

culprits usually manage to make their escape into the frontier tracts of Khiva or Bokhara, and our troops find only innocent individuals (Cheklins) who, having no punishment to fear, quietly remain in their own settlements. The question as to guilt or innocence is decided by the Commander of the detachment, probably some petty officer of Cossacks, who exacts retribution from some imaginary culprits, saddles us with a blood-feud, and returns with his troops only to be loaded with glory. Then the "Cheklins" in their turn invade our lines in revenge. Another detachment has to be sent out to punish them: the same scene is enacted, and the ultimate result is a state of indiscriminate plunder and disturbance.

If matters go beyond mere *Barantas* or cattle-lifting expeditions and develop into a regular rising, the Russian flying detachments are deprived of even such cheap laurels as may be gained by punishing peaceful "auls," because in such times there are no peaceful people about. Every one is on the watch, and if they get the chance of falling unawares on small unprotected bodies of Russians, they carry them away as captives into the endless steppes. An example of this state of things

was afforded by the rising of Kenisar Kassimof towards the end of the third or the beginning of the fourth decade of the present century. Detachment after detachment was sent out into the steppe towards Orenburg and Siberia, but Kenisar turned back and so skilfully manœuvred almost in the very sight of our troops as to elude pursuit. Again the winter expedition of Perovski against Khiva in 1839 showed most unmistakably that, without secure fortifications, it is impossible to undertake distant campaigns.

The experience of the past and the failures of the present at last convinced Obruchëf that neither flying detachments nor measures either of kindness or severity, nor the exercise of diplomacy could effect the entire subjugation of the Kirgiz, so long as their summer and winter pastures were not in our hands. In other words Obruchëf was obliged to revert to the old system which had been tried in the case of the Bashkirs, and to encircle the Kirgiz by a chain of forts.

In the year 1845 the fort of Orenburgsk was built on the river Turga and the fort of Uralsk on the Irgiz. In 1847 the fort of Raimsk was built at the mouths of the Syr Darya, but the

name was afterwards changed,* and ultimately in 1855 it was removed by Perovski (it may be added, without the slightest advantage) to Kazala. In 1848 the fort of Karabutak was built for the purpose of securing communication between the Uralsk fort and the regular line, and also that of Kos-Aral on the Sea of Aral for the protection of a private company started for fishery purposes which ultimately collapsed, the fort being thereupon abandoned.

As this continuous belt of forts sprung into existence along the line of retreat of the tribes addicted to "Barantas," their incursions ceased.

As a further means of facilitating communication, Obruchëf also ordered two steamers from Sweden which were brought to Raim in separate pieces, the first, called the *Perovski*, being launched in 1853. He also made certain proposals tending towards the occupation by the Russians of Ak-Musjid and Khiva: in order to understand which it is necessary to state briefly what our position at that time was.

By the occupation of the mouths of the Syr we were brought into immediate contiguity with Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokan, of which

* To Aralsk—(*Trs.*)

Khanates Bokhara alone preserved the peace, the other two incessantly disturbing the Russian Kirgiz and making incursions into Russian territory. To such an extent indeed did the Kokanians carry their lawlessness, that the entire population from Ak-Musjid was kept in a perpetual state of alarm. Under these circumstances Obruchëf in March 1851 submitted a memorandum containing his views, and was immediately superseded by Perovski, who subjected the memorandum to a severe criticism and condemned the whole system on which his predecessor had acted. Even the erection of permanent forts appeared to Perovski “an unprofitable measure as compared with the system of acting by means of flying detachments, and it is curious to notice that the scheme of undertaking a fresh expedition against Khiva, which had previously been Perovski’s favorite idea, was now admitted by him to be unfeasible, although owing to the occupation of the mouths of the Syr Daria we stood four-fold nearer to that Khanate than in 1839. It may probably, however, be taken for granted that had not this proposal emanated from Obruchëf, Perovski would have been the first to advocate it.

Almost at the same time that Obruchëf wrote his memorandum, Adjutant-General Annenkof submitted another to the Emperor Nicolas called "a sketch of the Kirgiz steppe," in which he proposed to reopen the Ayaguz-Akmolinsk line which had been abandoned in 1838, on account of the rebellion raised by Kenisar Kassimof. Annenkof considered that it would be advantageous to move the left flank of the line to the River Chu, and the right to the Syr Daria representing that the intervening space could be better guarded than the large break between Akmolla and Orsk. Nicolas approved of this scheme, but when the Governor-Generals of Orenburg and Western Siberia were consulted (Perovski and Hasford), and when the former gave his opinion against the project and against the system of permanent forts generally, the Emperor ordered Hasford to abandon for the time-being the idea of occupying the River Ili, for carrying out which he had already made arrangements.

Nevertheless military surveying parties were despatched up the Jaxartes. In 1852 Colonel Blaremborg, with a force of 469 men and two guns, penetrated to Ak-Musjid and stormed the small fort of that name, but was repulsed with

the loss of seventy-two men. In the following year Perovski in person took the command and marching with a force of 2,168 men, 12 guns, and five mortars he advanced against Ak-Musjid, the result being that after a regular siege of 22 days' duration, the fort, which was held by a garrison of only 250 men, was taken. Of the whole garrison only 74 survived, 35 of whom were wounded, while our losses were 106 killed and wounded. In this way the first step was taken by the Russians to establish communication between the Orenburg and Siberian lines, but Perovski opposed a regular junction by all the means in his power, though, since he had himself in the year of the fall of Ak-Musjid built no less than four forts on the Syr Daria, he could not support his objections by the argument of the uselessness of establishing permanent fortifications. The obstinacy of Perovski, combined with the intrigues of the English during the Crimean war, interrupted the junction of the frontiers of Siberia and Orenburg, which was not effected until the year 1864.

The Kokanians also used every means in their power to prevent the accomplishment of this scheme and, naturally so, as the intention was

to carry the Russian frontier through their territory. This opposition soon became apparent from an attempt made by them to recover possession of Ak-Musjid not many months after it had been taken by the Russians. On the 14th (26th) December a mass of Kokanians numbering 13,000 men with a small park of seventeen brass guns advanced against the fort, where at that time there was a garrison of only 1,055 troops with fourteen guns and five mortars. The Russian fortification being at that time unfinished could not sustain a siege, and the Commandant, Ogarëf, therefore resolved to take the offensive and make a sortie. On the 18th (30th) at dawn 550 Russian troops with four field pieces and two stands of rockets issued from the fort under the command of Captain Shkupa. The Kokanians observing the small number of the detachment endeavoured to take advantage of their own numerical superiority by outflanking the Russian troops and circumventing their rear so as to cut them off altogether from the fort. So eager were they to act on the Russian rear, that they left their own centre, where the camp and the guns were, comparatively undefended—an oversight of which Captain

Shkupa took immediate advantage. Leaving only three platoons of infantry (about 110 men) and one sotnia of Cossacks in position, he threw himself forward with the remaining six platoons (about 230 men) and a sotnia of Cossacks, and having put to flight the Kokanian sharpshooters, made himself master of the camp, including the whole of the seventeen guns. Then to aid the platoons which had been left in position, two sorties were made by small bodies of Cossacks (eighty in number with one gun) which attacked the rear of the Kokanians. The result was entirely successful. The losses of the enemy were about 2,000 killed and wounded, seven standards, seventeen guns and 130 "puds*" of gunpowder, while those of the Russians did not exceed eighteen killed and forty-nine wounded. 9352

In justice it must be added that the hero of the day was Captain Shkupa who conducted the whole management of the sortie. As a recognition of his services he was promoted to the rank of Major, while Sub-Colonel Ogarëf was rewarded for his good judgment in selecting such a suitable officer by promotion to the rank of General and by the decoration of St. George.

This was the first affair of any importance in which we had up to that time been engaged, and it showed the tactics which should in future be adopted against the Kokanians. For a period of seven years afterwards the latter remained peaceable, and it was not until the year 1860 that they tried their fortunes a second time—on that occasion on the Siberian side.

An irresolute attack made by them on Kastek ended in a defeat, and the fact that their losses on that occasion were not large, was owing only to the haste with which they abandoned their position. After this the detachment on the further side of the River Chu, under the command of Colonel Zimmerman, took the forts of Tokmak and Pishpek, and after rasing them to the ground started on its return march, in the course of which the Russian troops were pursued by an enormous mass of Kokanians to the number of about 20,000 men with ten guns.

The commandant of the Alataf district, Sub-Colonel Kolpakofski, speedily collected three companies of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry with six guns and two stands of rockets and entirely defeated the enemy at

the natural boundary Uzun-Agach; the Russian losses amounting to only one killed and twenty-six wounded, while the enemy lost as many as 1,500 men, and their artillery was only saved from capture by the fact that it could not for some reason or other take part in the affair. This was our second important engagement, but the key-note was now given, and the Kokanians were taught to respect our strength. In 1863 two reconnoitring parties were sent out, one by the Orenburg army to Turkistan, and the other by the Siberian army to Auliata, and on the foundation of the knowledge thus obtained it was resolved to advance our frontier to the northern declivity of the range of the Karatau mountains above the towns of Tashkent and Turkistan.

The occupation of such insignificant forts as Ak-Musjid, Tokmak, Pishpek, and Auliata was not of course made the subject of comment on the part of foreign powers, especially as the names of these places were not even inserted in many English maps, but it was another matter with Tashkent and Turkistan, ancient and celebrated towns which were eminently adapted to create a stir by their occupation.

The settlement of the new frontier was

entrusted to Colonels Cherniayef and Verëfkin, the task being divided as follows: the former with the Siberian soldiers was to occupy Auliata, while the latter with the Orenburg troops was to take possession of the towns of Suzak and Chulak-Kurgan. This programme was carried out with such zeal that besides these towns, those of Turkistan and Chemkent also succumbed to the Russian power. Promoted to the rank of General, Cherniayef was appointed Commander of the newly established Novo Kokanian line, and at once entered into communication with the inhabitants of Tashkent, with the view of keeping up in that town an anti-Kokanian party.

In fact Tashkent, which was then supposed to contain 200,000 inhabitants, and which, enriched by its commerce with the Russians, Bokhariots and Kokanians, had prospered by its once complete independence, and was only one hundred and twenty versts distant from our frontiers, could not in the interests of Russia be left to fall into the hands of either Bokhara or Kokan. In the opinion of Cherniayef it was in the highest degree advisable to prevent this by leaving Tashkent to the self-government of its inhabitants under

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Russian supremacy. The so called "Russian party" in the town professed to share this view, and pledged themselves to open the gates to our troops, but this promise was not fulfilled, and accordingly when Cherniayef took the town by storm on 15th (27th) June 1865, he considered himself unfettered by any previous promises. Without endeavouring to give here the details of this celebrated storm, it is sufficient to say that a town which was surrounded by a wall twenty-four versts in length and was garrisoned by 30,000 armed men and sixty-three guns, was taken by a Russian detachment numbering only 1,951 men with twelve guns.

About a month before the storming the regent of the Kokan Khanate, Alum Kul, had also been defeated under the walls of Tashkent, and from this time the Kokanians desisted entirely from warlike pursuits, their place on the Central Asian stage being taken by the Bokhariots. It is not known who prompted the Bokhariots to stand up for the defence of the interests of Mahomedanism, but that they did so and paid dearly for it is certain. The first steps taken by them to our knowledge consisted in a demand for the evacuation of Tashkent and Chemkent pending the receipt of the final

decision of the "White Czar," and in the event of a refusal they threatened us with a holy war or, in other words, a general rising of all Mahomedans.

In reply to this message Cherniayef arrested the Bokharian merchants who lived in the towns occupied by the Russians, and directed that a similar measure should be taken on the Syr Darya line and in the Orenburg Province. The essence of the dispute thus commenced was that the Bokhariots declined to carry on negotiations with Cherniayef, but insisted on treating directly with the Imperial Court, a mode of proceeding which our Government was unwilling to countenance.

In order to induce the Russians to comply with their wishes in this respect the Bokhariots had recourse to the following clever stratagem: they voluntarily invited Cherniayef to send an Embassy of Russian Officers to Bokhara, hinting that some Europeans had already arrived there *via* Afghanistan. Cherniayef, deceived by their fair words, and regarding the request for the despatch of a Russian Embassy as an indirect consent to carry on negotiations, not in St. Petersburg, but in Tashkent, gave his consent. An Embassy was accordingly despatched to

Bokhara, but the Ameer had no sooner got the Russian Ambassadors into his power than he changed his tone, demanded a safe conduct for his Ambassador who had been detained at Kazala, and declined to permit the departure of the Russians until the return of his own Envoy in safety from St. Petersburg.

In order to procure the release of the Russian Mission, Cherniayef undertook a winter expedition against Jizzakh, but fearing to storm the town lest the safety of the Embassy should be thereby placed in jeopardy, he retired with his troops on the 11th (23rd) February in entire ignorance of the fact that on the 10th (22nd) of that month General Romanofski, the Editor of the *Invalide Russe*, had started from St. Petersburg to supersede him.

Events after this quickly followed one on the other. The battle of the Irjar,* the storming of Khodjent, Oratippe,† and Jizzakh took place in the interval between the 8th (20th) May and 18th (30th) October 1866, and formed one of the brilliant pages in our military history. Immediately afterwards a separate military

* A place on the left bank of the Syr Daria, about 34 miles above Fort Chinaz.—*Trs.*

† Uratube in Walker's map.

district was organized consisting of the newly acquired territory, to the command of which was appointed an officer, already celebrated for his energetic conduct in Vilna, Adjutant-General Von Kauffman.

So extensive had our conquests at this period become that the time appeared to have arrived for pausing awhile to consider the best means of consolidating our possessions, organizing a local Government, and developing the wealthy resources of the newly occupied region—a task which fell to the lot of General Von Kauffman.

The Emperor at this time considered it advisable to entrust the Governor-General of Turkistan with full powers in political matters for the purpose of enabling him to carry on negotiations and conclude treaties with all the Khans and independent Rulers of Central Asia.

The grant of these full powers was a remarkable innovation in the history of our politics in Central Asia, but it was unavoidable owing to the isolation of the region and to its distance from St. Petersburg, which made it impossible to wait in all cases for the orders of the Imperial Government. Besides this the impoverished petty Khans of Central Asia

drove a profitable business by means of embassies which they despatched on every possible pretext, and envoy after envoy made his way to the Imperial Court led on by motives of cupidity and in the expectation of receiving largesse. This had been from time immemorial the habit of the Khans, and the Russian Government was therefore forced to limit the right of sending Envoys to once in every period of three years, everything in the interval being managed directly under the orders of the frontier authorities.

In the following sketch of our recent relations with the Central Asian Khanates I hope to give a clear view of the present tendency of Russian politics in that country.

CHAPTER II.

RELATIONS WITH BOKHARA.

Negotiations with Bokhara—Project of a Treaty formed by Generals Krijhanofski and Von Kauffman—Appearance of marauding bands—Seizure of Lieutenant Shujhenko—Fresh negotiations—Reconnoitring expedition despatched from Jizzakh to Ukhum—Reports regarding communications of the Ameer with Kashgar, Kokan, Afghanistan and Khiva—Financial position of the Ameer and the measures adopted by him to remedy it—Disturbances in Bokhara—Proclamation of a holy war—Occupation by the Russians of Samarcand and Katta-Kurgan—New conditions of peace—Necessity of retaining possession of Samarcand—Stratagem of the Bokhariots—Simultaneous attack on Katta-Kurgan, Samarcand and Yani-Kurgan—The Ameer tenders his capitulation with all his artillery and effective troops—Capitulation declined—Treaty of peace—Rebellion of the Katta Tora, the eldest son of the Ameer—Assistance given by the Russians to the Ameer—Occupation of Karshi and its restoration to the Bokhariots—Difficulties of the Ameer in the payment of the war indemnity.

AT the time of the establishment of the office of Governor-General of Turkistan negotiations were in progress between the Ameer of Bokhara and the Governor-General of Orenburg, with the view of entering into a Treaty of peace, the general outline of which had received the approval of the Emperor. Since, however, full powers in political matters both as regards declaring war and concluding

peace had been vested in the new Governor of Turkistan, General Krijhanofski was directed to discuss the matter with General Von Kauffman, and if the latter agreed, to attach his signature to the new Treaty.

The proposed engagement originally consisted of ten clauses, but General Von Kauffman considered it necessary to insert two supplementary articles—one providing for free access to all towns in Bokhara and for the protection to be given to Russian merchants, and the other stipulating that future communications with the Ameer should be carried on exclusively with the Governor-General of Turkistan. It was also declared that the right of Russian subjects to acquire immoveable property in Bokhara should require the previous consent of the Governor-General of Turkistan ; and, lastly, regarding frontiers, General Von Kauffman considered not only unobjectionable but also unavoidable to cede to the Bokhariots the fort of Yani-Kurgan, which had been recently captured from them and which lay on the further side of the Nurata mountains at a distance of seven versts in front of the outlet of the Jizzakh defile. This fort was useless for purposes of securing the water-supply of Jizzakh,

and by its position in advance of the regular line would have invited the Bokhariots to contest its possession; while the Ameer declared most decidedly to our authorities at Jizzakh, and repeated in his correspondence with Krijhanofski, his determination not to disband his army until such time as we evacuated Yani-Kurgan. Under these circumstances General Von Kauffman, wishing to remove all possible cause of future collision, and with the view of strengthening the long desired peace, resolved on the concession, the more readily since he had in his letters to the Ameer made the restoration of the fort conditional on the fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty, and consequently the evacuation of it by the Russians could not possibly be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

These modifications were accepted by General Krijhanofski, who, on the 14th (26th) September 1867, signed the Treaty and made it over to the Bokharian Envoy in order that the ratification of the Ameer might be procured. By the 1st article a new line of frontier was arranged between the Russian Empire and the Khanate of Bokhara, stretching along the Kashgar-davan range including the pass of Jhilan-uta,

then along the Nurata mountains as far as the sands of Kizil-kum, whence the new line marched along the Bukan-tau mountains ending at the mouths of the Syr Darya. By the 2nd article the contracting parties reserved to themselves the right of deputing trustworthy agents for the purpose of making a more precise definition of the boundary on the spot. The 3rd article bound both parties to take all measures in their power for reciprocally restraining the frontier Begs or Chiefs, the bands of robbers and others, from incursions and raids. By the 4th article the subjects of either contracting party were allowed a free passage to all the towns under the jurisdiction of the other. The 5th article obliged the Ameer to equalize the caravan and other duties payable by Russian subjects to the same rates as were levied from his own subjects. The 6th article declared that Russian subjects should have the right of establishing caravanserais wherever they might choose, which caravanserais should not be subject to interference of any kind on the part of any one. By the 7th article the Ameer bound himself to admit Russian *caravanbashis** into all cities where

* Commercial Agents of the nature of Consuls.

their location might appear necessary. The 8th article permitted Russian subjects to settle and acquire possession of immoveable property in the Bokharian dominions with the previous consent of the Governor-General of Turkistan. The 9th required that the trial, &c., of Russian subjects guilty of misdoings in Bokhara should be undertaken, not by the Bokharian authorities, but by the Governor-General of Turkistan. The 10th article bound the Ameer to take measures for ensuring the security of Russian caravans from the attacks of robbers. The 11th defined the method of conducting future communications, written or oral, between the contracting parties; while the 12th and last contained a mutual stipulation that the abovementioned provisions should, after the ratification of the Treaty, be faithfully carried out without the slightest deviation.

General Von Kauffman at the same time entrusted the Bokharian Envoy with a communication to the Ameer, in which, after informing him of his appointment to the post of Governor-General, he declared his desire to carry on peaceable communications with his neighbours, adding—"War is distasteful to my

Emperor, but it is inevitable if our neighbours do not observe the sacredness of treaties, the inviolability of our frontier, and the necessity for acting with justice towards Russian subjects. Recent events will doubtless have afforded an example of this, and will restrain every one from becoming the enemy of Russia."

The letter was made over to the Envoy, together with a copy of the document dated 17th (29th) July 1867, in which the Emperor conferred full authority on Adjutant General Von Kauffman in political, frontier, and commercial matters, including the power of deputing trustworthy delegates to neighbouring powers, and of concluding treaties. The Envoy having been dismissed in September, it was possible to expect that the reply would reach Tashkent towards the end of October, and a remark to this effect was inserted in the letter addressed to the Ameer. This expectation however was not fulfilled. General Von Kauffman arrived at Tashkent on the 7th (19th) November, but the expected Envoy from Bokhara had not made his appearance, and meanwhile disquieting news was received from the frontier that predatory bands of robbers organized by the Frontier Begs were

making incursions into Russian territory. In the beginning of September one of these bands captured Shujhenko, a Lieutenant of our Artillery, and three soldiers who were on their way from Chinaz to Jizzakh. Shujhenko, after enduring many tortures and having been threatened with death, was forced to accept the faith of Mahomedanism and to devote his services to the instruction of the Ameer's troops.

At last, in December 1867 the Bokharian Envoy arrived bearing a letter from the Ameer, of which the following is an extract:—

“The agreements which were sent by our trusted Envoy, Musa Beg, have been received; the proposals which were made to him have been communicated. All these propositions are agreeable to friendship. I send the above-mentioned Musa Beg with the hope that he may obtain a reply. I send also the agreement.”

No agreement of any kind was received by the hands of the Envoy, and the Governor-General, ascribing the circumstance to some misunderstanding, addressed another letter to the Ameer on the 19th (31st) December, requesting him to ratify the Treaty of peace, and to release without delay Shujhenko and the three soldiers who still remained in captivity.

From the very commencement, however, of the negotiations with Musa Beg, it was apparent that the Ameer was far from being so earnestly desirous of peace as it was natural to expect that his own interests would have demanded. It was evident also that the Bokhariots were indefinitely prolonging the negotiations with the hope of gaining time, and in the interval were making such preparations as would enable them to prosecute a second war against the Russians under more advantageous conditions. The Envoy did not express any particular wishes, nor did he insist on any demands on the part of the Ameer, but while apparently agreeing to every proposition made to him, he systematically did nothing, his utterances exhibiting a passive resistance which would have foiled the very best intentions on our part. Distrust, too, was apparent in his actions, for disregarding the entire liberty which was allowed him in his correspondence, he preferred to send his letters by the hands of secret couriers despatched in the dead of night.

On the 2nd (14th) March 1868 a letter was received from the Khooshbegi containing the news of the release of Shujhenko and his companions in misfortune. As regards the Treaty, an equivocal and ambiguous reply

was sent, which in no way cleared up the matters pending with the Russian Government. Wishing however at all hazards to prevent a breach of the peace, especially as he had already made arrangements for his departure to St. Petersburg, the Governor-General dismissed the Envoy, hoping that the Bokhariots influenced by the example of the Khan of Kokan, who had concluded a commercial treaty with us, would interpose no further delays.

In the letter of the Ameer, which was entrusted to the Envoy, it was moreover necessary to explain the force and sacredness of stipulations embodied in a Treaty when formally confirmed by the contracting parties, for from the outset of the negotiations the Ameer's action had displayed an entire ignorance of even the first and universally accepted principles which govern intercourse between nations.

After the departure of the Envoy the state of affairs on the frontier, instead of improving, grew steadily worse. Lawless bands multiplied in every direction and plundered Russian subjects. In order to put a stop to these incursions six sotnias of Cossacks were ordered

to advance to the foremost line, the Ameer being informed of the causes which rendered such a measure necessary, and being at the same time warned that a detachment would advance from Jizzakh to Ukhum along the northern slopes of the Nurata range (that is along the Russian frontiers and within Russian territory) for the establishment of the necessary order and the introduction of administrative measures amongst our new subjects. The detachment was also entrusted with the duty of selecting a suitable site for a fort which it was then in contemplation to erect. In the defile of Ukhum the progress of the Russian troops was opposed by the Beks of Katta-Kurgan and Chulak, who were defeated, although pursuit was not extended on to the southern slopes of the range, that is beyond the Russian frontier. It must not however be imagined that we accused the Ameer of Bokhara of having instigated this attack; on the contrary it was ascribed solely to the wilfulness of the Frontier Beks.

The Governor-General indeed was most anxious that nothing should occur which might lead to a breach of the peace, inasmuch as he desired to bring to a satisfactory issue the civil reforms on the frontier, and also to return to

St. Petersburg, having already fixed the 9th (21st) of April as the date of his departure.

On the eve of that day news was received of proclamations, traceable to the intrigues of the Bokharian Moollahs, of a holy war (*Jihad*) against the Russians, also of the concentration of the Bokharian army near the fort of Kermineh, and of the intention of the Bokhariots to commence hostilities immediately on the departure of the Governor-General. At the same time the reports of spies, regarding communications which had passed between the Ameer of Bokhara and the Governments of Kashgar, Kokan, Afghanistan, and Khiva, with the object of creating a universal coalition of Mussulmans, revealed to us the secret of the steady refusal of the Ameer during seven months to ratify the Treaty, and of his persistence in prolonging the preliminary negotiations.

Under these circumstances the Governor-General determined to put off his departure, and was confirmed in this resolution by extraordinary reports from Naryn and the most advanced line of forts, which tended to prove that a connection existed between the preparations of the Ameer of

Bokhara and the movement of troops in Altishuhr, the nominal pretext for which was to put down disturbances amongst the nomadic Dikokamenni* Kirgiz. It was evident that the Ameer, taught by the bitter experience of former failures, had not resolved on again opposing the Russians without being assured that in so doing he did not stand alone.

The overtures however made by the Bokharian Envoy, Mahomed Farissa, to the East Indian Government and to the Sultan of Turkey led to nothing. Of the other members of the proposed coalition, Khudayar Khan of Kokan alone appears to have declined to co-operate, on the pretext that in the event of failure Kokan would be the first victim to feel the wrath of the Russians, while in the event of success, she could at any moment join in the confederation. The desire of the Ameer once more to try his fortunes combined with the fear of new disasters stamped his conduct with the seal of uncertainty, and by compelling him to be always ready to meet any emergency involved him in an expenditure which his exhausted treasury was unable to meet.

* (Literally the Kirgiz of the bare rocks.—*Trs.*)

On the pretext of collecting funds for the defence of Mahomedanism against unbelievers, the Ameer in the course of the winter of 1867-68 had made two exorbitant and altogether unusual demands on the Bokharian merchants, the apportionment of which amongst the mercantile body he left to be arbitrarily determined.

Sufficient funds, however, could not be raised by these means, and the following plan was therefore brought into operation. A tenga, which corresponded to twenty Russian copeks, was formerly equivalent to sixty-four cheks,* but the Ameer directed that all these coins should be bought up in the markets and caravanserais, and having done this, notified that a tenga would in future be accepted in payment of the taxes as the equivalent of one hundred and thirty-two cheks. Inasmuch, however, as all the silver had already been withdrawn from circulation, the actual value of the tenga was raised to two hundred cheks, and hence a very considerable profit was made by the Royal treasury. This result, however, was not gained without bitter complaints on the part of the people, who had already suffered considerably from dearth, com-

* A small copper coin.

bined with the slackness of trade and the taxes levied from them by the Beggars for the insatiable *Jihad*.

To complete his folly the Ameer laid hands on the income of the Moollahs, the Professors in the Bokharian seminaries,—thus raising against him the priestly element, who accused him of having misapplied the monies nominally collected for the war, and demanded that the *Jihad*, which they regarded as obligatory owing to the taxes that had been levied, should be proclaimed without further delay.

The Ameer was forced by the difficult and embarrassing position in which he was placed to put off the declaration of war from one holy festival to another, but when the feast of Kurban Bahram arrived—a feast in commemoration of the sacrifice made by Abraham which brought vividly before the minds of all true believers the necessity for making every possible sacrifice when the faith might require it—and still the Ameer gave no sign, the priests took advantage of his temporary absence on a pilgrimage in the neighbourhood of Bokhara, and set on foot a “*riboyat*”*

* *Riboyat* is an institution of the Priesthood and Kazis, founded not on the “*Shariyat*” but on ancient usage.

regarding a holy war against the infidel Russians.

The Ameer was publicly announced to be unfit to govern the people, and to be incapable of conducting a war, since, in the battle of Irjar in May 1866, he himself had set the example for flight after the first discharge from the Russian guns. In Samarcand the behaviour of the Moollahs was such as to oblige Osman (a Cossack deserter in command of the military) to call out his troops, and the disturbances were not quelled without the loss of sixty-two lives on the part of the insurgents. The Ameer on his return to Bokhara was met *en route* by an infuriated mob, who greeted him with reproaches and threats, and compelled him to turn back and conceal himself in the town of Gij-Davan, which was evacuated on his approach. Here he heard of the skirmish at Ukhum in which the Russians had been victorious, and of two hundred and eighty-six Afghans under Secunder Khan having joined the Russians with two guns which they had captured from the Beg of Nurata. From Gij-Davan the Ameer proceeded towards Kermineh, where at last he took the fatal step of proclaiming a holy war.

On the 1st (13th) May 1868 a Russian detachment marched out of Yani-Kurgan along the Samarcand road, and this was the signal for an animated correspondence between the Russians and the various Chieftains who had collected together in Samarcand. Courier after courier arrived bearing a variety of promises and requests, but still there was no sign of the long expected treaty. After a march of some hours the Russian vanguard had already confronted the advanced forces of the Bokhariots, when an envoy made his appearance declaring that he was the bearer of the conditions of peace duly ratified by the Ameer. After scrutiny however these conditions were found to be wholly at variance with those which had been previously proposed by the Russians, and in fact consisted of an entirely new series devised by the Bokhariots. The envoy excused himself on the plea of having misunderstood what was required, and promised to bring the proper conditions after an interval of two days, begging that in the meantime hostilities might be suspended. The Governor-General yielded to this request on the condition that firing should cease on the part of the Bokhariots during the entire period of the negotia-

tions, and that the heights on the opposite side of the Zerafshan should be evacuated by the enemy. The communication of these conditions to Shere Ali, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bokharian forces, resulted only in renewed firing on the part of the enemy, which was chiefly directed against the spot pointed out by the envoy as the situation of our general staff. The challenge thus given was accepted without hesitation, and a summary defeat was inflicted on the Ameer's forces.

The inhabitants of Samarcand closed their gates, refusing admittance to the fugitive Bokhariots, and on the following day sent a deputation to the Russian camp begging that the town might be taken under the protection of the Emperor of Russia, and that they might not be abandoned to the wrath of the Bokhariots which they had aroused by their behaviour on the preceding day.

Since the dignity of the Russian Empire rendered it imperative that her partisans should be protected and not left to the vengeance of her enemies, and since our victory could not otherwise be considered complete, it was resolved that the town should be occupied. Accordingly, on the 2nd (14th) of May, the Russian troops

made a triumphal entry into the summer residence of the Ameers—the ancient capital of Tamerlane, and the chief town of Bokhara.

The necessary arrangements were at once made for the administration of the newly occupied tract, and after the arrival of some small reinforcements from Tashkent, the Governor-General on the 11th (23rd) May again addressed the Ameer proposing terms of peace. The former conditions were adhered to almost in their integrity, with the exception of some articles which could be omitted from them without prejudice to our interests, and with a modification in the first article regarding the Russian frontier, since it was impossible to agree to restore Samarcand to the Ameer without serious risk to the future of that town.

Acting on the Imperial command that the Russian frontiers should not be extended by new conquests, and being unwilling to leave the Ameer unpunished after his recent conduct, especially as the weakening of his power in Asia was one of the chief objects of Russian policy, the Governor-General immediately after the occupation of Samarcand opened communications with Syud Abdulla, the Ameer's nephew, who for some time past had not been

on good terms with his uncle and had taken flight to Shahr-i-Sabz. It was at first proposed to form the territory of Samarcand into an independent government, which should be under the authority of Syud Abdulla: but the negotiations, commenced with this object, showing clearly that Syud Abdulla had fallen under the influence of the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz, who had exhibited as much hostility towards us as the Ameer of Bokhara himself, the project was abandoned.

The peace however was not of long duration. The proposed treaty failed to elicit a reply from the Ameer, except the murder of the courier to whom it had been entrusted, while the results of the agitation (the centres of which were at Katta-Kurgan and Kara-tippe) began to be felt far and wide. The Russians were consequently forced again to have recourse to arms, the result being that the fall of Kara-tippe, Urgut and Katta-Kurgan had the anticipated effect of reassuring and pacifying the population of the Zerafshan valley.

Pursuing even after the occupation of Katta-Kurgan his former object with regard to the establishment of such a political combina-

tion as, without extending our frontiers, might extract from recent successes the greatest possible amount of advantage, and might prevent any further breach of the peace, the Governor-General laid before the Bokhariots two alternatives—either to pay in the course of eight years 1,150,000 “tils” (4,600,000 roubles) as a war indemnity, conditionally that on payment of this amount the Ameer should be restored to the possession of all the newly acquired territory from Katta-Kurgan to Yani-Kurgan inclusive, or that he should pay all the expenses of the war (about 120,000 roubles) and should cede to Russia all the territory which she had conquered since 1865. Neither of these proposals were accepted by the Bokhariots, and the Governor-General therefore resolved to incorporate the lands which had thus been gained by conquest into Russian territory—a measure which left him entirely unfettered by any conditions for the future, and even in the event of the Imperial order being received to that effect, free to permit the unconditional restoration of the newly occupied territory to the Bokhariots.

The gratuitous restoration of this territory, if it had been necessitated by the

command of the Emperor, might have been explained to the Bokhariots as a mark of the Czar's consideration and as an indication of his pardon, but a similar measure if adopted by the Governor-General of his own authority would have had the appearance of retrogression, and would have been construed by the Bokhariots as an indication of weakness and as an acknowledgment of inability to hold the newly occupied country. In addition to these considerations the city of Samarcand exercises a very powerful traditional and religious influence over the whole of Central Asia, and for this reason the prestige which the Ameer had up to that time enjoyed in Asia would by the loss of his ancient Capital have been entirely eclipsed by the glory of the Russian Empire. Under such circumstances it was impossible that the Governor-General should withdraw from an acquisition which carried with it such moral influence, and would if restored to the Ameer, afford him the possibility of regaining at some future time his former position.

Independently also of these indirect advantages, the possession of Samarcand is of the greatest importance to us in other more mate-

- rial respects, since Samarcand commands the water-supply of the whole of the rest of Bokhara, and the possession of that town consequently enables us to hold Bokhara in entire and perpetual dependence. Deprived of water
- Bokhara can at any moment be condemned to the ravages of famine, and the knowledge that this is the case, places the fanatical inhabitants of the Khanate entirely in our power.

The importance of the question regarding a fair regulation of the water-supply was clearly indicated by the circumstance that from the very commencement of the negotiations the Bokhariots laid great stress on the necessity for observing a regular and equitable distribution of the waters of the Zerafshan.

Again having the lands which lay along the lower course of that river in our possession we could dispense with physical bulwarks, and could at last consider our position sufficiently secure against every possible turn of Asiatic politics. In this way the object of many years' fighting was gained only by the occupation of Samarcand, and in the interests of permanent peace, it is imperative that we should continue to hold this important point.

In view of these considerations it was con-

sidered necessary to modify the conditions of peace which had been previously prescribed. The Bokharian Envoys who made their appearance at Katta-Kurgan asked for a ten days' armistice to procure the ratification of the treaty, during which interval they begged that our troops might not be moved from the position then occupied by them. A promise was made to this effect and religiously observed until the termination of the prescribed period on the 1st (13th) of June, notwithstanding the incessant attacks made by the Bokhariots on the Russian troops who were encamped under the walls of Katta-Kurgan. The Amcer however even at this time did not appreciate the moderation of our demands, and during the negotiations for peace was making secret preparations by every means in his power to inflict upon us an unexpected blow. On the 2nd (14th) June the Bokhariot troops and their allies made a simultaneous attack on the Russians in Katta-Kurgan and Samarcand. This was immediately followed by the battle of the 2nd (14th) June at Zerbulak, the siege of the citadel of Samarcand by the people of Shahr-i-Sabz and the insurgents, which lasted from the 2nd (14th) to the 8th (20th) of June, and the attack on

Yani-Kurgan, all of which resulted in the entire discomfiture of the enemy.

These disasters inflicted a fatal blow on the hopes of the Ameer, humbled his pride, and obliged him to accept all the conditions of peace which had been before proposed to him at Katta-Kurgan, and which were not changed in spite of the new successes that had attended our arms. On the 12th (24th) June another courier arrived bearing a letter from the Ameer, the tone of which indicated hopeless despair. Some extraordinary circumstances must indeed have happened, which could so humiliate his pride as to make him submit a request that we would accept his capitulation together with that of his remaining troops and guns, and that he might be allowed a personal interview with the Emperor to pray for permission to withdraw to Mecca. The Governor-General replied on the same day and hastened to allay the Ameer's agitation, assuring him that "I have never entertained the object or desire of annihilating the Khanate of Bokhara. I formerly said, and I now repeat, that the peace and quietness of the neighbours of the Russian Empire constitutes the one object of my labors and also of my wars." The Gover-

nor-General also counselled Syud Muzaffar to proclaim to the people that peace had been concluded, and regarding the tendered capitulation of his army, he reminded the Ameer that these troops would be useful in repressing his disobedient sons, and in bringing under his authority the seditious chieftains who had cast off dependence during the late years of his unsuccessful wars with Russia.

To have accepted the unconditional surrender of the Ameer would have produced an extraordinary sensation far beyond the limits of Asia, while by declining the capitulation we deprived ourselves of enormous advantages. Nothing hindered us from restoring the Khanate to the Ameer, Syud Muzaffar, as a voluntary gift, in which case he would have felt that the maintenance of his power was entirely dependent upon our good will, and we should have gained a most advantageous position.

However, we withdrew voluntarily before the magnitude and unexpectedness of the results achieved, although to have accepted the capitulation would not necessarily have implied the occupation of Bokhara, or still less the permanent establishment of the Russians therein.

Perhaps the policy then adopted may have

been dictated by the fear that to accept the capitulation of the Ameer would practically have left no one with whom to conclude an engagement of peace: but in opposition to this it might be urged that documentary engagements of themselves have no force with Asiatics, who recognize superior power alone, and that the only really important article of the treaty, namely that which provided for the payment of a war indemnity, could have been enforced by ourselves altogether independently of any Ameer.

The three supplementary Articles of the Treaty of peace of the 23rd June (5th July) provided—(1) for the incorporation in Russia of the districts of Samarcand and Katta-Kurgan; (2) for the demarcation of the Russo-Bokharian frontier; and (3) that the demarcation should be effected by a Commission to consist of delegates of either nation. In addition to the above, the Ameer, by certain secret articles, bound himself to pay in the course of the year an indemnity of 125,000 “tils” or 500,000 roubles in gold or silver, and to be responsible that the frontier Begs should restrain robbers from crossing the Russian frontier.

Upon the conclusion of the Treaty of peace,

the Ameer expressed a desire that his fourth and favourite son might be received into some educational establishment at St. Petersburg. The recommendation of the Governor-General that this request should be complied with received the approval of the Emperor, and information was sent to the Ameer accordingly; but his attention at that time was taken up by a nearer and more serious matter. His eldest son, the Katta-Tora,* having acquired considerable popularity owing to his hatred for the Russians, had raised the standard of revolt, and was already in some places proclaimed as Ameer, while proclamations distributed throughout the country, in which his father, the Ameer, was described as unworthy to be numbered amongst the faithful after having made peace with the infidels and was said to have been deposed, produced great agitation amongst the people.

The Bokharian troops were moved to Cheraktch in order to demand from the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz the surrender of the Katta-Tora who had taken refuge with them, while

(* This word is synonymous with the "Wullee Ahud" (Crown Prince) of Western Mahomedans. The present Katta-Tora's name is Abdool Malik Khan.—*Trs.*)

at the same time the Governor-General desiring to assist the Ameer and to bring home to him in an unmistakeable manner the advantages of peaceable relations with us, ordered General Abramof to make a diversion against Karatippe, Urgut, Jam, or even further, under the pretence of sending out a corps of observation or in any other shape, provided only that the movement was made in time to have its desired effect, adding:—"Thus we shall serve the Ameer without entering into warlike operations ourselves, which in any event it is incumbent upon us to avoid." General Abramof accordingly informed the Ameer that he would advance a detachment towards Jam with the object of preventing the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz from co-operating to any serious extent with the Katta-Tora.

Further complications, however, ensued. The rebellious Prince entered into communications with the Toorkomans, with Khiva, and with his Kirgiz partisans. On the 16th (28th) August, Saddyk, taking advantage of the absence of the Ameer, occupied the fort of Nurata, and thence moved against Kermineh, of which place the Katta-Tora appointed him the Beg. The Ameer, leaving 1,500 men in

Cheraktch, returned to Bokhara, and the Katta-Tora immediately occupied Cheraktch and afterwards also Karshi. The Russian demonstration, however, in the direction of Kitab compelled the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz to recall 4,000 troops from Karshi with their artillery, and any further action on the part of the Katta-Tora was thus arrested. The Ameer also took advantage of the temporary lull which ensued, and marching out of Bokhara defeated Saddyk at Kerminch and re-established his own authority there.

This was immediately followed by disturbances raised by another Kirgiz partisan named Nazar, who laid siege to Khatyrchi with an army of 10,000 men and captured the town. A part of his army also crossed the frontier into Russian territory, but was quickly dispersed by a detachment of Russians sent out for that purpose. Meanwhile the Toorkomans were making predatory incursions up to the very walls of Bokhara, and the Ameer on his return to the capital found himself in a state almost of siege.

All these disturbances, which were re-echoed amongst our frontier subjects, and were accompanied by a variety of rumours regarding

the projects of the Katta-Tora against Samarcand and Katta-Kurgan, exerted a pernicious influence upon Russian interests. The fall of the Ameer must almost inevitably have been followed by a war, which at that time would have been highly inconvenient, as the season had arrived for collecting the taxes, and it was also necessary that our troops should be provided with quarters for the winter. Moreover, the unpopular, impotent Syud Muzaffar was a much easier tool in our hands than would have been the Katta-Tora, who had displayed considerable energy and gained considerable popularity amongst the Bokhariots. Again according to the ideas of Asiatics the treaties of a ruler are not binding on his successors, and hence it was to our interest to support the old Ameer, whose death or deposition would have been the signal for the repudiation of all existing engagements.

These reasons appeared so forcible that when Syud Muzaffar at last applied to Abramof begging for assistance (a request which up to that time the Ameer had endeavoured by all the means in his power to avoid) the detachment at Jam was moved against Karshi, and on the 23rd October (4th November) after an insignificant

skirmish occupied the town, the Katta-Tora being obliged to seek safety in flight. The Ameer had previously received intimation of the proposed movement of our detachment against Karshi, and had been requested to send one of his own Chiefs accompanied by troops to take over possession of the town after its capture. Owing, however, to the slow progress of the Bokhariots, who were evidently inclined to distrust our sincerity, the Russian troops on the 27th October (8th November) marched out of Karshi on the road to Samarcand, and encamped at a distance of one march from the town, leaving the Aksakals* to make over formal charge of the town to the Ameer's officers. This plan produced the desired effect. The Bokhariots at once hastened on and entered Karshi the very day on which it had been evacuated by the Russian soldiers, who on receipt of news to that effect immediately moved on to Samarcand.

The following letter from the Ameer shows the suspicion and distrust with which the Bokhariots at that time viewed our actions. "We have ascertained," he wrote, "that the Russians have entered and occupied Karshi,

* Native officials. Literally grey-beards.—(*Trs.*)

but the nature of the reasons which have necessitated this proceeding we entirely fail to understand. The Russian Emperor is a powerful King and his dominions are very extensive. I have entered into terms of friendship with him and now both friends and enemies know of the occupation of the town."

The easy success over the Katta-Tora and the restoration of the town to the Ameer produced a very favorable impression towards us both amongst our own Mahomedan population and also in the neighbouring Khanates. Yahya Khodja, who had taken over possession of Karshi on behalf of the Ameer, in a letter to Abramof said: "By your withdrawal from Karshi, you have completed a great and noble action. Now the sincerity of your friendship is a matter of wonder to every one, and we pride ourselves upon it in the face of those who asserted the contrary." The satisfaction of the Ameer was so boundless that he begged us to undertake for him also the conquest of Yakobakh and Shahr-i-Sabz; the military expenses connected with which undertaking he promised to defray from his own funds. But the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz were so terrified by our demonstration in the direction of Kitab

that they sent a deputation tendering their submission, and on our demand bound themselves to restore Yakobakh to the Ameer. Meanwhile the Katta-Tora, refused shelter by the people of Shahr-i-Sabz, applied to General Abramof, begging him to mediate between him and his father. "I desire to go personally to my sovereign," wrote the now pacified Prince, "to ask his forgiveness and to fall at his feet."

His repentance appeared to be sincere, but when the Ameer agreed to pardon him and summoned him to his presence, Katta-Tora, fearing treachery, asked for protection from Russia. Permission was accordingly granted him to come to Samarcand, but turning off the road thither he moved against Khatyrchi, occupied that town, and put many of his opponents to death. After this he directed his steps towards Kermineh, but the Ameer having marched to Karshi and forestalled him there, the Katta-Tora fled to Nurata. Finally driven out thence he wandered to Khiva and Afghanistan, and was ultimately received by the Ruler of Kashgar.

All these disturbances were naturally prejudicial to the regular payment of taxes into the Ameer's treasury, and he was thus

disabled from punctually fulfilling the condition regarding the payment of the war indemnity, the last instalment being paid seven months behind the stipulated time, viz., in April 1870. Besides being due to his domestic troubles, the Ameer's default in this respect is ascribable to other causes, namely (a) the fear that the Ameer of Cabul should occupy the left bank of the Amu Darya; (b) the rumour that General Von Kauffman having gone to St. Petersburg, would not again return, and that a change of politics might ensue upon the arrival of a new Governor-General; and lastly (c) the reports of disturbances among the Orenburg Kirgiz. The passage of the Governor-General through the steppe removed the two last, and the Ameer hastened to pay in before his arrival the sum of 276,000 roubles on account of the "contribution" still due.

A merchant of Moscow, M. Khludof, offered to advance at once the whole balance of the indemnity which still remained unpaid by Bokhara, on condition that the Russian Government would guarantee the payment of the debt thus due from the Ameer. This offer, however, was declined, and in lieu thereof it was proposed by Government to M. Khludof

that he should accept the guarantee of the commercial body of Bokhara. These negotiations broke down, but the Ameer in various ways brought forcible pressure to bear on the merchants, and in April 1870, the balance of 30,000 "tils" was paid in, a quittance receipt being given for the full payment of the whole amount due. A portion of the Bokharian silver coins to the number of 320,000 pieces (value 64,000 roubles) was sent to the mint at St. Petersburg, the golden tilis being issued for circulation.

CHAPTER III.

RELATIONS WITH BOKHARA.—(*Continued.*)

Letters of the Ameer to the Governor-General and Emperor—His perverted statement of the causes of the war—Embassy of Tora Jan—Requests for the restoration of Samarcand and other towns—Despatches of Sir A. Buchanan—Disquieting rumours from the Khanates—Reconnoitring expedition into the Kizil Kum—Dispute between Bokhara and Kokan regarding Karategin—Intervention of the Governor-General—Highway robbery in Bokhara—Destruction of the marauding band of Baban by the Russians—Mission of Sub-Colonel Nossovitch—Dissatisfaction with Shahr-i-Sabz—Taking of Kitab and Shahr and their restoration to the Ameer—Famine in Bokhara—Discontent of the people against the Russians—Mission of M. Struve—Mission of Colonel Kolzakof—Surrender to the Ameer of a disgraced Beg who had taken refuge with the Russians—Question regarding the water of the Zerafshan—Engagement of the Ameer not to enter into future communications with the Turks except through the Governor-General—Deputation to Bokhara of M. Petrovski, an Agent of the Minister of Finance—Can we count upon uninterrupted peace with Bokhara?—Conduct of the Ameer during the Khivan expedition of 1873—Fresh deputation of M. Struve—New Treaty of 28th September 1873.

THE Ameer of Bokhara, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, resolved to educate his youngest son in Russia, and asked for permission to send him to the Imperial Court nominally as an indication of his peaceable and friendly intentions, and as a sign of regret for the errors into which he himself had fallen. In the letter, however, which was despatched to the Governor-General on the 23rd July (4th August), there

were indications of a further and very different object. "In view of the greatness and high name of the 'White Czar,'" wrote the Ameer, "it would be fitting that he should permit the few Musalman towns which have been deprived of their fatherland" (*i.e.*, conquered by the Russians) "to return to their former state. It is a matter of notoriety that so far as we were concerned, there was not from the first to the last any occasion given for war. We are well aware of the extent of your Empire; but nothing lasts for ever."

Again it is curious to notice the naive perversion of facts with respect to our former relations with him which was contained in the letter addressed by the Ameer to the Emperor. The Ameer wrote:—"The Sultan of Turkey informed us that the Russian Sovereign is a powerful Emperor with whom it is safer to live on terms of peace and friendship. Therefore we deputed Nujm-ooddeen Khodja Sudoor to Your Majesty with a letter, but he was not permitted, we know not why, to proceed beyond Orenburg. Similar treatment has been experienced by another of our envoys, Musa Beg. On one occasion alone we marched out with a detachment of troops

to Sasyk-kul, and then only with the object of re-establishing peace, but the Russian troops advanced, and we, bearing in mind the friendship of Your Majesty, turned back without engaging them in battle. Your Governors have entered into war with us, and have taken from us several forts. We are well aware that your power is terrible, your dominions extensive, your wealth unbounded, and that you are a great Emperor; whereas our kingdom in comparison with yours is altogether insignificant. Still we are content with our hereditary lands, although we are forced to live in narrow circumstances. We are Oosbeks, and if we have erred against your laws and customs, we pray you by your greatness to pardon us, and to restore to us the forts of which we have been deprived."

Perceiving from this that the mission had a further object in view, the Governor-General warned the Dadkhwah* (chief envoy) that all matters connected with frontiers, trade, &c.,

* Dadkhwah, rank corresponding to that of General. The envoy had the power of inflicting corporal punishment on the members of the mission. "If any one says an unbecoming word, or does an unbecoming action," wrote the Ameer, "let the Dadkhwah Bai punish him with stripes, but if any one shows disobedience to the Dadkhwah, him we will put to death, let the Dadkhwah only name the culprit."

must be settled on the spot without reference to St. Petersburg, by virtue of the full powers with which he had been entrusted by the Emperor. To the Ameer he gave the following explanation:—"The will and pleasure of the Emperor, which are directed towards the well-being of his subjects and the peace of his neighbours, are well known to me and serve as my invariable guide."

Arguments, however, were useless, and the Dadkhwah on the occasion of his State reception on the 22nd October (3rd November) laid before the Emperor the Ameer's request for the restoration of the towns conquered by the Russians. Regardless of the categorical reply given by the Emperor, the envoy failed to grasp the true position, and continued to urge the request again and again during his interviews with our higher officials. On every such occasion he was met by a decisive reply, it being impressed upon him that by virtue of the full authority vested in the Governor-General of Turkistan, the consideration and decision of matters with the neighbouring Khans appertained solely to that officer, and that the Central Government in St. Petersburg declined to take any immediate part in such negotiations. The

persistence, however, with which the request was urged showed how deeply the Bokhariots felt the loss of Samarcand, which they regarded as the queen of cities. Failing to obtain the much wished-for concession, the envoy made a final attempt to work upon the feelings of the Russian officials by declaring that the Ameer, influenced by the desire to earn the favor and good-will of the "White Czar," had prohibited all slave-traffic in Bokhara—a measure which, had it really been introduced, might have been valued as a result of our political influence, whereas subsequent information showed that the traffic in slaves still continued to flourish in the Khanate. Defeated at every point, the Dadkhwah as a last resource, on the occasion of a discussion with M. Stremoukhof, urged that hitherto the Ameer had never before deputed one of his sons or relatives, or even a high functionary to St. Petersburg, and that he had now done so with the sole object of eradicating the past, and procuring the restoration of the towns which had been taken from him. Met by the reply that the Ameer in the letter to the Emperor, and the Khooshbegi in his letter to the Chancellor, had deviated from the truth and had entirely

distorted the course of recent events, the Dadkhwah admitted that the letters contained errors in this respect, but added that the Ameer himself had of all things been unwilling to make war with the Russians, and had been forced into such a course by his seditious subjects. Lastly, he urged that such a few towns could not constitute an important acquisition for Russia, while on their restoration might depend almost the existence of the Khanate of Bokhara.

His request that the Ameer might be relieved of future payments on account of the war indemnity was declined on the ground that the measure was unavoidably necessary, firstly for defraying the military expenses caused by the recent hostilities with Bokhara, and secondly as a salutary warning to the seditious subjects of the Ameer who had forced him into the war, and upon whom the real burden of the payment would fall. For the rest the importunity of the Bokhariots may be explained by the reiterated reports that it was the Emperor's intention to restore Samarcand to them—reports which more than once were circulated in print.

The English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Alexander Buchanan, informed his Govern-

ment in his despatch dated 1st November 1869 that it was the desire of the Emperor to restore Samarcand, "but there* was some difficulty in ascertaining how this could be done without a loss of dignity and without giving up the guarantee for the welfare of the population which had accepted the sovereignty of Russia.

In another despatch dated 13th July 1870, Sir Alexander Buchanan communicated to Lord Granville that "the intention of the Emperor was to withdraw his troops from Samarcand as soon as the Ameer of Bokhara had fulfilled the engagement which he had contracted towards the Russian Government."

He further explained what would be required from the Ameer, *viz.*, "not to appoint any one to the Government of Samarcand without General Von Kauffman's approval of the appointment being previously obtained, and to engage to dismiss and punish the Governor so appointed, if his conduct towards the subjects of the Emperor should give occasion to just grounds of complaint."

* The author places these words in the mouth of Sir A. Buchanan. They represent however the statement made by Prince Gortchakof to Sir A. Buchanan on the 1st November 1869. See Hutton's "Central Asia from the Aryan to the Cossack," page 292.—*Trs.*

Observing that under such an arrangement the sovereignty of the province would really remain in the hands of Russia, Sir A. Buchanan added* "The Russians find it a simpler and more desirable arrangement in their own interests to fetter themselves with no conditions as regards retaining possession of this town, which, by its position on the upper waters of the Zerafshan, holds Bokhara as it were in the palm of its hand."

These extracts sufficiently show that reports were at this time current in St. Petersburg regarding the intention of the Russian authorities to restore Samarcand to the Ameer, and it is very possible that these rumours may have reached the ears of the Bokharian Envoy and encouraged his hopes.

On the return of the Mission to Tashkent on March 1st (13th), 1870, the Governor-General immediately despatched a letter to the Ameer by an express messenger with instructions to ascertain on his journey the state of popular feeling and to make enquiries regarding the hostile preparations, reports of which were everywhere current. Moreover information

* These words do not occur in the despatch quoted. They appear to be quoted from Mr. Hutton's "Central Asia from the Aryan to the Cossack," page 293, q. v.—*Trs.*

received from spies tended to show that perpetual communications were passing between the Ameer of Bokhara and the neighbouring Khans, and there were indications that a general confederacy was on foot. The messenger, however, returned with reassuring news, and Tora Jan on the 8th (20th) April was allowed to proceed on his return journey to Bokhara. The members of the Mission were deeply dispirited, and the Dadkhwah felt a presentiment of coming misfortune, inasmuch as not one of the requests of the Ameer had been fulfilled. As a last hope Tora Jan attempted to soften the heart of the Governor-General by a written petition, which he submitted on the occasion of the State audience held on the 2nd (14th) March. "I have come to Tashkent," wrote the Prince, "with a firm conviction that Your Excellency would effect this matter" (*i.e.*, the restoration of Samarcand) "as a personal favor to myself, so that I may not return dishonored to my native land." This hope, however, proved to be vain, and it may be added that after the return of the Mission to Bokhara the Dadkhwah fell into disfavor, while Tora Jan ceased to be the Ameer's favorite amongst his sons.

The disquieting rumours regarding the projects of Khiva and the active part taken by her in the commotions and disturbances of the Orenburg Kirgiz, which had been current during the autumn of 1869, induced the Russian authorities to despatch a body of troops from Fort Perovsk to the Kuvan-Darya with instructions to intercept the freebooter Saddyk on his way to the Yani-Darya. A second corps of observation, consisting of two sotnias of Cossacks, marched out of Jizzakh on the 24th October (5th November), and having accomplished in fifteen days a distance of 380 versts to the Bukan mountains close to the frontier of Khiva, without encountering any obstacles, established boundary marks on the new Russian frontier, which was demarcated by the author of this work with the concurrence of a Bokharian officer, who had joined our detachment and was vested with full powers for that purpose.

Simultaneously with these movements of the Russian detachments in the direction of the Kizil Kum, the Ameer re-established his authority in Hissar, Kulab, Dainau, and other towns which had cast off allegiance to Bokhara. The Beg of Kulab, Sara Khan, the most formidable of the Ameer's opponents;

was defeated and put to flight, while the town itself was forced to capitulate, and fell a victim to all the severity of an inexorable and vindictive sovereign.

After the capture of Kulab the Ameer marched against Karategin which was subject to Kokan, accusing the Beg of that place, Shere Ali Bai, of having assisted Sara Khan. Shere Ali was forced to flee to the territories of Kokan, and the Ameer of Bokhara set up in his place one of his own chieftains and annexed Karategin to the Khanate of Bokhara. Khudayar Khan preferred a complaint to General Abramof against these proceedings on the part of the Ameer, who in order to justify his action, produced a letter of Shere Ali's which appeared strongly to compromise the latter. Khudayar Khan however declared that the letter was a forgery, and attributed the whole affair to the crafty intrigues of the Ameer. In proof of the forgery of the handwriting he produced a genuine letter of Shere Ali's, and on comparison it was clear that the formation of the seal on the letter produced by the Ameer was entirely different from that on the genuine document, while the want of regularity in the writing afforded a presumption that the docu-

ment alleged by the Ameer to be genuine was an indifferent copy, hastily executed, of Shere Ali's handwriting.

Thereupon the Governor-General, wishing to bring about an amicable settlement of the dispute and inclining for many reasons to the side of Khudayar Khan, wrote to the Ameer advising him to adopt the following rule as a guide in his future relations with Russia:—
“Friendship towards the friends of Russia and enmity towards her enemies.” Then he proceeded to explain how the Khan of Kokan had for three years been living in peace with the Russians and in strict observance of the Treaty stipulations concluded with him, and that he ought therefore in an equal degree with the Ameer himself to benefit by the protection of the Russian Emperor. It was accordingly proposed to the Ameer that he should restore Karategin to its lawful ruler; and meanwhile Khudayar Khan was counselled to defer for the time the expedition which he was about to undertake for the forcible recovery of that place.

Shere Ali, however, without waiting for the Ameer's reply, crossed the hills *en route* to Karategin, was defeated by the united forces of



the Begs of Kulab and Hissar and taken into captivity.

The Governor-General advised Khudayar Khan to despatch to the territory in dispute its former and lawful Governor, Muzaffar Shah, giving him a guarantee that this measure would be a sufficient satisfaction to the Ameer, who was at the same time requested to release the Kokanian Chief from captivity—a request which was followed by immediate compliance. Thus it happened that owing to our intervention an amicable settlement was effected of the Karategin affair which at one time threatened to produce a serious dispute between Kokan and Bokhara, the natural result being that the influence of Russia was very much increased.

The general condition of affairs however was by no means satisfactory. The internal disorders in the Khanate during the previous year, combined with frequent incursions of predatory bands, acted most injuriously on the well-being of the Ameer's subjects. An entire absence of control became evident and resulted in the appearance of numerous parties of robbers who in some cases made irruptions into Russian territory. The most notorious of these bands was that under the leadership of

Baban which carried on a system of highway robbery along the road between Jam and Katta Kurgan. The Beg of Ziaddeen (whose Chiefship borders on Russian territory) frankly admitted his impotence to put a stop to these predatory incursions, and the Governor-General accordingly issued orders that every practicable measure should be taken to annihilate the robbers, even if they should be overtaken beyond our frontier. In the middle of December 1869, on the receipt of information that Baban's band to the number of 300 men had shown itself at no great distance, a sotnia and a half of Cossacks were moved out from Katta Kurgan, who overtook the outlaws at a distance of eighteen versts on the further side of our frontier, cut up a part of them and put the remainder to flight. Twenty-five captives were despatched to the Beg of Ziaddeen, who immediately issued orders that they should be put to death.

Even previously to the return of Tora Jan from St. Petersburg, a report was prevalent in Tashkent to the effect that the Ameer, dissatisfied with the results of his embassy to the Imperial Court, had notified to his subjects that a fresh war with the Russians was

unavoidable, and that he had with that object entered into negotiations with Khiva and Afghanistan. The delay in the payment of the war indemnity tended to confirm this rumour, which, however, was shown to have no foundation in fact as the Russian messenger, who was despatched to inform the Ameer of the arrival of Tora Jan, brought information that the Bokhariots, so far from meditating any aggressive action, were in perpetual dread of a Russian movement against them. In order to convince the Bokhariots of the folly of such unfounded apprehensions, and to assure them of our peaceable intentions, the Governor-General, under the pretext of sending a reply to the often repeated embassies from the Ameer, and especially of acknowledging the friendly feeling which he had shown by sending his favorite son to the Imperial Court, resolved to despatch a Mission to Bokhara under the command of Colonel Nossovitch with a suite of eight members and a convoy of fifty Cossacks.

This embassy was received with the utmost honor, and fulfilled its object with entire success. The attitude of the people moreover appeared friendly—a result which was in some measure due to the arrangements made by Abramof for supplying Bokhara with water simultaneously

with the arrival of the Mission. The Khoosh-begi,* in the course of his conversations with our envoy, expressed, among other things, the desire of the Ameer to procure 4,000 guns and some gun casters, on the ground that in the event of war with Afghanistan the scanty supply of arms then in his possession would be wholly insufficient. This request afforded an opportunity for explaining clearly to the Ameer the line of policy which he ought to follow with respect to Afghanistan.

The only practical result of the Mission was the receipt of reassuring news with regard to the political tendencies of the Ameer and the state of national feeling in Bokhara. The Ameer admitted freely that the continuance of his authority within the Khanate of Bokhara depended on the support which he had received from the Russian bayonets, and gave us to understand that in order to preserve the throne of his forefathers he was prepared to accept the supremacy of Russia. At the same time he repudiated any sympathy or connection with the projects of the Afghans and the people of Shahr-i-Sabz, and expressed a resolution not

* The title of the Foreign Minister. He is also a sort of steward and supervisor of the Ameer's household arrangements.

to permit Shere Ali Khan to establish himself on the right bank of the Amu Darya.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the Russian Mission in Bokhara an embassy from the Ameer of Cabul appeared there.

Envoys from Turkey and Khiva had also shortly before arrived at Bokhara, but we are not informed as to the nature of the negotiations which passed between them and the Ameer. Report alleges that the subject-matter discussed was the formation of a confederacy against Russia, and that the Ameer gave his consent to the scheme only on the condition that the confederates should really and truly recognize his supremacy. That the Ameer did as a matter of fact insist on a condition of this kind is credible from the following words which he addressed to the Afghan and Khivan envoys:—"I have more than once paid dearly for taking the initiative in hostilities. You tell me that I am your elder, and you invite me to stand at your head. Let then your Khans first come to me and submit to me, and thus prove that they recognize my supremacy."

Such a demand was more akin to refusal than compliance, especially as it was almost immediately followed by the arrival of the

Russian envoy, whose splendid reception showed the promoters of the confederacy the impossibility of realizing their hopes. In fact it is said that from the day of the arrival of the Russian Mission, the Turkish and Afghan envoys ceased even to show their faces in the streets of the city.

The petty and semi-independent Chiefships of Kshtut, Magian, Machin, Farab, and others, which occupied all the region between the circle of Zerafshan, the dominions of Kokan and the district of Khodjent, along the upper course of the Zerafshan river, formed a sort of wedge in the Khanate of Bokhara, and served as a refuge for all persons desirous of concealing themselves from the Russian authorities. As a matter of fact these small Chiefships were never subordinate to any one of the neighbouring Khans, and the Governor-General determined to regulate his conduct towards them by the same political principles which had previously guided the Ameer, namely, to leave them entirely to themselves—not interfering in any way in internal matters, but insisting that they should respect the inviolability of our frontier. This line of action was adhered to until after the attack made by these Begs

on the detachment of General Abramof, when returning from the reconnoitring expedition which had been equipped for the exploration of the head waters of the Zerafshan and the lake of Iskander-Kul.

Afterwards, however, when marauding bands organized by the Begs of Magian and Kshtut for the purpose of compelling us to surrender possession of two debateable villages (*Kishlaks*) began to show themselves in the Zerafshan district, we resolved to inflict a well-merited chastisement on our unruly neighbours. In acting as they did, these Chiefs clearly did not stand alone, for throughout their attacks the reports current amongst the people indicated another and more powerful hand in the background. For some time past also a change for the worse had been noticed in the relations of the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz to the Russian authorities. At first, terrified by the exploring expeditions of former years, these Begs had preserved a peaceable attitude and had willingly complied with all our demands, but from the time of the arrival of the Afghan embassy an entire change was observed both in their tone and in their conduct.

Towards the end of June 1870 an attack

was made on the Cossacks despatched from Samarcand to the Russian tax collector, which, according to information gained by the Russian official, was perpetrated by the well known robber Chief, Aidar Khodja, who had received especial benefits from the protection of the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz, and in whose employment he had formerly served as a messenger. To our demand for the surrender of the robber, the Chiefs replied that neither according to their own religious law (shariyat) nor according to their ideas of what was right, could they give up an innocent man—inasmuch as Aidar Khodja not only did not take any part in the attack, but was at the time of its occurrence in an entirely different part of the country. The demand was repeated, but receiving no answer we determined to take more decided measures against these Chiefs whose conduct had shown that it was useless to trust to promises extorted from them only by fear. On the 7th (19th) August two columns of Russian troops under the command of General Abramof were despatched by different routes—one towards Jam and the other towards Kara-tippe, while the Ameer on the eve of their departure was requested to send one of his officials to take

over from us on his behalf Shahr-i-Sabz, the capture of which had been resolved upon. The town* having been taken by storm on the 14th (26th) August, was immediately made over to the Ameer's officers; and the Russian troops by the 25th August (6th September) had returned to Samarcand after having demolished the fortifications of Farab and Magian and declared those Chiefships to be incorporated in the Russian dominions.

The Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz fled to Kokan, but were captured there by order of Khudāyār Khan and handed over to us, while the other smaller Chiefs presented themselves with a declaration of submission, and begged that they might be received as subjects of the "White Czar." Aidar Khodja, who had been the immediate cause of these disputes, and had fallen into our hands, was made over for trial in Samarcand; and to the honor of our Courts be it added that he was acquitted. Thus the storm burst over Shahr-i-Sabz, owing immediately to the non-receipt of a reply to one of our communications, but in any case the result must have been the same, and ultimately the

* More truly a group of towns, for the outer wall includes the two distinct towns of Kitab and Shahr, and also two fortified villages.

adoption of more decided measures would necessarily have been forced upon us.

The occupation of Karshi and Shahr-i-Sabz, and the immediate restoration of these towns to the legitimate authority of the Ameer produced a strong and favorable impression on our neighbours; for they saw in these acts, firstly, a confirmation of our invariable assurances that we had no wish to extend our frontier, and secondly, an illustration of the benefits that flow from our friendship and the inadvisability of exciting our animosity.

External matters having been thus settled, our policy was directed towards upholding the Ameer's authority in the interior of the Khanate and weakening the elements hostile thereto.

The unfavorable harvest of 1870, which threatened the well-being of the whole of Turkistan, produced a terrible famine in Bokhara, and anxiety for our own subjects compelled us to prohibit the export of corn from Turkistan—a prohibition which was not withdrawn even after earnest entreaties on the part of the Ameer, to whom personally the Governor-General had sent a hundred *arofs* of corn as a present. In the spring of 1871 crowds of famine-stricken

paupers began to wander throughout the Khanate, and some disturbances were the natural result. A report was prevalent amongst the people that the famine in Bokhara had been caused by the Russians, who were represented as having allowed only an insignificant amount of the waters of the Zerafshan to enter the Khanate, and when they experienced insufficiency of corn, to have prohibited its export from Russian territory. Such rumours naturally strengthened the hostile attitude of the people and increased the difficulties of the Ameer's position. At last it began to be whispered that the Ameer was engaged in preparations for a possible crisis, and that he had entered into communications with Afghanistan, Kokan, and other countries.

The part which the Ameer had at this time to play was a most difficult one. In spite of the heavy punishment with which he had been visited by the Russians, and of his relations with the latter subsequent thereto, which afforded reasonable ground for expecting that he would in future be an obedient and submissive vassal, it was clear that the force of circumstances was becoming too strong for him. Before the famine-stricken and agitated popu-

lace, the rash impetuosity of the Begs, and the restless fanaticism of the Moollahs he was absolutely powerless.

All this supports strongly the long established opinion that on the occurrence of any misunderstanding with the Ameer the people would stand aloof from him and make common cause with us. The popular feeling towards the Ameer was one of deep hatred, the conspiracies against him were ceaseless, and couriers appeared secretly in Tashkent with letters not only from the different Begs and courtiers, but also from those who professed to be his staunch supporters. Prayers for assistance in bringing about a change, invitations to occupy Bokhara, and if not to unite the Khanate permanently with Russia, at all events to rid the people of their hated Ruler, were thus made to the Russian authorities.

Reports, however, were prevalent that these internal complications did not prevent the Ameer from making suspicious preparations. Hence arose a diplomatic correspondence which evoked from him an explicit declaration that he intended to adhere firmly to the established relations of confidence and friendship, and that he possessed entire trust in the

sincere desire of the Governor-General for peace and quietness.

A visit which the Governor-General made to Samarcand, however, showed conclusively that the Ameer was far from believing in the peaceable tendency of our politics. The objects of the Russian reconnoitring expeditions, which were generally equipped in the spring of each year, were misinterpreted. Counter preparations were made by the Ameer, while there were unmistakeable signs of agitation amongst the people, who were encouraged by the party at Bokhara hostile to Russian interests to regard these peaceful preparations as the precursors of immediate invasion.

In order to gain more reliable information of the real position of affairs in Bokhara, and of the personal feelings of the Ameer; and at the same time to let all parties in the Khanate know unmistakeably that it was the firm intention of the Russians to uphold the authority of the Ameer, and to stand towards their neighbours on terms of mutual confidence and peace, the Governor-General deputed M. Struve to Bokhara, instructing him at the same time to ascertain the probable attitude of the Ameer in the event of a Russian move-

ment on Khiva. The result of this visit of M. Struve was to place beyond all doubt the fact that the Ameer fully understood and appreciated the unwavering and peaceable line of policy which we had uniformly adopted towards him since the campaign of 1868. Of all the parties who had any voice in the Government of Bokhara, the advocates of peace were found to be the most influential, though the Ameer was not in a position altogether to cast aside the party in favor of war, which had so long had the upper hand in the counsels of his forefathers. With regard to the contemplated movement against Khiva, the Ameer declared his readiness to afford every possible assistance, and conceded to the Russian troops the right of marching through his dominions promising to supply them with all necessaries *en route*.

M. Struve after having received several rich presents, including, it is said, an offer of 30,000 pieces of silver money, which was of course refused, left Bokhara and returned to Russian territory, bringing with him a report that after careful enquiry he felt convinced that the traffic in slaves had been partially checked in deference to the wishes of the Governor-

General. The sequel will show how far this information was true.

Having thus ascertained the peaceable intentions of the Ameer, justice required that we should prove to him in some way or other our confidence in his friendship—an opportunity for doing which soon presented itself. In the beginning of June 1871 there appeared in Samarcand a Beg of Shahr-i-Sabz by name Tokhtamysh Bai who had fallen into disgrace and fled from the wrath of his sovereign.

From the first moment of his appointment this Chief had distinguished himself by unchangeable devotion to the Russians, and on the occasion of the Governor-General's visit to Samarcand had appeared there with a complimentary address and personally taken part in the festivities and *fêtes* with which that event was celebrated. It was said that this display of devotion to the Russians raised against him the displeasure of the Ameer, who, when he visited Shahr-i-Sabz, was represented as having displaced Tokhtamysh and confiscated all his property. Although we had invariably insisted on our right to demand the surrender of Russian deserters—demands which the Ameer never once complied with—no

extradition Treaty existed with Bokhara, and therefore so far as Treaty stipulations were concerned, we were free to act as we chose towards this refugee. In order, however, to prove to the Ameer the sincerity of our intention always to uphold his authority in the eyes of his subjects, the Governor-General resolved to give up Tokhtamysh, reminding the Ameer that the highest prerogative of sovereignty is to show mercy and pardon.

Tokhtamysh was accordingly made over to Colonel Kolzakof who conveyed him to Bokhara, and who was instructed also to communicate to the Ameer an expression of the condolence of the Governor-General at the death of his son Tora* Jan (Syud Abdoollah Futteh Khan). It is satisfactory to add that the Ameer accepted the mediation of the Governor-General and Tokhtamysh was pardoned.

As matters within the Khanate at this period began to assume a more peaceable and settled aspect, the question of the proportion and mode of utilizing the waters of the Zerafshan frequently became the subject of discussion. In order to clear up this important question, a

* The same to whom the Emperor granted an audience in 1870.

Committee was convened at Samarcand in the autumn of 1871, amongst the members of which some representatives of the Bokharian Government were included. Hitherto the water supply in the neighbourhood of Samarcand had been maintained by a special yearly tax levied from those agriculturists who benefited by the water. These tax payers were almost exclusively subjects of Bokhara, for whom undoubtedly it was of the greatest importance that the water in the river should be kept up to a certain level; but to ensure this, frequent repairs were necessary, which were usually carried out under the supervision of the Beg of Ziaddeen, our nearest neighbour. The repairs thus executed were only of a temporary nature and owing to the floods had to be annually renewed—an arrangement which entailed, firstly, a useless waste of materials, money, and labour; and, secondly, the loss of a great volume of water in the interval of time which elapsed before the yearly repairs could be completed. For these reasons it was considered advisable to establish permanent works and to make a grant for that purpose from Government funds, the yearly payments which had previously been made on the annual repairs being devoted to the liquidation of the debt thus incurred.

The erection of permanent works obviated the evils above noticed, and at the same time the payment of a regular tax was made obligatory on people of other nations who might derive benefit from the Russian works. The results were in every way satisfactory. Our importance was increased in the eyes of the natives, while fuller control over the waters of the Zerafshan and, consequently, also over the crops of Bokhara, was thereby afforded us. The absolute power which we possess over the husbandry and well-being of the Bokharian provinces will strengthen our influence to an immense extent, and constitutes a political lever, the power of which may be illustrated by the readiness, for example, with which the Ameer renounced the right of holding communications with the Sultan of Turkey without the previous knowledge of the Governor-General.

The question of the communications between Bokhara and the Porte originated in consequence of the proceedings of one Abul Hai, who gave himself out in Constantinople to be an envoy from Bokhara and misrepresented the policy of the Ameer. The result of the correspondence which ensued on this

subject was that the Ameer not only renounced his right to enter into direct communications with the Sultan, but also promised to address such a letter to the Porte as would in future effectually deprive of all credit personages of the stamp of Abul Hai.

In spite, however, of the existence of such friendly relations with the Ameer, the spring of 1872 brought with it all the usual disquieting apprehensions amongst the inhabitants of the Khanate, the usual reports of an impending war and the usual hopes of aid from the Afghans combined with the co-operation of the English. The Governor-General considering it necessary to allay the disquietude of the Ameer proposed to him with this object that he should send an envoy to Tashkent who might be persuaded by ocular proof of the entire absence of any hostile preparations whatever on the part of the Russians.

This proposal was accepted and produced the anticipated results. The Bokharian envoy was accompanied on his return journey by an agent of the Russian Financial Minister, named M. Petrovski, a gentleman well acquainted with the course of trade in Central Asia and of the method of fulfilling the task with which he

was entrusted, *viz.*, to determine how far our goods held the command in the Bokharian markets, and to what extent it might be advisable to impose restrictions on English goods.

The observations of this agent placed it beyond a doubt that our commercial influence over the Bokharian markets was simply *nil*, and that the markets there were in other hands. With regard to the highest aim of Russian politics, *viz.*, the annihilation of the slave traffic, our endeavours had proved wholly useless. In Tashkent news had already reached the merchants that this traffic still flourished, and that the Russian officials, who either did not understand how, or were unwilling, to ascertain the truth, were prohibited from entering the slave bazaar where the trade was carried on. Still these reports were disbelieved, until at last M. Petrovski managed to see with his own eyes the revolting traffic. His report however was not followed by any result, probably owing to the difficulty of reconciling it with the assurances of M. Struve to the contrary.

As regards markets, Bokhara occupies the foremost place of all the Central Asian Khanates, but as has already been stated the goods

there are almost exclusively English. To remedy this state of affairs one of three alternatives must, in my opinion, be adopted, namely, either to organize a Russian Company for direct trade with Bokhara, or to unite the Central Asian Khanates with our manufacturing districts by means of a railroad, and thus to facilitate the transport of goods; or, lastly, directly to occupy the markets, and to take such measures as will exclude foreign goods. It remains for experience to show to which of these three measures circumstances will lead us to give the preference.

However decided may be our determination to abide by and not overstep our present frontier, circumstances may at any moment place us in a most embarrassing position. I refer to that very simple and ever threatening circumstance—the death of the present Ameer. The successors of Asiatic rulers never consider themselves bound to fulfil to the letter the Treaty stipulations concluded by their predecessors, who even during their own lifetime only regard Treaties as obligatory during such time as it suits their interests to do so, or as long as they feel that any breach will involve immediate punishment. Thus it is very possible that the

death of the present Ameer may nullify our previous efforts, and that we may be obliged to adopt the same means for "educating" his successor as we have had to use towards himself. It should, however, be explained that the method of "education" to which an Asiatic despot is most susceptible is not the exercise of diplomacy but the proximity of bayonets, and that for the present influence of the Russian name and the orderly conduct of the neighbouring Khans, we are indebted not to the results of diplomatical correspondence* but to the presence of Russian troops. The submissive manner in which the Ameer unconditionally consented to allow our troops to march through his territories at the time of the Khivan Expedition of 1873, and the readiness with which he hastened to supply with food the detachment which had run short of provisions, were not signs of any favorable feelings towards us, but were simply the results of salutary awe.

On this occasion the request for supplies did not take the form of a demand, but was worded in such a way as to convey the idea that, as the

* In the original "to some half-witted Berdykul."—(*Trs.*) He was a well known "jiggit" in Tashkent, frequently sent by the Russians as a courier into the Khanate of Bokhara.

detachment would halt for a few days at Khalata, it would be very acceptable if the troops could be provided with a few meals of fresh grain. The Ameer was therefore informed that it would be esteemed a great favor if he would invite his merchants to convey to that point some 5,000 "puds" of flour. This amount, however, shows clearly that the intention was not merely to procure a passing meal for the troops, but to leave them a margin on which to support themselves. The Ameer of course knew perfectly well the difficulties which the Russian detachment had to meet, and hastened without delay to despatch as a gift to the Governor-General 400 "batmans" (3,200 puds) of flour, 50 "batmans" of barley, and 30 "batmans" of rice, which were preceded by a letter to the effect that he would consider any payment for these supplies as a personal affront.

"On Easter Day eggs are dear" says a Russian proverb, and it was an Easter Day in more senses than one to that Turkistan detachment, for had not the grain arrived from Bokhara, the troops might have been forced to retrace their steps. We need hardly add that the good offices of the Ameer were warmly appreciated, and the Governor-

General writing on the 23rd April (5th May) acknowledged them in the following terms:—
“The friendly and liberal hospitality shown by you to the troops of the Great ‘White Czar’ on their march through your dominions, obliges me once more to express to you my heartfelt acknowledgments for your neighbourly feelings towards us.” Further the Ameer was informed that in view of the impending difficulties which our troops would meet in crossing the waterless and sandy steppes to Uch-Uchak, it would be necessary to make use of a small number of camels for the transport of water, and that a part of the Russian baggage would consequently be left at Khalata, under a small guard, which would be directed to protect Bokharian territory from the inroads of marauding Khivans. Afterwards as a special mark of our regard news was communicated to the Ameer that the Russian troops were healthy, that all of them “from the oldest veteran to the youngest recruit are longing to meet the enemy,” and that “all this is communicated to Your Greatness* as being our trustworthy friend and ally.”

* The mode of address used by the Russians to the Khans of Central Asia is a title not recognized in Russia. The word in the original is “Vysoko-stepenstvo,” exactly corresponding to the English “of high degree.”—*Trs.*

In addition to this written acknowledgment of his behaviour the Ameer received a more solid recompense in the shape of all the sandy waterless desert on the right bank of the Amu Darya up to the borders of the populated region occupied by the Russians. Thus along the entire right bank of the Amu Darya there does not now exist a span of Khivan territory.

M. Eugene Schuyler, the Secretary of the United States Legation at the Court of St. Petersburg, visited Bokhara at the time of the Khivan expedition, and therefore had opportunities for becoming sufficiently well acquainted with the disposition of the inhabitants. The following account is taken from a report addressed by him to the United States Government on the 7th March 1874:—

“When the Khivan expedition started, there was general fear in Bokhara that it was directed also against that city, and merchants even sent away their property and came to Samarcand to be out of harm’s way. At one time the terror was so great that the population proposed to seize upon the Ameer and deliver him up to the Russians. The Ameer, however, professed friendliness to the Russians, met them at the frontier with messengers and

presents, and sent an envoy with the expedition. He furnished a certain amount of provisions and camels, though, with the exception of a small present, these were sold at high prices and not given away. He further held himself ready to take advantage of any circumstance favorable to him, and while he was sending kind words and worn out camels to the Russians, he was giving his blessing and opening his purse to the Turkoman Chiefs who left Bokhara for Khiva. The Russian authorities considered it best, however, to wink at his conduct, and to reward his friendliness and the equanimity with which he regarded the re-establishment of a Russian fortress—St. George—at Khalata within the Bokharian territory, by bestowing upon him a narrow strip of country on the right bank of the Oxus, which was in dispute between him and Khiva.”

And thus the unimpeded progress of our troops was due not to diplomacy but to the awe in which the Russians were held. In spite, however, of the fact that the Ameer had not played the part of a friend of his own free-will, but owing to the pressure put upon him by his subjects, an embassy was despatched

at the close of the campaign to Bokhara under the command of M. Struve to convey to the Ameer an expression of our gratitude for his friendly co-operation. The mission, after having met with a peculiarly cordial reception, proceeded from Bokhara to Karshi, where the Ameer then was, and every possible attention was paid to them. As a rule their comfort was complete, and the arrangements must have involved a considerable expenditure on the part of the Bokhariots.

M. Struve considered it advisable to conclude a fresh Treaty with the Ameer, the greater part of which was word for word a repetition of the articles of the Treaty of 1868. As to the precise reasons which rendered this new Treaty necessary we are not informed, but the object may possibly have been to remind the Ameer again of the necessity of fulfilling its stipulations which had hitherto existed only on paper.

The text of the Treaty was as follows:—

Clause I.—The frontiers between the possessions of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Greatness the Ameer of Bokhara remain unchanged.

The Khivan territory on the right bank of

the Amu having been embodied with the Russian Empire, the former frontier between Khiva and Bokhara from the oasis of Khalata to Gugertli, is altered in this wise: The possessions of the Amcer of Bokhara are augmented by the addition to them of the lands between the former Khivo-Bokhara Frontier on the right bank of the Amu from Gugertli to Meshekli, and from Meshekli to the point where the former Khivo-Bokhara frontier met the frontier of the Russian Empire.

Clause II.—In consequence of the right bank of the Amu being severed from Khiva, the caravan roads going from Bokhara north to the Russian possessions traverse Bokharian and Russian territory exclusively. The Russian and Bokharian Governments, each in its own territory, will watch over the safety of these caravan roads and the commerce along them.

Clause III.—Russian steamers and other vessels, whether belonging to the Government or to private persons, will have the right to navigate without let or hindrance the Bokharian portion of the Amu equally with Bokharian ships.

Clause IV.—Any locality on the Bokharian

banks of the Amu which the Russians may select for the construction of piers or store-houses may be used by them for this purpose, the Bokharian Government being responsible for the safety of the erections thus established. The final and definitive selection of these localities depends upon the Supreme Russian authorities in Central Asia.

Clause V.—All the towns and villages of the Khanate of Bokhara will be open to Russian commerce. Russian merchants, and caravans will be allowed to travel freely in the whole Khanate, and will enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The safety of the Russian caravans on Bokharian territory is expressly guaranteed by the Bokhara Government.

Clause VI.—On all merchandize belonging to Russian traders, whether imported from Russia to Bokhara, or from Bokhara to Russia, an *ad valorem* tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. will be levied in Bokhara. In the Russian Province of Turkistan, the goods mentioned in the preceding sentence are to pay a tax amounting to one-fortieth of their value. No other tax, duty, or impost whatsoever will be levied upon merchandise of the description mentioned.

Clause VII.—Russian merchants will be entitled to send their goods through Bokhara free of transit dues.

Clause VIII.—Russian merchants will be entitled to have caravanseraies for the storing of merchandize in all Bokharian towns. The same right is accorded to Bokharian merchants in the towns of the Province of Turkistan.

Clause IX.—The better to direct the course of commerce, insure the levying of the above tax, and regulate their relations with the local authorities in mercantile matters, Russian merchants are accorded the right of keeping commercial agents in all towns of the Khanate. The same right is accorded to Bokharian merchants in the towns of the Province of Turkistan.

Clause X.—Commercial engagements between Russians and Bokhariots must be considered as sacred, and be unconditionally carried out by both parties. The Bokhara Government promises to look after the honest fulfilment of commercial engagements, and the fair and conscientious conduct of commercial affairs generally.

Clause XI.—Russian subjects will enjoy an equality of right with Bokharian subjects

in carrying on in Bokharian territory all branches of industry and handicraft allowed by the law of Shariyat. A corresponding right is accorded to Bokharian subjects in Russian territory with regard to the exercise of all trades and handicrafts permitted by the Russian law.

Clause XII.—Russian subjects are permitted to possess houses, gardens, arable lands, and every species of real property in the Khanate, such property to be subject to the land tax assessed on Bokharian property. A corresponding privilege is accorded to Bokharian subjects in the whole territory of the Russian Empire.

Clause XIII.—Russian subjects are admitted to the Bokharian territory when provided with permits signed by the Russian authorities. They may travel freely in the whole Khanate, and are placed under the special protection of the Bokharian authorities.

Clause XIV.—In no case will the Bokharian Government receive on Bokhara territory persons arriving from the Russian territory, whatever nationality they may belong to, unless provided with a special permit duly and satisfactorily signed by the Russian authorities. If criminals who are Russian subjects should take refuge on Bokharian territory, they will

be arrested by the Bokharian authorities and delivered to the nearest Russian authorities.

Clause XV.—With a view to the maintenance of direct and permanent relations with the Supreme Russian authorities in Central Asia, the Ameer of Bokhara will appoint one of his intimate Counsellors to be his Resident Envoy and Plenipotentiary at Tashkent. This Plenipotentiary will live at Tashkent in the house and at the expense of the Ameer.

Clause XVI.—If it chooses to do so, the Russian Government may keep a permanent representative at Bokhara attached to the person of His Greatness the Ameer. As the Ameer's representative at Tashkent, so the Russian Plenipotentiary at Bokhara, will live in the house and at the expense of the Russian Government.

Clause XVII.—To please the Emperor of all the Russias and enhance the future glory of His Imperial Majesty, His Greatness the Ameer Syud Muzaffar of Bokhara has determined as follows:—The traffic in human beings, being contrary to the law which commands man to love his neighbour, is abolished for ever in the territory of the Khanate. In accordance with this resolve the strictest injunctions will be given by the Ameer to all his Begg to

enforce the new law, and special orders will be sent to all border towns where slaves are transported for sale from neighbouring countries, that should any such slaves be brought there, they shall be taken from their owners and set at liberty without loss of time.

Clause XVIII.—His Greatness the Ameer Syud Muzaffar being seriously desirous to strengthen and develop the amicable relations already established five years for the benefit of Bokhara, approves and accepts for his constant guidance the above seventeen clauses, constituting an agreement relative to the friendship between Russia and Bokhara. This agreement has been made out in two copies, each copy in the two languages—Russian and Toorkee. In proof of his having sanctioned this agreement, and accepted it for his own guidance, as well as for the guidance of his successors, the Ameer Syud Muzaffar has affixed to it his seal.

Done at Shar on the 28th September 1873, being the 19th day of the month of Shayban of the year 1290 A.H.

The only new articles introduced into the new Treaty were the following :—the stipulations (1) regarding the incorporation in Bokhara

of the desert from Khalata to Meshekli; (2) regarding the free navigation of the Amu Darya by Russian steamers and other vessels; (3) regarding the right of the Russians to construct piers and store-houses on the Bokharian bank; (4) regarding the permanent establishment of a Bokharian agent in Tashkent and a Russian representative in Bokhara; (5) regarding the surrender of Russian criminals in the event of their escaping into the territory of Bokhara; and lastly (6) regarding the abolition of the traffic in slaves.

The articles regarding the navigation of the river, the establishment of Consulates, the surrender of criminals, and the traffic in slaves, as well as those taken from the former Treaty, *viz.*, regarding the unrestricted entrance of Russians into all the towns of the Khanate, the establishment of caravanserais, and of commercial agents wherever might be thought fitting, were in my opinion altogether superfluous. The introduction of such articles appears to me to be open to two great objections—for in the first place we demand advantages the benefits of which we cannot possibly enjoy, and therefore the Bokhariots grow accustomed to regard a treaty as simply a form;

and in the second place we insist on conditions which the Ameer is powerless to comply with (for example the surrender of fugitives and the abolition of the slave trade), and the result of incorporating such conditions is to deprive a treaty of all practical effect.

When we once succeed in establishing navigation on the Amu Darya, then as a matter of course and without any treaty stipulations, the Bokhariots will not dream of raising obstacles. When in the place of one solitary Russian merchant a body of traders shall make their appearance in the Khanate of Bokhara, caravanserais will naturally become necessary and will spring into existence without any co-operation on the part of the Bokharian Government; and when we are in a position to find means to meet the necessary expenditure for the maintenance of a Political Agent at Bokhara, then it will be quite soon enough to ask the Ameer's permission, whereas at present such a request is altogether premature.

As regards the unrestricted right of travelling within the Khanate, the Bokhariots will always find a method for arresting the progress of any enterprising traveller. "We cannot

guarantee your safety" is a phrase which has hitherto admirably served their purpose. Regarding the surrender of Russian criminals who may escape into Bokharian territory, we have invariably failed to procure the extradition of Russian fugitives, even in cases in which reports were current in Tashkent as to their whereabouts. "We sent him to Charjui, where by the will of God he died" is their stereotyped reply. Lastly, with regard to the abolition of the slave-trade, we ought to admit that the success of all our efforts in that direction has been simply imaginary. This trade has always existed in Bokhara, and after the Treaty of 1873 it actually increased, whereas in Khiva slavery has certainly become an impossibility owing to the proximity of Russian bayonets. The following is M. Schuyler's account of the slave-trade :—

"When I was in Bokhara in August I personally witnessed the open sale of slaves in the bazaar, and I myself purchased one. The authorities, however, grew alarmed, knowing that I could thus prove their duplicity towards the Russians, and took him away from me. I then bought another one through my servant, whom I subsequently brought

with me first to Tashkent and afterwards to St. Petersburg. This caused a great scandal at Samarcand and Tashkent, as it occurred at the very time when the news came that General Kauffman was insisting on the liberation of all Persian slaves at Khiva, but the act was viewed with favor by most persons, official and otherwise, for it was considered that I had afforded the Government conclusive evidence of the existence of the forbidden traffic."

It is impossible to predict what lies in the future, though it may reasonably be presumed that after the departure of M. Struve, who was immensely popular amongst the Bokhariots, the course of affairs will change. The Bokharian Consul in Tashkent has at the present time become an indispensable necessity. The new Russian official, M. Weinberg, appears to act on the principle of instilling the people with respect rather than winning their affection, but whatever may be the results of this line of action, I am of opinion that our treaties will cease to be a dead-letter; that the Bokhariots will be compelled to fulfil all their treaty engagements to the letter, and that ultimately a Russian Consulate will be established at Bokhara.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIONS WITH KOKAN.

Apprehensions at Kokan in consequence of the appointment of a new Governor-General—Negotiations—Conclusion of a Commercial Treaty—Behaviour of Khudayar Khan during the war with Bokhara in 1868—Letter addressed by the Khan to the Emperor—Conferment of honors on the Khan—Request of the Khan for Russian intervention in the matter of the claims of the Ameer of Bokhara to Karategin—Permanent Kokan Agent at Tashkent—Friendly conduct of the Khan—Surrender of the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz who had taken refuge in Kokan territory—Deputation of M. Struve to Kokan—National feast on the occasion of conveying to the Ameer the Emperor's approval at the surrender of the Begs—The Khan contracts to supply corn to the Russian troops—Our future programme—Probable conduct of the Khan-zadah, the heir-apparent of the throne—Views expressed by M. Schuyler regarding our relations with Kokan. Question as to necessity of establishing a Russian Residency at Kokan.

ON reaching Tashkent General Von Kauffman informed Syud Khudayar Khan of his arrival, and at the same time invited him to send a trustworthy delegate to Tashkent who might enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a commercial Treaty. Immediately after the despatch of this letter by the hands of an express messenger, the Governor-General paid a visit to the most advanced line of forts, and

on arriving at Khodjent on the 19th November (December 1st) found that serious apprehension prevailed amongst the Kokanians that a new line of policy would inevitably follow on the arrival of a new Governor-General. The rumours of these apprehensions appeared the more credible from the fact that the Kokan troops began to be concentrated at various points, while private makers of arms received extensive orders from the Government. This induced the Governor-General to despatch from Khodjent a further letter containing an assurance that the only object of his visit to the frontier was to inspect the troops and to obtain a better acquaintance with the region, the administration of which had been entrusted to him.

About the time of the Governor-General's return to Tashkent the Khan sent Sudoor Sarymsak Khodja with a friendly and eloquently worded letter, which was presented at the State reception on the 3rd (15th) December.

"We are the slaves of the Deity, and pray with upright hearts," wrote the Khan. "All mankind are sons of Adam and therefore kindness should reign amongst rulers! God has directed us to make it our first rule to live in

peace one with another. Friendship and kindness are a wine of which he who drinks one drop forthwith forgets all his sorrows and all his disappointments, and is made happy!" Further on in his letter the Khan begged us to place no credence in untrue reports, and he thus explained the concentration of his troops:—"We have a custom of reviewing our troops twice each year, on which occasions summer and winter clothing is distributed amongst them."

The envoy met with a splendid reception in the presence of all the Government officials and of some of the most notable inhabitants of Tashkent. In his reply the Governor-General said amongst other things: "I shall not interfere with those who value the friendship of the Great Russian Emperor, but let such as do not appreciate the beneficent objects of the peace-loving 'White Czar' beware, for his troops are always in readiness at my signal to chastise a turbulent neighbour, and no forts or armaments can protect the culprit."

In the negotiations with the Kokanian envoy as with other Asiatics, the Governor-General resolved to adhere to one rule, namely, that

every word should be dictated by truth and frankness. Firmness combined with a peaceable demeanour and with veracity were the means by which General Von Kauffman invariably endeavoured to secure success.* Acting on these principles all our demands were on the very first day communicated to the Kokan envoy in the self-same words in which they were afterwards expressed in writing. To the objection raised by him that he had been sent only with the object of enquiring after the health of the White Czar, and not for the purpose of concluding a commercial Treaty, the Governor-General gave a decided reply that the first and indispensable condition of friendship must be the acceptance by Khudayar Khan of all the articles proposed to him with the object of removing every restriction upon trade. The Governor-General followed this by declaring to the envoy that for his own

* The Prince Chancellor in reply to a letter from General Von Kauffman regarding the conclusion of a treaty with Kokan wrote :—
“ You express your conviction, produced by experience, that in our intercourse with Asiatics the grand secret of success consists in unchanging veracity and firmness combined with a decided attitude of peace, I too am the more firmly convinced of the correctness of this view, since it has invariably served as my guide in my political actions and intercourse both in the East and the West.

part he considered that there was no further room for discussion, inasmuch as he did not imagine that the Khan could possibly decline to consent to such just demands. Dismissing the envoy on the 19th (31st) December the Governor-General entrusted him with a letter for delivery to the Khan, in which he wrote:—
“The words which I addressed to your envoy on his State reception will be doubtless communicated to you. I spoke frankly to him as to the envoy of a friendly nation. Whosoever honors, as is fitting, the Great White Czar, will discern in my words only such expressions as spring from peace and friendship.” To the letter was appended a mutual engagement for the protection of free trade and for regulating the method of collecting duties upon merchandise. The articles were five in number, *viz.*—

(1.)—Regarding the right of Russian merchants to visit all the towns of the Khanate.

(2.)—Regarding their right of establishing caravanserais wherever they might choose.

(3.)—Regarding the right of appointing commercial agents in all the towns of the Khanate.

(4.)—Regarding the equalization of the

imposts on the goods of Russian merchants to those levied from Mahomedans.

(5.)—Regarding an unrestricted passage through Kokan for Russian caravans on their way to neighbouring States.

A Russian mission accompanied the Kokan envoy on his return journey with instructions to collect all available information regarding that country, of which very few particulars were then known. In the course of the negotiations the Khan agreed to all the conditions with the exception of the first and fifth, declaring that he could not place any reliance on the attitude of his fanatical subjects in the event of the appearance of Russian merchants within the Khanate. He also asked for permission to depute an embassy to the Imperial Court, or if this request should be considered inconvenient, at all events to procure from the "White Czar" a letter bearing the Imperial seal. Such a letter, the Khan declared, would have the effect of enhancing his authority in the eyes of his subjects, and would serve to him as a guarantee that nothing would be allowed to interfere with his amicable relations with Russia, in spite of any possible changes in the Russian local authorities, for he observed that in the

course of three years there had been no less than four* changes in the Governor-Generalship, and each incumbent had proposed different conditions for his acceptance. In support of his request for a letter from the Czar, the Khan adduced the precedents of two of his predecessors, Omar Khan and Mahomed Ali Khan, who had received such letters.

The same Kokan envoy who had previously visited Tashkent accompanied the Russian Mission on its return, bearing a letter from the Khan regarding the embassy which he wished to send to St. Petersburg, and the impossibility of guaranteeing the safety of our merchants who might visit the Khanate. In his reply, dated 29th January (10th February) 1868, the Governor-General wrote:—"The Great Russian Czar will never permit the existence of differences between the Khans whose territories border on his Empire, and their subjects. Your Greatness writes that you are unable to answer for the behaviour of some of your subjects in regard to Russian merchants. My

*From Cherniayef's occupation of Chemkent in 1864 to the year 1867 there were four Governor-Generals, *viz.*, Generals Cherniayef, Romanofski, Krijhanofski, and Von Kauffman, not counting Mannteufel who temporarily filled the office during the period between Romanofski and Von Kauffman.

reply is that either your subjects must fulfil your commands, or else they do not acknowledge your Chiefship over them. Every nation must have a head. Those of the inhabitants who, in spite of your orders, do harm to Russian merchants will have to answer for their misdeeds to myself. I cannot tolerate outlaws being at large in proximity with the Russian dominions. General tranquillity requires their subjection either to my authority or to yours." To this letter were appended duplicate copies of the Treaty signed by General Von Kauffman for ratification by the Khan, and also an extract from the Emperor's order granting full authority to the Governor-General in political matters, which was intended to be a proof of his power to settle all matters on the spot without recourse to such an unusual measure as an embassy to St. Petersburg.

To another agent of the Khan by name Mirza Hakim, who was deputed to Tashkent soon after the first, the Governor-General pointed out the want of resolution on the part of the Khan as a proof of his distrust in the friendly disposition and uprightness of the representative of Russian authority. "Had I wished to subdue the Khanate," added the

Governor-General, "I should not have continued to waste time and words, but I should simply have given the troops the order to move forward, and long ago all would have been ended."

The decided tone of the foregoing communications had its effect on the Khan, and dissipated whatever doubts he entertained. On the 13th (25th) February another letter was despatched by Khudayar Khan, renouncing all pretensions to a right to enter into direct communications with the Imperial Court of St. Petersburg without the knowledge of the Governor-General, and expressing his readiness for the sake of maintaining friendly relations to fulfil every demand which might be made upon him. The following is an extract from the Khan's letter:—"Now that I perceive that the Great 'White Czar' has empowered you to make all arrangements; that you possess his entire confidence, and that he has considered you worthy to stand in his place; whatever may be signed by you and confirmed by your seal, I shall regard as ratified by the 'White Czar' himself."

From this period there was a visible improvement in the attitude of the Kokanians towards

us, and our merchants not only ceased to meet with the unfriendliness and abuse to which they had already begun to grow accustomed, but the word "kafir" (unbeliever) was exchanged for that of "tamyr" (friend).

On the 24th February (7th March) the Khan forwarded the ratification of the Treaty, sending at the same time to the Governor-General, as a token of friendship, his own ring (a large emerald) and also a horse, the pick of his stable, together with a complimentary letter.

Moreover he issued orders that one of the caravanserais in Kokan should be evacuated and made over to the Russians. On goods, even including cotton (the tax on which the Khan had up to that time so obstinately maintained), a duty was levied at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* instead of 15 per cent. as had previously been the case. Still the authorities at Kokan did not consider themselves sufficiently strong within the Khanate to attempt the fulfilment of the treaty without first endeavouring in every possible way to prepare public opinion for what was about to be done. With this object Sarymsak Khodja begged that such a letter might be addressed to the Khan as could be

published in all the towns of the Khanate, in order to allay the disquietude of the people and to serve as a guarantee for peace even during the periods of the Governor-General's absence from Turkistan. The envoy referred also in his conversations to the demarcation of the Russian frontier, but in consequence of the absence of certain geographical and ethnological data, the consideration of this question was postponed, in order that the final settlement might not afterwards be complicated by any previous decisions adverse to Russian interests. The Governor-General declared that for the present the chief thing was to conclude a treaty of peace and to live in friendship, adding that no boundaries would protect a turbulent neighbour.

The 9th (21st) April 1868 was fixed for the departure of the Governor-General to St. Petersburg, and when information of this fact was in due course given to Khudayar Khan, the opportunity was taken of assuring him that General Dandevil had received instructions "to live in friendship with the friends of Russia, to strike terror into the hearts of her enemies, and to protect her subjects." At the same time the Khan was informed that reports

had reached us of the armament of Kokan and of the formation of certain alliances against Russia, but it was explained that we placed no credence in such rumours, and therefore gave no attention to them, inasmuch as a war would only tend to the exaltation of Russia and an appeal to arms could have but one result.

Soon afterwards the unsatisfactory change in our relations with Bokhara compelled the Governor-General to put off his visit to St. Petersburg, and information was sent to the Khan accordingly.

On the 8th (20th) of May about a week after our occupation of Samarcand, Mirza Hakim, an envoy from Kokan, reached the Russian detachment, congratulated the Governor-General on his victory, and handed to him a letter in which the Khan denied the reports of his hostile projects, and explained his so-called armament as simply a reform rendered necessary by the neglected condition of his army, and the uselessness of the weapons with which they had hitherto been armed. Mirza Hakim also declared that national thanksgivings had been offered up in Kokan for the discretion of the Khan which had averted the

storm then raging over Bokhara. After the battle of Zerbulak the envoy was dismissed, but he appeared a second time on the return of the Governor-General to Tashkent, bearing congratulations on our further successes.

It is noteworthy that the Kokan nation had at the beginning of the war taken up a hostile attitude towards us, and had called upon the Khan to interfere in our dispute with the Bokhariots on the ground that Samarcand—"the beauty of the earth," the sacred abode of Mahomedanism—could not be allowed to fall into the hands of unbelievers, and that if it should be taken by the Russians, it would be a sign of the end of the world.

The behaviour of the Khan of Kokan and of his envoy during all this period was characterized by such tact that the Governor-General determined to procure permission for a Kokan embassy to visit St. Petersburg, and accordingly Mirza Hakim was received by the Emperor on the 2nd (14th) November 1868.

The respectful letter addressed by Khudayar Khan to the Emperor illustrates very clearly how well chosen our policy had been, since it had made the Khan fully aware that his very existence was dependent upon the support of

the Russians. Thus the Khan wrote :—" Now it has been clearly revealed to us that under the lofty protection of Your Majesty we can devote our attention to the amelioration of the inhabitants of our territory, and to the fulfilment of your wishes, by the establishment of mercantile intercourse between your territories and the Khanate of Kokan, undisturbed and without the fear of danger." The mercantile Treaty received the confirmation of the Emperor on the 6th (18th) of November 1868.

The envoy returned to Kokan bearing for his master the insignia of the first degree of the Order of Saint Stanislaus set with diamonds, and on the 31st July (12th August) 1868 the Governor-General received from Khudayar Khan a most profuse letter of thanks.

In the beginning of December 1869 the Khan preferred a complaint to the Governor-General against the Ameer of Bokhara, *viz.*, that the Ameer having established his authority over the outlying Begships (Hissar, Kulab, and others) had attacked and put to flight the Beg of Karategin by name Shere Ali, who was subject to Kokan. A reference was made to the Ameer, who, as a justification

for his action, forwarded a letter of Shere Ali's purporting to prove that the latter had taken part in the civil dissensions in Bokhara and held communications with the rebellious Begs. Khudayar Khan declared that the letter was a forgery, and to prove this sent a genuine letter of Shere Ali's for purposes of comparison. The seal of the document first produced certainly appeared to be counterfeit,* and the Governor-General therefore proposed to the Amcer that Karategin should be restored to its lawful ruler.

At this juncture Shere Ali again led his troops against Karategin, but was defeated by the united forces of the Begs of Kulab and Hissar and taken into captivity. Wishing to obviate the possibility of collision between Bokhara and Kokan (as the success of either party might have compromised the submission to us of the other) the Governor-General proposed to Khudayar Khan that Karategin should be restored to its former

* The cutting of this seal was not distinguished by such delicacy and elegance of design as is usually considered necessary for the seal of every Native of any position whatever, especially a nobleman. Making such a counterfeit seal is by no means a circumstance of rare occurrence in this part of the country. In 1867 a seditious proclamation was seized in the Kuraminsk district bearing the counterfeit seal of the Khan himself.

ruler, Muzaffar Shah, who was then a captive at Kokan, and he also requested the Ameer of Bokhara on his part to liberate Shere Ali. These suggestions were accepted and at once acted upon by both parties, and this successful mediation was not without the indirect advantages to Russian influence. In the first place, the frontiers of the two Khanates were thereby separated by an almost independent power, and consequently the facilities for direct intercourse, and the chances of future collision, between Kokan and Bokhara—the two invariable rivals for precedence in Central Asia—were to a certain extent diminished. Secondly, the fact that we had brought about the liberation of Shere Ali, our sworn enemy, a man who boasted of forty wounds received in actions against us, who made a parade of his hostility to the Russians, and who in consequence stood at the head of the anti-Russian party in Kokan, reconciled him to us, and was the means of weakening the obstinate prejudice by which we were then regarded amongst the majority of the people of Kokan. Lastly, the fact that the disputants had been reconciled by means of Russian intervention enhanced our authority very considerably.

The result of diplomatical intercourse during a period of three years was that Syud Khudayar Khan abandoned every idea of making war with us or of thwarting our wishes. By means of Mirza Hakim Dadkhwah (who at the present time has been promoted to the rank of *Parvanachi*), his permanent agent at Tashkent, the Khan sends information to the Governor-General of every circumstance however insignificant, while our wishes have only to be communicated to him to be at once carried into effect. Even regarding his own family matters the Khan has considered it necessary to give the Governor-General information, while he has also shown himself in various other ways desirous of gaining the favor of Russia. For instance, in the summer of 1870 the Oratippe detachment, which had been despatched on an exploring expedition along the road of the Zerafshan valley across the Kashgar-Davan range, was attacked by the mountaineers of Auvagin, subjects of Kokan, and Khudayar Khan took energetic measures for the punishment of the culprits, sending at the same time a sum of 5,000 roubles in silver for the benefit of the wounded and for distribution amongst the families of those killed (nineteen were wounded

and four killed). Three hundred roubles were accordingly apportioned as the share of each man who had been seriously wounded (of whom there were four), fifty roubles were given to each of those who had received only slight wounds, and a sum of 600 roubles was distributed to each of the families of those killed, the balance being devoted to providing for the religious wants of the troops on the line of march.

The most important episode in our relations during this period was the surrender of the Beks of Shahr-i-Sabz (Jhura Bai and Baba Bai) who had taken refuge in Kokan territory. On this occasion Khudayar Khan showed clearly that he would permit neither the laws of hospitality nor the undisguised murmurings of the people to deter him from acting in such a way as to retain the friendship of Russia, on which he perceived that both his present and future authority were dependent.

In order to express to the Khan our sense of his invariably friendly behaviour and of his readiness to act agreeably to the views of our Government, the Governor-General deputed M. Struve to Kokan, with instructions to take advantage of the opportunity to enter into

negotiations and make enquiries on the following subjects :—

(1.)—The establishment of a permanent Russian agent at Kokan.

(2.)—To ascertain the causes which prevented the return to Karategin of its former ruler, Muzaffar Shah.

(3.)—The demarcation of the frontier of the Khanate.

(4.)—To procure compensation for the attack of the Kirgiz mountaineers of Auvagin on our Cossacks; and

(5.)—The settlement of some matters in dispute between our merchants and the Kokanians.

The replies which were received from the Khan on all these subjects were eminently satisfactory.

Perceiving that he would gain much moral support from the presence of a Russian Agent at his Court, Khudayar Khan begged us in view of his own interests to send “an upright, trustworthy, and just man, not for the good of the Russian merchants alone, but also for the benefit and profit of all traders and of the inhabitants generally.” This was not the first time that the question regarding the location

of an agent at Kokan had been discussed, but the matter had for some reason or other been allowed to remain in abeyance, and so it happened also on the present occasion, in spite of the fact that we should have derived no small advantage from such an arrangement.

With reference to the frontier question, the Khan acquiesced in all our wishes as explained to him, only begging that the actual boundary line might be laid down as quickly as possible. The matters in dispute between our merchants and the Kokanians, and all the points raised thereby, were investigated and adjusted in the presence of M. Struve.

With regard to the payment of compensation for the attack made by Kokan subjects on the Cossacks of the detachment under the command of Sub-Colonel Dennet, some opposition was at first apparent on the part of the anti-Russian party, but the matter was afterwards adjusted by the intervention of Mirza Hakim, and the Khan despatched the sum demanded from him (5,000 roubles).

The hearty reception which was given to our envoy, the permission which was accorded to him to visit all the most important towns of

the Khanate (M. Struve intended to define their position by astronomical observations), together with the frank and friendly tone of the negotiations, afforded additional proof of the political tact of Khudayar Khan, who had played to perfection the part assigned to him by the Russians. Later communications with Kokan lose somewhat the character of correspondence with an external power, and become rather of a domestic character. The confidence which the Kokan Government places in our political views is little by little diffusing itself amongst the mass of the inhabitants, while the people generally are beginning to appreciate the fact that it is only by means of peaceable relations with Russia and the Russians that they can preserve the favorable position, which the diplomacy of Khudayar Khan has gained for them. The best proof of the reality of this feeling both in the Khan and his subjects is afforded by the festivals which were held in the Khanate on the occasion of the approval of the Emperor being conveyed to Khudayar Khan on account of the loyalty of his amicable intercourse with Russia, and especially of the surrender by him of the Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz. At a national feast given in

Kokan, a multitude of people were assembled, and the Khan took the opportunity of communicating to his subjects the Imperial satisfaction.

Such complete subordination on the part of the Khan of Kokan to the views of our Government induced the Governor-General to consider the advisability of assisting Kokan to assert her authority over the territory of Kashgar—an arrangement which would have been to our advantage as in the place of two neighbouring powers we should have had only one, and that one strongly bound by ties of obligation to us. The irresolution, however, of Khudayar Khan prevented the accomplishment of this plan, in the place of which he expressed his readiness to act the part of a “mediator” between us and Yacoob Beg. The communications which followed between Kokan and Kashgar were productive of no immediate result, but at the same time it is undeniable that they had some influence on the determination of Yacoob Beg to make the first advance toward friendly relations with us.

Besides his services of a political nature, the Khan of Kokan was able on more than one occasion to show his readiness to serve us in

other respects. Thus in the winter of 1870-71, when, owing to the bad harvest the price of corn rose to an unprecedented extent, and we were consequently obliged to prohibit its export to Bokhara, Khudayar Khan in spite of the dearth in Kokan itself allowed corn to be exported into our territories. In the summer of 1871 and throughout 1872 the Khan also furnished provisions to our troops, who were distributed through Khodjent, Ura-tippe, and Nau, at rates which were under the circumstances remarkably moderate. Wishing to show the value which we placed on such services, the Governor-General invited the heir-apparent of the Kokan throne, Syud Nur-ooddeen Beg of Andijan, to pay a visit to Tashkent, where he met with a most honorable and splendid reception.

At the present time, in order to complete the subordination of the Khanate of Kokan to our authority and to place it in the position of a vassal power, our policy ought to be directed towards the following objects:—

(1.)—The establishment of a Russian commercial agent at Kokan.

(2.)—The establishment of a control over the appointment of officials to the more important posts in the Khanate.

(3.)—The removal of the present almost feudal system of Government by means of semi-independent Beks; and

(4.)—The reduction of the number of troops in the Khanate to the lowest possible limit, and the future limitation of the military forces to such a strength as is required simply for objects of police.

To carry these measures into operation would be easy, inasmuch as Khudayar Khan fully recognizes the fact that the existence of his power is entirely dependent upon the will and support of Russia. At the time of the last rising of the Kirgiz in the summer of 1873, the Khan applied to us for help, but we abstained on that occasion from all intervention in the affairs of the Khanate, and there is no doubt that had we adopted any other line of action at a time when we were engaged in the Khivan Expedition, our position would have become inconveniently complicated. It is very possible however that the fulfilment of our present programme may carry us to a point beyond that which we at present consider to be desirable, and this may possibly be precipitated by the death or deposition of Khudayar Khan, which latter contingency in view of the uninter-

rupted disturbances in Kokan may happen at any moment.

The Khan-zadah or heir-apparent to the throne certainly appears to be of a progressive turn of mind, as he builds houses on the Russian pattern and drinks champagne, but it is impossible to foretell what part he may play in future, and whether his popularity may not embolden him to risk incurring the displeasure of the authorities at Tashkent. It is well known, for example, that on the occasion of his visit to Tashkent the Khan-zadah paid a visit to the Ex-Begs of Shahr-i-Sabz, and expressed to them his sorrow that his father should have handed them over to the Russians and thereby have been guilty of an act ignominious to a true Mahomedan. In making these gratuitous remarks, he was in no way the victim of circumstances, and the only possible explanation is an innocent wish to gain popularity, even at the risk of thereby acting to the detriment of his father's interests.

As regards the internal disturbances, the most frequent offenders are the Kipchaks—the old enemies of Khudayar Khan—and the Dikokamenni Kirgiz. Of late the pressure of the taxes has excited serious discontent, which

began to show itself as early as the spring of 1871 under the leadership of Batyr Khan, a relative of Khudayar. On that occasion the conspiracy was divulged by one of the parties concerned and seventeen of the chief conspirators, including Batyr Khan, were drowned in the tanks near the Khan's palace. If the Khan had shown himself unable to settle matters with the rebels, we should have been obliged to interfere, and sooner or later this will certainly happen. The incorporation of Kokan into our territories would certainly not be without great advantages, as it would put a stop to the present intermingling of territory and would round off our frontier by carrying it to the snowy range.

Our recent relations with Khudayar Khan have lost some of their former cordiality, probably owing in a great degree to the policy of abstention which we adopted during the insurrection of the Kirgiz and Kipchaks, and to the fact that instead of giving him active assistance to uphold his authority, we left him entirely to his own resources. M. Schuyler, Secretary of the American Embassy at St. Petersburg, who visited Turkistan in 1873, and remained for a short time at Kokan, thus expressed the

impressions which he had obtained :—" A Treaty of commerce was concluded in 1868, by which Russian merchants were to have protection and free permission to travel in Kokan, and only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty was to be imposed on exports and imports. The impression was given at St. Petersburg, by the signature of this Treaty and by the reports from Tashkent, that Kokan was in a perfectly vassal position to Russia, but this is far from being the case. The Treaty has been by no means carefully observed : duties amounting to nearly six per cent. are constantly imposed, and the remonstrances of the Russian Government have been unheeded. The Khan is entirely hostile to Russia, and objections are made to travelling in the country. The Russian merchants resident there are under the severest restrictions. One was attacked and nearly killed, and although the fact was well known, the Khan was never brought to answer for it. Of course there were reasons for this inaction on the part of the Russian authorities. It was not desired to make a war without absolute necessity, as it would be disapproved of at St. Petersburg, and it was still less desired to show that the policy pursued to Kokan had been ineffectual in bringing about the desired end."

It is only necessary to recall the whole course of our correspondence with the Khan and all our relations with him to be convinced of the want of accuracy displayed in M. Schuyler's remarks. The Khan not only pays especial regard to the demands of the Governor-General, but endeavours also to anticipate them. As regards the statement that the Khan only with reluctance permits Russian subjects to enter his dominions, I myself know of several cases of Russian subjects having entered Kokan, not only without his permission, but also even without previous information having been given to the Kokan authorities.

The danger which individual merchants may have to undergo in particular places cannot fairly be attributed to the evil designs of the local administration, if the particular crime is not clearly traceable thereto. Of course if we desired to pick a quarrel with Kokan, we could easily construe a thousand insignificant circumstances into a *casus belli*, and the fact that we have hitherto restrained ourselves from so doing proves our anxiety, evinced both by words and deeds, not to provoke a rupture. It is interesting however to observe that while hitherto, we have been reproached for over-

readiness to pick quarrels in our impetuous desire for conquest, we are now met by a reproach for over-indulging an insolent neighbour. M. Schuyler, moreover, does not content himself with this, for he proceeds to show us how the annexation of Kokan to Russia might be effected before the eyes of the whole world without attracting any notice whatever:—

“Open force used towards the Khan might be improperly explained, and give rise to questions and criticism, especially on the part of England, which the Foreign Office was very anxious to avoid. At the same time, had the Governor-General been fully informed of the state of the case, or had a different policy been pursued, it would have been perfectly easy to have reduced Kokan to a vassal condition without publicity or calling for the slightest notice from England. It would only have been necessary to have taken a leaf from English history in India, to have sent a Resident Agent to Kokan, protected by a guard of Cossacks, who might have been paid either by the Russian or Kokan Government. About them a Russian colony of merchants and others would have been naturally formed, the people of Kokan would have become accus-

tomed to Russians, and at the same time would never have dared to insult or molest them, and the Government of Kokan would have found itself obliged implicitly to follow the command of the Governor-General, which reached him on a suggestion of the Resident Agent. After pursuing a policy of this kind for several years, it would be perfectly easy, if necessary, on the death of the Khan, or even without that, to quietly unite the province with the Russian dominions."

This method would certainly be unfailing. In the public press an opinion has been expressed that the position of such a Resident could not be upheld unless with the presence of a whole detachment of Russian troops, because, it is argued, to act otherwise would be to invite a repetition of the disastrous catastrophe of Prince Bekovitch Cherkasski.*

In my opinion, however, the case of Bekovitch cannot be properly taken as a precedent. In the first place it cannot be said that Prince Bekovitch was accompanied by only a slender detachment, since it numbered 3,000 men with six guns—a force which, seeing that General Cherniayef took Tashkent with only 1,951

* Of Circassia—(*Trs.*)

troops, was capable of effecting great things. Secondly, the catastrophe was caused not by the numerical paucity of the Russians, inasmuch as these very troops had only a short time before brilliantly sustained a three days' combat with the Khivan army near the town of Porsu.

The only moral that can be drawn from the catastrophe of Bekovitch is, in my opinion, that the command of distant expeditions ought not to be entrusted to fool-hardy officers, and that if the Commandant during such a campaign should happen to lose his head, his subordinates ought not to hesitate to disobey his orders.*

As regards the treachery of Asiatics, that was proverbial long before the time of Bekovitch.

A multitude of examples on the contrary show that a man of prudence, resolution, and above all of circumspection (that is, a man who will not allow himself to be made the victim of a surprise) can, even with a handful of troops, accomplish wonders over Asiatics. Without, however, discussing this question further, it is sufficient to add that the post of Resident

* This affair I hope to discuss in detail in my work at present under preparation—"The History of Russian Conquests in Central Asia."

requires to be filled by a man possessed of all the abovementioned qualities, and that under such circumstances an unusually strong guard would not be necessary. On the whole, however, while freely admitting the advantages of the English system of gaining possession of neighbouring territories, I am of opinion that no present necessity exists, or will probably exist in the future, for maintaining a Resident in Kokan. If at any future time the aspect of affairs becomes serious, it will only be necessary to move the Khodjent battalion to Kokan ; but so long as this necessity does not arise, and the Khan shows his intention of trusting to our unchangeable veracity and friendliness, both our material interests and our good name require that we should so conduct matters as not to afford him any just ground of complaint.

CHAPTER V.

RELATIONS WITH KHIVA.

Position of affairs in Khiva—Submission of the Turkomans to Khiva—Letter of the Governor-General to the Khan—Reply of the Khooshbegi—Reasons of our indulgence—Advice given by Mr. Alison to the Turkomans—Idea of a Mahomedan coalition against Russia—Disturbances amongst the Orenburg Kirgiz—The Adayefs—Weakness of our influence—Reason of the disturbances—Proclamations of the Khan of Khiva—Conditions proposed by the Kirgiz to the Governor-General of Orenburg—Disturbances amongst the Kirgiz of the Turkistan region—Two letters of the Governor-General to the Khan—The Russian messenger Sultan Bushayef—Movement of Russian detachments to Irkibai and the Bukan Mountains—Disembarkation in the Bay of Krasnovodsk—Measures taken by Khiva to oppose the Russians.

DURING the previous hostilities with Bokhara which have been described in Chapter II., Khiva discreetly abstained from interference, and in 1866, taking advantage of the Bokharian forces being occupied elsewhere, brought under her authority the Yomut Turkomans. Again in the spring of 1867 by diverting the course of the Laudan she deprived the other Turkoman tribes who had settled along her frontiers, but had refused to recognize her authority, of their supply of water. Thus it happened that ten of the elders appeared before the Khan tendering submission,

and at his demand brought their families to Khiva as hostages. Meanwhile their fellow tribesmen considering themselves entitled to utilize the water in their new homes without waiting for formal permission, destroyed the dam which prevented them from doing so. A skirmish with the Khivan troops ensued, in which the Turkomans were defeated, and ultimately acknowledged their subjection to Khiva. After this the more powerful amongst the tribes were forcibly settled by the Khan in the vicinity of Chimbai and Kubet [about sixteen versts from Kungrad], while the remainder scattered themselves throughout the Khanate.

One Khan only, Ata Murad, moved off to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and by means of his fellow tribesmen, who inhabited the Island of Cheleken, entered into communications with the Commandant of the Astrabad Naval Station, begging that the Turkomans might be received as subjects of Russia, and allowed to settle in the Balkan Mountains—a request which was declined owing to the remoteness of the region.

Having in this way subdued the Turkomans, and being secure from attack on the side of the prostrate Bokhara, Khiva justly began to

consider herself more powerful than she had ever before been. In proportion to the decay of the influence of Bokhara, that of Khiva increased, and the hopes of Asiatic Mahomedanism naturally centred themselves on a kingdom which was believed to enjoy the peculiar protection of the Deity, and which was rendered the more arrogant by its fancied inaccessibility to Russian troops and by our failures in the years 1717 and 1839. The storm that had burst over Kokan and Bokhara had passed harmlessly over Khiva, and this circumstance increased still more her self-confidence, which was soon exhibited by attacks on Russian caravans, the seizure of Russian merchants, and the prevalence of various other disorders.

Immediately on his arrival at Tashkent, General Von Kauffman addressed a letter to Mahomed Rahim, the Khan, dated 19th November [1st December] 1867, containing an announcement of his appointment and arrival, of the full powers entrusted to him by the Emperor, and of the advance of a Russian detachment beyond the River Syr for the chastisement of some robbers who had plundered Russian caravans, &c. This letter, however, was misconstrued into a friendly overture on the part

of the Russian authorities and as an attempt to secure the good-will of the Khivans, who accordingly adopted a more presumptuous tone.

The Khan in his arrogance left the reply to be written by his chief officials, who delayed the matter so long, that it was not until February 1868 that an answer was received. Knowing that Mahomed Rahim, whose age was only twenty years, was more occupied with field sports than with State matters, the management of which he left entirely to his officials, the Russian authorities did not anticipate any peculiar display of delicacy, but the insolent tone of the reply was unequalled. "Every sovereign," wrote the Khooshbegi, "rules over his own territory and over the people who are placed under his authority, and his troops ought not to cross the boundaries, thereby breaking the peace. Nevertheless your expression that both sides of the Syr Darya belong to your Government involves an infraction of previous treaties, inasmuch as the southern bank of the Syr Darya belongs to us. If robbers disturb caravans on the southern side of the river, we will take upon ourselves to repress them, and if on the other side, the responsibility will be yours."

As arrangements had already been made for his visit to St. Petersburg, the Governor-General resolved not to reply to this letter until his return, and in the meantime to enquire into the truth of the statement made regarding previous treaties. At the same time he determined not to evacuate either the left bank of the Syr, or the rivers Kuvan Darya, and Yani Darya as far as the Lake of Akcha-kul, which were then *de facto* in our possession; especially as the Kirgiz of the Kazalinsk district were in the habit of wandering along the course of these rivers, spending the winter there, and in the summer migrating, but leaving a few scattered "auls" behind them for agricultural purposes. In the winter of 1867, in order to protect these Kirgiz from being attacked and plundered by the Khivans, detachments were frequently despatched from Kazalinsk or Perovsk to Irkibai, and if the weather permitted even further—a method of procedure which was continued up to the year 1873 with excellent results.

With regard to the statement made by the Khivans that we were precluded by existing treaties from holding the left bank of the Syr, the enquiries which were afterwards made in

St. Petersburg showed that no treaties regarding frontiers were in existence, and that although the Khivans had raised the question of boundaries at the time of the visit to Khiva of our envoy Ignatyef, he had declined to settle this point on the ground of the impossibility of defining with any precision a line of boundary between two countries, the frontiers of which were peopled by only nomad tribes.

Then followed the war with Bokhara, which, coupled with the refusal of Khiva to accept the Ameer's invitation to join in the universal confederation against Russia, caused our conduct towards the latter to be marked by greater forbearance. The desired effect, however, was not produced. The dispersion of the Bokharian forces and the occupation of Samarcand, so far from producing the necessary impression upon Khiva, only appeared to increase her arrogance.

It was the old tale and one more proof of the fact that examples and warnings are thrown away upon oriental rulers. Thus the overthrow of Kokan not only failed to humble Bokhara, but was followed by such conduct on the part of the latter as to render necessary the war of 1868. Again the defeat of

the Bokhariots failed to induce the Beks of Shahr-i-Sabz to comply with our moderate and just demands, and even such insignificant Chiefs as those of Kshtut and Magian did not hesitate, without any occasion, to take up arms against us.

So it was with Khiva. So far from recognizing our strength, she afforded a ready asylum to all such as were dissatisfied with the peace of Samarcand, while at the same time she set on foot intrigues in the very heart of our Kirgiz. All the outlaws who had hitherto cloaked their robbery under the colours of the Ameer of Bokhara, such as Saddyk, Nazár, and others: all the traitors to Russia, such as Cornet Atamkul,* with his brothers: and lastly the rebellious son of the Ameer, the Katta Tora, all took refuge in Khiva, where they were well treated by the Khan. The Katta Tora was offered the title of Khan over the Turkomans subject to Khiva, the whole of whom, including those who had previously moved away with Ata Murad, willingly accepted him as their Chief. Soon afterwards, however, a demand was made by the Ameer of Bokhara for the surrender of his son,

* An illiterate Kirgiz "Jiggit" who had been appointed Governor over all the nomads under the authority of Russia between the Rivers Syr and Amu, but who abusing his position commenced to plunder them, and when called upon to justify himself, fled to Khiva.

and Khiva, wavering between the laws of hospitality and the demand of a near and still dangerous neighbour, steered a middle course, and advised the Katta Tora voluntarily to leave the Khánate. Atamkul endeavoured to accompany him, but was captured by his pursuers, and being placed in chains was incarcerated for four months in a dungeon.

In December 1868 two deputations from the Turkomans of the Tekke and Jamshidee tribes presented themselves before Mr. Alison, the English Ambassador at Teheran, praying to be received under the protection of England in view of the threatening attitude of Russia and of the perpetually forward movement of the Russian troops. The English Ambassador declined to give any direct reply on the plea of want of instructions, but at the same time this fact does not appear to have prevented him from assuring the deputations that the Russians would not dare to cross the Amu Darya, and from advising them to organize a general confederation amongst all the various tribes inhabiting the left bank of the river. He especially counselled them to gain to their side the powerful tribe of Irzari, numbering as many as 50,000 kibitkas and, as a means to this end,

recommended them to make overtures to Syud Kuli Bai, one of the chief hereditary rulers of that tribe.

These proceedings coincided both in point of time and in their object with the negotiations of the neighbouring Khans for the creation of a Mahomedan coalition against the inroads of the Russian infidels. Information regarding an active correspondence on the part of the Ameer of Bokhara with Altishuhr, Kokan, Shahr-i-Sabz, Khiva and Afghanistan was received from all sides. The coalition, however, on that occasion was not actually formed, although it encouraged Khiva to adopt a bolder and more decided attitude. In the spring of 1869 a new administrative arrangement then being introduced amongst the Orenburg Kirgiz, the objects of which were misinterpreted by the Sultans and Moollahs, produced general dissatisfaction amongst the tribes concerned, and disturbances broke out in the regions of Turgai* and Ural, which Khiva hastened to turn to her own advantage.

We were brought into the immediate vicinity of these so-called "Orenburg Kirgiz" [amongst

* (The steppe was divided into four regions, *vizi*, Ural, Turgai, Ak-mola and Semipalatinsk.—*Trs.*)

whom are included the tribe of the Adayefs] three hundred years ago on the subjugation of Astrakhan. In 1730 the Kirgiz acknowledged themselves to be our subjects, but their dependence was only nominal, and it required all the perseverance of the Governors of Orenburg to establish the authority of Russia in these regions. The last to succumb were the Adai Kirgiz, who, owing to the remoteness and inaccessibility of their haunts, were better able to withstand Russian influence. They stubbornly insisted upon their independence, and rather than admit the power of the infidel Russians displayed a tendency to become subordinate to Khiva, which professed orthodoxy and possessed all the necessary means for holding them in subjection.

It often happened that the tribes who wandered about near our forts paid tribute both to us and to the Khivans, and as recently as 1870 the Khivan tax collectors (zyaketchi) fearlessly distributed themselves amongst the "auls," and collected taxes at a time when the Russian authorities (even the Sultan Governor of the western portion of the Orenburg Kirgiz, who was the immediate Chief of the Adayefs) did not dare to show themselves amongst the nomads.

In spite of his convoy of 150 Cossacks the Sultan Governor never ventured to visit the abodes of the Adayefs during his yearly circuits, which proceeded no further than the River Emba, at that time the limit of our real influence. It should, however, be added that the Cossack convoys placed no confidence in these Sultan Governors, often leaving them to deal as best they could with the unruly Kirgiz, and declining to interfere in their quarrels. Whatever may have been the reason, the fact admits of no doubt that while the other Kirgiz tribes had already succeeded in attaining a certain degree of civilization and order, owing to the immediate vicinity of the Russians, the Adayefs still remained in their former state of barbarism.

The first Russian settlement in the neighbourhood of the Adayefs was established in 1834 as a safeguard for the expedition against Khiva then contemplated by Perovski. Unfortunately the choice of a suitable site for the erection of a fort was entrusted to a civilian named Karelin, a man wholly unfit for such a task. The spot which he chose, and on which the fort of Novo Alexandrofsk was erected, was situated on the eastern shore of the Bay of Kaidak, and was

eminently unsuitable—firstly, owing to the fact that the water in the wells was bitter and brackish, growing worse in proportion as it was allowed to accumulate; and secondly, since the shore of the bay at this point is so low lying as to be often over-flooded by water, leaving behind it a large deposit of refuse, which soon becomes decomposed and infects the air. These two circumstances were sufficient to produce sickness and death in the fort, and every six months it was necessary to relieve the garrison, of whom scarcely one-half lived to return to their homes.

Such an unwise choice of a spot for the first Russian settlement naturally did not impress the neighbouring tribes with our sagacity, while the persistence with which we declined to abandon this charnel house was attributable solely to our unwillingness to admit the mistake that had been made. Thus it happened that a considerable amount of human life amongst the Ural Cossacks* was sacrificed to the folly of one official and the reluctance of the Orenburg authorities to recognize the error; and it was not until 1846, or after a period of twelve

(* In the original "true, these were only Ural Cossacks." Of course this is sarcastic. —*Trs.*)

years, that Obruchëf evacuated this deadly fort, erecting in its stead Fort Novo Petrovsk (the name of which was in 1859 changed to Alexandrofsk) at a point on the Mangishlak isthmus, where the fishing station of Nicolayefsk was subsequently established.

As has been already stated, the authority of the Sultan Governor over the Adayefs could scarcely be said in point of fact to exist, and the administration of each division of the Adai Kirgiz was undertaken by their own elders, of whom there were in all ten, equally distributed under the jurisdiction of two District Superintendents, who were selected by the Orenburg authorities from the more respected and influential Bais, and were in direct communication with the Commandant of the Fort of Alexandrofsk.

The Adayefs were not declared liable to payment of the tax on kubitkas [at the rate of one rouble fifty copecks on each tent or kubitka] until about the year 1850, and even after that time no measures were taken for a regular assessment, but their own statement as to the number of kubitkas on which the tax should be levied was accepted without question. The Russian Commandant, moreover, was utterly unable to coerce those of the tribe

who refused to pay taxes or declined to accept his arbitration, since the entire forces at his disposal were limited to two hundred infantry of the Ural force with only sixty-five horses available for all purposes including police duty.

While things were in this condition a new arrangement was introduced into the administration of this tract, and the following changes were simultaneously carried out. A new tax was imposed on kibitkas at the rate of three roubles fifty copecks, an exact enumeration of the kibitkas was made, a system of election was introduced which weakened the influence and authority of the hereditary Chiefs, a division was made of the country into "volosts" (parishes) and "auls" (encampments); and lastly, the existing system of passports was wholly changed.

In 1869 the two Native Superintendents of Districts appointed by the Orenburg authorities were summoned to Uralsk in order that the principles of the new arrangements might be fully explained to them. On their return at the end of that year with the newly appointed Prefect, Sub-Colonel 'Rukin, late Commandant of Fort Perovsk, false reports became current regarding the unprecedented intentions

of the Russian Government, which resulted in a popular agitation. One of the Native Superintendents named Mayayef, declared to his subordinates that the new arrangements and the new tax must be at once introduced amongst the Adayefs, while the other named Kalbin [who was a personal enemy of Mayayef], insisted that the new system should not at present be propagated amongst the Kirgiz of the Adai tribe. The contradiction between these two officials, combined with the inspiration of Moollahs supported by the Khivan Government, and lastly the instigation of the Khivan tax-gatherers, ultimately resulted in bloodshed. The steppe became agitated, and in the middle of March 1870 the Adayefs broke out into open revolt.

Proclamations of the Khan and of his Ministers were distributed throughout the steppe, Khivan emissaries were lavish in their promises, while at the same time small detachments of troops sent out by the Khan were magnified by the imagination of the Kirgiz into an immense army and encouraged them to every possible kind of folly.

The extent to which our Native officials carried their prevarication may be judged from

the reports of the overseers of parishes [volost]. For instance Iset Kutebar on the 22nd May (3rd June) 1870 very naively wrote: "Having received information of the arrival of the Khivans on our frontier and an invitation to visit them, I, in company with Niaz, went to them. They asked us 'On which side are you?' We replied 'On both sides.' The Khivans took three of our merchants [Ivan Burnashof with his companions] and 1,000 sheep."

In one of the intercepted proclamations, authenticated by the seal of Mahomed Rahim Khan, it was said that according to the Treaties with Russia, the frontiers of the Khanate were the Ural and Emba, and that the movement of the Russians across the Emba was a breach of Treaty stipulations:—"You and all the Kirgiz tribes" wrote the Khan "have with one accord agreed to separate yourselves from the infidels and have resolved to strike them with the sword of Islam. This is well known to him who commands at the threshold of the refuge of Islam. Therefore we send our troops with Isaul-Bashee-Mahmood and Mahram-Khudai-Nazar." In other proclamations issued under the name of these emissaries, the Bais and Elders were called upon to come to

Khiva "for the sake of their fire-sides and children" in order to confer regarding the impending hostilities. The Diwan* Begi at the same time encouraged the rebels and informed them that the forces of the Khan would soon come to their assistance.

Although as a rule great caution is required before accepting documents as authentic in a country where the counterfeiting of seals is by no means of rare occurrence even in diplomatical correspondence, (for example, the counterfeit letter of Shere Ali Bai with reference to the Karategin affair† and the proclamation of Khudayar Khan to the people‡ of the Kuraminsk District), still inasmuch as the part taken by the Khivans in the disturbances of the Russian Kirgiz is vouched for by the admissions of the Khooshbegi himself, the authenticity of these proclamations does not admit of doubt. It should be added that no less than six seals were affixed to them, and it is difficult to believe that all of these could have been counterfeit.

* Diwan Begi, the Commander in-Chief--he also has the control over the irrigation, the collection of taxes, and the mint. At that time the Diwan Begi was an Afghan named Mahomed Murad.

† See under Bokhara [Chapter II]

‡ See under Kokan [Chapter IV]

Encouraged by promises, stimulated by their Moollahs and Sultans, and by the Khivan authorities, the Kirgiz plundered the postal stations, and at last boldly drove away the horses picketed under the walls of Russian forts: thus 300 horses were driven away from the fort of Uralsk, 200 Government horses from the post of Emba, and twenty artillery horses were stolen near the Fort of Ouil. Efforts were made in vain to pacify the rebellious tribes, and the degree of their presumption may be judged from the following conditions which they offered for the acceptance of the Governor-General of Orenburg: (1) to give them a special Mufti; (2) to appoint Mahomedans as Governors of their districts; (3) to exempt them from the payment of new taxes; (4) to leave to them the unrestricted right of freely roaming about; (5) to do away with the division into districts, placing the people as before under the jurisdiction of Orenburg; and (6) not to require from them the election of headmen* for every group of ten or fifty kibitkas. Besides this, under the influence of

* The election of headmen implies an exact knowledge of the number of kibitkas, inasmuch as given the number of headmen the number of kibitkas could easily be deduced from it, whereas the Kirgiz had hitherto paid the kibitka tax according to their own inclinations.

absurd reports which were propagated by the Moollahs, the Kirgiz feared that they would be compelled to build towns and villages, that they would be obliged to accept Christianity, and that recruits would be taken from them for the Russian army.

The result of the disturbances was that the Commission, which had been appointed at Orenburg to consider the question, acted with indecision and timidity; they did not summon the headmen elected from every ten kubitkas, which implies that they accepted figures very far removed from the real facts. Instead of 148,089 kubitkas, which was the former computation, it was represented that there were only 127,669, thus showing a decrease of 20,420. It is true that a considerable number of the tribe had moved off to other pasture grounds, and that in the figures formerly given were included also the mud huts, but taking into consideration the fact that the new organization of the Turkistan region resulted in double the former number, we may rest assured that careful enquiry would have proved the true figures for Orenburg to be considerably higher than they were represented to be. In justice, however, it must be stated that the Russian officials were



not free from blame. Little indeed could be expected from district authorities of the stamp of Captain V of Irga, who at the most important juncture went off to Orenburg issuing orders thence to his subordinates, and who by appointing as a sub-assistant the well-known cattle-lifter Iset, cast a direct slur on the Russian name. Another of these district authorities went so far as to sign a document declaring that he would not introduce the new administrative changes.

The disaffection amongst the Orenburg Kirgiz began to find an echo in the Turkistan region, where attacks on stations, merchants and caravans became almost of daily occurrence. These disturbances were, it is true, perpetrated by bands who collected on the Great and Little Barsuk sands, *i.e.*, outside the boundaries of the Turkistan region, but it was impossible to guarantee that similar disorders would not break out also amongst the Kirgiz of the Syr Daria. The temptation was great and immunity from punishment, as the event proved, an encouragement.

In April 1869 the Cheklins, hearing the news that a Khivan detachment had advanced on to the frontier and was summoning the Bais and overseers of parishes [*volost*], seized Ivan

Burnashof, a commercial clerk, with his two comrades, and 1,000 sheep which they had received in exchange for merchandize. The booty was divided by the robbers, but the men were taken away to Khiva. In May a band of robbers at a distance of seventy-five versts from the Fort of Uralsk fell on some artisans of the Engineering Department on their way to Tashkent, of whom six were killed and eight carried away into captivity, though the captives were afterwards sent back in safety by Iset to Uralsk. The Cossacks captured at the postal stations were handed over to Khiva. On the Bukan Mountains, which formed part of our territories, a band consisting of eighty Khivans and Kirgiz under the pretext of collecting taxes, extorted tribute from passing caravans at the natural boundary Ilyar, took away such of the goods as they chose, and at last carried off a Jew named Yacoob Mushi with three camels from his caravan and 2,000 roubles in cash. They also seized all the goods of Yevgraph Kekin to the value of 9,000 roubles. Besides these the following also were victims: the brothers Bykofski, Mustafa Adam Ogla, Bidjan Jangaz, and a merchant of Bokhara, Abdul Hakim.

Not wishing in the first instance to have recourse to extreme measures, the Governor-General endeavoured to bring Khiva to reason by means of diplomacy. In a letter dated 12th (24th) August 1869, it was explained to the Khan (1) that seditious proclamations had been distributed in his name amongst the Russian Kirgiz and Turkomans; (2) that emissaries sent out by him had appeared with armed escorts in our territory for the purpose of inciting disturbances amongst our subjects; (3) that certain Russians had been carried off to Khiva, where they were retained with his cognizance; and (4) that the rebels and robbers who had fled from Russian territory had received from him hospitality and protection.

It was at the same time insisted that similar occurrences should not be repeated, and that the guilty parties should be called to account for having violated the boundaries. "I am unwilling to think," added the Governor-General, "that all this has happened with your cognizance, and I should wish to believe that you were in no way a participator in these proceedings. Similar acts have also taken place on the side of Kokan and Bokhara, the consequences of which are well known to you."

On the receipt of further intelligence regarding disturbances in the Bukan Tau hills, another communication was on the 20th September (2nd October) addressed to the Khan demanding the punishment of the robbers, the restoration of the plundered property and the liberation of all the Russian and Bokharian subjects taken into captivity by the robbers. By way of a threat the Governor-General added—"If Your Greatness declines to fulfil my just demands, then, in the event of a rupture of friendship between us, it will be unavoidable, although unfortunate, that your peaceable subjects should pay for the misdoings of the unruly."

No reply, however, was sent either to this or to the former letter, and the special messenger who was entrusted with them was arrested and detained at Khiva. This messenger was a very intelligent Kirgiz of the district of Perovsk, a candidate for the office of Superintendent of a "volost," by name Sultan Daulat Bushayef. Starting on the 7th (19th) September 1869 from Perovsk, he arrived at Khiva* in thirteen days,

* The following was his route: Taznur, Togusken, Karakul, Akkyr, Chirkrobat, Irkibai, Zangar, Lake Akcha-Tengiz, thence to the right of Daukara. In eight days he arrived at Fort Irjan-Bia on Lake Jhuruk, afterwards to Kara Kuduk, Kalendar Khan, crossing the Amu near Yani-Urgendj, and thence to Khiva.

where the populace met him with joyous shouts of "elchi, elchi" (envoy, envoy). Very different, however, was the reception accorded to him by the Ministers, who were by no means satisfied with the replies which he gave to their enquiries. For instance, in answer to the question of the Khooshbegi, "What do the Russians think of Saddyk"? Bushayef replied that the Russians regarded him as their own forerunner, since all the towns which he defended invariably fell into the hands of the Russians. Thus the Kokanians had been indebted to him for the loss of their towns, the Bokhariots for the loss of Samarcand, and "now he is with you" abruptly added Bushayef. On the day following this conversation the messenger was deprived of his arms and a guard was placed over his hut. Thus he remained for three months.

This arrest occurred about the time when the Government horses picketed under the walls of Förts Uralsk and Embensk were driven away by the Kirgiz. The disturbances grew daily more serious: rumours were everywhere current regarding the movements of the Khivan troops, and the Russian authorities in Turkistan determined to adopt precautionary measures. In order to secure unity of

action, the troops in the districts of Kazalinsk and Perovsk were placed under the orders of an officer of the staff especially deputed for that purpose, while two corps of observation were sent out from Kazalinsk and Jizzakh, the first to the Yani Darya, and the second to the Bukan Mountains. The Kazalinsk detachment was directed to intercept Saddyk, who was collecting his adherents in Daukara* for a projected attack on the Russian forts on the Syr. The Khan of Khiva sent Saddyk nine "nars"† elegantly adorned and hung round with bells; but hearing of the movement of a Russian detachment to the Yani Darya, he ordered Saddyk to desist from making further preparations.

The expedition to the Bukan Mountains had another object in view, namely, to demarcate the new frontier line which had been defined by the Treaty of 1860. Two sotnias of Cossacks and a party of surveyors started on the 25th October (6th November) from Jizzakh

* 100 versts south-east of the Sea of Aral and 350 versts east from the Jaxartes.—*Trs.*

† A *nar* is a one-humped camel. The particular number nine was by custom regarded as a sort of mystic number in offering presents, *e.g.*, nine loaves of sugar, nine water melons, &c.

and returned on the 22nd November (4th December), having accomplished a distance of 800 versts in spite of the cold (the thermometer registered—14°R.), without kibitkas in which to rest at night, and with only their felt coverings. The expedition was under the command of Major Bergbaum of the first battalion of rifles, and the writer of these lines accompanied him. The Bokharian delegate,* sent by the Ameer to watch his interests in the demarcation of the frontier, weary of camp life, or perhaps fearing the results of a possible collision with the freebooter Saddyk, feigned sickness and remained behind half-way. Undeterred, however, by the disquieting rumours and the reports of spies, the Russian troops carried out to the letter all the instructions given to them. Proclamations were distributed amongst the “auls” and pacified the nomad population, who had already begun to prepare for breaking up their camps, while the Bais and elders came in to pay their respects, some of whom were then for the first time in their life brought face to face with Russians. Hitherto not one

* Mahomed Nasir Meerakhor—literally Superintendent of the stables.

of our detachments had penetrated so far into this region.

Meanwhile the Council of the Khan resolved to liberate the Russian messenger, but before this could be effected, a Kirgiz deputation arrived at Khiva, at the head of which were the deserters Azbergen and Kanali, who brought rich presents* to the Khan, and begged him not to yield to our demands, and by so doing lower his dignity and leave the Kirgiz in the lurch. "We have fought against the Russians" said they "according to your orders, and in consequence have been deprived of our lands and of our subjects. We have only our lives left." The Khan listened favorably, and revoked the decision of the Council, but soon afterwards receiving tidings of our disembarkation at the Bay of Krasnovodsk, and also of the movement of the Russian detachment to the Bukan Mountains, he directed the liberation of our courier, who had meanwhile been placed in a most serious danger in consequence of the flight of two of his followers and the suspicion that he was carrying on secret communications with us. An executioner had been placed over him as a sentry, whose removal

* 50 hawks, 100 ambling horses, 100 camels, and 50 pieces of white felt.

was only effected by the presentation to each of the Khivan Ministers of a horse. At last, however, Bushayef was liberated, the Khoosh-begi presenting him as a parting gift with a red "choga" of the value of thirty-six roubles, two pounds of tea, and two loaves of sugar.

The disembarkation of Russian troops at Krasnovodsk produced a very powerful impression in Khiva, and the Khan at once proceeded to take more active measures. A detachment of Khivan horse was despatched to fill up all the wells on the road to Kizil Su. The bodies of dogs served the Khivan as ready materials for this work, and the greater part of the wells on the Krasnovodsk side were rendered useless. One well only, Sahja, was spared for a time, but a picket was left there with instructions to fill up the well in the event of the appearance of the Russians. In the town of Khiva itself a new citadel was built, and was fortified with twenty pieces of artillery, while the main channel of the Amu Darya, the Taldyk, was diverted into the Aibugir, and forced into a number of small channels in order to make the river shallow and unpassable for our vessels. Near the promontory of Urga a fort was erected, to which provisions were conveyed from

Khiva and Kungrad. It was also in contemplation to build another fort at the natural boundary Kara-Tamak. Those of our Kirgiz who had established their "auls" on the borders of Khiva were exempted from all taxes under the condition that in the event of war they should furnish one volunteer (jiggit) for every two kubitkas. Besides this, in order to inspire them with confidence, the Khan took advantage of the arrival of some Turkish Effendi, and gave out that he was an ambassador, who had offered to Khiva the co-operation and assistance of the Sultan. It is said that this Effendi was in reality an agent of the Turkish Government, in whose name he begged for the release of the Persian slaves, urging as an argument for such a measure the necessity for conciliating and gaining over Persia, who had only refrained from assisting either the Afghans or the Bokhariots, because they incessantly made raids into her territory and sold Persian subjects into slavery.

At this time also a Bokharian envoy arrived at Khiva with information of Hissar having submitted to the Ameer, and of the severe chastisement with which the inhabitants had been visited under his orders. The Bokhariots boasted

that they had spent seven days in killing the males and three days in slaughtering the children in their cradles. The Ameer also wrote that he had succeeded by means of artifice in keeping the peace with the Russians, but that he never ceased to remember the chief commandment of the Koran—"the annihilation of unbelievers"—which he was only waiting for a fitting opportunity to carry into effect.

These embassies increased the arrogance and self-confidence of the Khan, which was only shaken by the news of our disembarkation at Krasnovodsk and the forward movement of the Bukan detachment.

CHAPTER VI.

RELATIONS WITH KHIVA.—(*Continued.*)

The objects of the disembarkation at Krasnovodsk—Communications with the Persian Government on this matter—Correspondence between the Governor-General and the Khivan Ministers—Ultimatum from the Khooshbegi dated 14th (26th) April—Considerations regarding a Russian expedition against Khiva—The catastrophe of the 15th (27th) March which overtook Sub-Colonel Rukin, Superintendent of Mangishlak—Burning of the post of Nicolayefsk under the walls of Fort Alexandrofsk—Arrival of troops from the Caucasus—Mediation of the Ameer of Bokhara—Khiva has recourse to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, the Governor-General of Orenburg, and to the Viceroy of British India—Expedition of 1873—Occupation of Khiva—Liberation of Persian slaves—Occupation of the mouths of the Amu Darya.

THE alarm caused at Khiva by the occupation of the Bay of Krasnovodsk is in itself sufficient to show the importance which that point possesses for the Russians. The occupation of Krasnovodsk had been resolved upon as early as the year 1865, but it was at that time postponed to a more favorable opportunity. In the spring of 1869 the question was again brought forward with the object of gaining the following ends—(1) the development of commerce by affording a new market, and opening up a new and shorter route to all the Khanates of Central Asia; (2) the pacification of the Orenburg Kirgiz who had found

an asylum in Khiva; had rested their hopes upon her; and had sought from her support for their rebellious proceedings; and lastly (3) the separation of Khiva from the coalition of Mahomedans then being formed against us. With a road from Krasnovodsk Bay to Khiva opened out and thoroughly explored, it would at any moment be possible, in the event of a crisis in Central Asia, to move a detachment of such force as might be necessary from the Caucasus by means of the Caspian Sea.

These views were generally approved by the Imperial Court, but in order to give time to make the necessary preparations for landing troops and material, for the erection of a mercantile factory, and also for the necessary preliminary communications with the Persian Government, the Emperor directed that the expedition should be put off until the spring of 1870, entrusting the fulfilment of it to the Viceroy of the Caucasus. Matters however were precipitated by the reports current amongst the public regarding the contemplated expedition which, it was feared, might reach the Persian Government through an unofficial source and cast a doubt on the real intentions of the Russians. The Emperor therefore

resolved to act upon the suggestion of His Imperial Highness the Viceroy of the Caucasus, and on his representation that the necessary arrangements could be made in less than a month and a half, directed that the expedition should be carried out in the autumn of 1869.

On receiving the official announcement of the disembarkation of the Russians, the Shah in a manuscript letter to our Ambassador, M. Beger, dated 4th (16th) December, asked that an assurance might be obtained from the Emperor that the only object of the Fort of Krasnovodsk was the development of commerce with Turkistan, that no interference was intended in the affairs of the Yomuts who had established their "auls" on the banks of the Rivers Goorgan and Atrek, and that no forts would be built either on the banks of those rivers, or at their mouths. M. Beger telegraphed for instructions to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and received the reply that "the Imperial Government recognises the dominion of Persia up to the Atrek, and consequently that it does not contemplate the erection of any fortifications whatever in that locality."

This reply was communicated to the Shah

on the 13th (25th) December, and produced such a favorable impression that three days afterwards he issued an order that Russian commercial steamers should be allowed to navigate the Murdab and Enzeli* on the same terms as sailing vessels—a concession which our diplomats had for some ten years past zealously striven to obtain, but without success.

General Von Kauffman determined to make the Khan of Khiva aware of the fact that the Krasnovodsk expedition was not an isolated undertaking, but was intimately connected with, and formed a part of, our general policy in Central Asia, and accordingly, in a letter dated 18th (30th) January 1870, informed him of the objects of the disembarkment of the Russian detachment, *viz.*, the foundation of a commercial depôt for the storage of merchandise, and the protection of caravans from the attacks of the Turkomans.

At the same time the Governor-General availed himself of the opportunity to remind the Khan in somewhat more decided terms of his former demand regarding the free entrance of Russian merchants into the towns of the Khanate, adding—"Being desirous of establish-

* (Probably the lake of the same name near Resht.—*Trs.*)

ing and maintaining peaceable and friendly relations with you, I have thrice written to you, but not one of my letters has received a reply. You have allowed yourself, in spite of every right, to detain my last emissaries. A similar course of conduct cannot again be tolerated. There are two alternatives—we must be friends or enemies. No middle course is possible between neighbours.” The Governor-General also counselled the Khan to reply by consenting to the demands which were made, for “there is a limit to forbearance, and unless I receive a satisfactory answer recourse must be had to force.” About a month after the despatch of this letter Bushayef at last returned from Khiva, bringing a reply to the second letter from the Dewan Begi and to the third from the Khooshbegi.* The first wrote that the Khivan “zyaketchi” (tax-collectors) were in the habit of going to the Bukan Tau Mountains for the collection of the taxes from the Char tribe and from caravans. “The Bokharian merchants,” explained the writer, “can bear

* The Khooshbegi rules the northern portion of the Khanate and is therefore our neighbour. The man then holding that office was Nazar Yar. He was partial to opium, and therefore was not always in full possession of his faculties. Perhaps from this reason he had not the privilege of a personal *entré* to the Khan, which was enjoyed by the Dewan Begi.

witness to the fact that this is no new innovation." With reference to the Jew who had been seized, the Dewan Begi declared that the Khivan Government had received no information regarding him, and he ascribed the robberies in the Bukan Tau hills to the Russian Kirgiz, declaring that the Khivan tax-gatherers did not travel in those parts in parties numbering more than ten, and never to the number of eighty.

The Khooshbegi wrote in a much more decided tone: "Our Sovereign has no wish whatever for war, but on the contrary desires the peace and well-being of his own subjects, and we should have desired that such would have been also your wishes. Nevertheless, a short time ago Russian troops crossed the frontier and are advancing towards us." In order to justify his proclamations and emissaries, the Khooshbegi wrote—"Your Kirgiz have complained to us that the Russians do not allow them to move their 'auls' into Khivan territory, as they were formerly allowed to do, and, moreover, that the Russians oppress and sometimes kill them. For the pacification of these Kirgiz, and for the punishment of the robbers, I sent to them five or ten officials." Regarding the captives he wrote—"The Kirgiz brought

to us three Russians, demanding from them the blood of their kindred who had been killed and the property which had been plundered," but "sitting at the threshold of the Deity" (or under his protection) "the Khan has cooled with the water of wisdom the inflamed hearts of the Kirgiz." Accordingly the Khooshbegi stated that the Khan had determined not to put them (the Russians) to death, but had taken them from the Kirgiz, and was resolved not to permit them to return unless our troops were first prohibited from crossing the frontier and the Kirgiz were indemnified for the property of which they had been robbed.

Perceiving from these letters that the Khivans still adhered to their former views as to their right of dominion over the left bank of the Syr; that, although admitting that they had sent emissaries amongst our Kirgiz, they endeavored to evade the question regarding the proclamations, and with regard to the captives limited themselves to the statement that they were alive, the Governor-General in a letter dated the 25th March (6th April) placed the whole matter before the Dewan Begi, expressing at the same time his surprise at

the detention of Bushayef and at the Khan's persistence in avoiding direct communications. With reference to the movement of our detachments, the Governor-General explained that they had advanced into places which were occupied by Russian subjects, who were in want of protection against robbers; that the subjects of the White Czar, wherever they might have their abode, remained his subjects, and that therefore the lands on the Yani Darya as far as Lake Akcha-kul had always been, and would always be, considered as Russian territory. Regarding the Bukan Mountains, it was explained that both they and all the road from the Kizil-Kum to the bridge of Irkibai across the Yani Darya belonged to us under the terms of our treaty with Bokhara, and that therefore with the exception of the Russians no one had the right of collecting any taxes whatever in those parts. The demand for the liberation of the Russian subjects who had been carried off to Khiva was repeated, and the Governor-General also insisted that the Khivan authorities should cease to afford protection to our rebels, and that the same rights should be conceded to Russian merchants in Khiva as Khivan traders enjoyed in Russia.

On the 14th (26th) April the following reply was received from the Khooshbegi to the Governor-General's letter of the 18th (30th) January regarding the disembarkation at the Bay of Krasnovodsk :—"The contents of your last letter are marked by an entire absence of cordiality. From the beginning of the world up to the present time there has never been an instance of one Sovereign, in order to reassure another and for the well-being of the subjects of a foreign power, having erected a fort on the frontier and having advanced his troops. Our Sovereign desires that the White Czar, following the example of his forefathers, should not permit himself to be led away by the greatness of the Empire with which God has entrusted him, and should not seek to gain possession of the lands of other powers, which is opposed to the custom of great Sovereigns. If, on the contrary, trusting to the strength of his army, he desires to make war with us, let him remember that before the Creator of heaven and earth, before the great Judge of all earthly Judges, all are equal—the strong and weak alike. To whom He wills to him He gives the victory. No one can succeed against the will and predestination of the All-Highest."

Perceiving from all this that the Khivans attached no importance to our demands or threats when not enforced by an armed hand, the Governor-General represented to the Minister for War his views in case of the necessity arising for making a change in the nature of our relations with Khiva. It appeared impossible to act against this Khanate from the side of Turkistan alone, because, in order to effect at once all our projected objects, a single detachment would have been obliged to traverse the whole Khanate as far as the shores of the Caspian Sea; and this, in addition to the great difficulty attending the movement, would have entailed a prolonged absence from head-quarters of a very considerable portion of the available troops, whose ordinary strength was scarcely sufficient to prevent a breach of the peace. On the other hand, an isolated movement on the side of Krasnovodsk would have involved considerable risk, as the last reconnoitring expedition in those regions, undertaken by Colonel Markozof, had clearly shown. It was above all things necessary that on this occasion we should gain a complete and brilliant success, which might obliterate the failures of 1717 and 1839, and might humble

Khiva from the height of arrogance to which she had been raised by the peculiarly inaccessible nature of the surrounding tracts, as well as by recent events in Central Asia and by the disturbances in the Orenburg steppes.

Adjutant-General Milutin in a letter dated 13th (25th) March communicated to the Governor-General the Emperor's approval of the views expressed by him, adding that if in spite of all our endeavours "the behaviour of the Khan of Khiva should oblige us again to have recourse to arms, we should not forget to take advantage of our newly acquired strategical position on the south-eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. The slender detachment which at present occupies Krasnovodsk can, in the event of necessity, be reinforced from the forts in Dagistan, where, with this object, some battalions and pieces of artillery should always be kept in readiness."

Meanwhile the Khan despatched an envoy to Krasnovodsk, who on his way thither entered into communications with the Turkomans and urged them to unite in an unanimous attack on the weak Russian detachment. The Jaffer Bai (one of the Turkoman tribes) replied that their summer abodes were in the hands of Russian detachments, but that if the Khan would

occupy these abodes with his troops, the Turko-mans would willingly obey him as being a ruler of their own faith, but that otherwise they were forced against their will to live on peaceable terms with the Russians.

The officer in command of the Krasnovodsk detachment, Colonel Stolietof, was advised by the Minister for Foreign Affairs not to enter into any negotiations with the envoy, but to refer him to the Governor-General of Turkistan as being the proper authority invested with the necessary powers for that purpose; while, as regards the movements of mercantile caravans, Stolietof was only authorized to conclude an agreement of a private nature, not necessarily binding on Government.

Meanwhile the disturbances in the Orenburg steppes still continued. The absence of energy, the want of practical knowledge, and the administrative incapacity of the lower grades of our officials, who were entrusted with the introduction of the new regulations, had a fatal influence on the course of events, and the attitude of the Kirgiz grew more presumptuous in proportion to the decay of energy on the part of the Russian representatives. On the 2nd (14th) February 1870 the Superintendency

of Mangishlak was incorporated in the Viceroyship of the Caucasus, and in the beginning of March the Superintendent of Mangishlak, Sub-Colonel Rukin, started with two officers and a convoy of forty Cossacks to introduce the new regulations amongst the Adai Kirgiz, who were well known for their turbulent character. This detachment was on the 15th (27th) March surrounded by hostile Kirgiz. Rukin entered into a parley and accepted an invitation for himself and his officers to partake of tea with a select circle of the Kirgiz, after which, at the request of the treacherous savages, he directed the Cossacks to pile their arms as a proof that his intentions were peaceable. The Cossacks, feeling that Rukin by such an order was surrendering himself to certain captivity, at first showed a disposition to disobey, but, being threatened with summary punishment in the event of non-compliance, the arms were piled. The Kirgiz immediately threw felt coverings over the arms, and at a preconcerted signal rushed upon them *en masse*, whilst simultaneously an ambuscade fell on the Russians, killed some of the Cossacks who were unable to regain possession of their arms, and took others captive. Thus the mistakes of

Bekovitch were repeated in miniature, and Rukin perceiving too late his culpable want of foresight, shot himself.

This catastrophe was immediately followed by the attack on the Fort of Alexandrofsk, the burning of the Station of Nicolayefsk and the destruction of the light-houses along the eastern coast of the Caspian; and matters became so serious that if aid had not come from the Caucasus, the fort in spite of its fourteen guns would have been taken by the rebels.

Although these proceedings and the plundering of caravans which occurred at the same time could not be directly traced to the instigation of Khiva, nevertheless the statements of some captive rebels clearly revealed her intrigues. Moreover some of the Cossacks* who had been taken captive were handed over by the Kirgiz to the Khan, and were taken by him into compulsory service, while the robbers implicated in the plundering of caravans received asylum and protection from Khiva, and the Khan continued to refuse compliance with our demands. Under these circumstances the Governor-General considered it useless to

* Horunjee Livkin and five Cossacks of Rukin's detachment.

continue any longer the diplomatical correspondence with Khiva, and commenced to prepare for hostilities. The preparations were rendered the more difficult by the bad harvest of 1870 which had resulted in a very considerable rise of the prices of provisions, but, by the month of May, all arrangements were complete, and the Ameer of Bokhara had agreed to allow our troops a passage through his dominions.

Meanwhile active preparations were also made by Khiva. The robber bands of Saddyk, Azbergen, and Sultan Khangali Arslan had a disquieting effect on the nomads subject to Russia, who were the first to be threatened by the coming danger. The detachment from the Caucasus, which was despatched under the command of Colonel Count Kutäisof to the aid of the fort of Alexandrofsk, consisted of the 21st battalion of rifles, two companies of Fusiliers of the Apsheronsk regiment, two companies of the 14th battalion of the line, four sotnias of the irregular Dagistan horse, and two sotnias of the Tersk Cossacks, accompanied by two field guns and two pieces of horse artillery. It was not long before a change became apparent in the aspect of affairs, and

the Adai Kirgiz were quickly overcome by the energetic attacks of the Caucasus detachment. By the end of June a part of the tribe had already tendered their submission, and at the close of September the rebellion was practically at an end : 5,000 kubitkas having accepted the new regulations. This number, although insignificant, was important since in introducing reforms, particularly in the case of uncivilized people, the first step is always the most difficult to take. Such a step having been taken and an example afforded, further progress is as a rule comparatively easy ; but in the present case there was a further difficulty, namely, the great distance of the nearest Russian fort (Alexandrofsk) from the abodes of the rebellious tribes, which enabled them to effect an easy retreat before an advancing detachment. In order to obviate this difficulty Count Kutäisof established another depôt on the Kunan Su, which contributed in no small degree to the success of the expedition, although owing to the shallow water in the bay, the difficulty of disembarking there, and the noxious climate, this point was by no means a satisfactory one.

In the following year (1871) it was at first determined to undertake an expedition

against Khiva from the side of Turkistan; the other two provinces—Orenburg and the Caucasus—being required to adopt a defensive line of action by sending out detachments to intercept the Kirgiz on their way from one camping ground to another. Detachments sent out into the Barsuk Sands and the Ust-Urt protected the steppe from disturbances, and those amongst the Kirgiz who were partisans of Russia, prevented the Khivans from penetrating into our territory.

The Khan of Khiva had also contemplated forming an alliance with Bokhara, but his Ambassador Baba Bai was detained by the Ameer pending the receipt of instructions from Tashkent. At this time, however, the question regarding Khiva had already entered on its second stage in consequence of matters with Kulja having been finally settled, and the Governor-General resolved to avoid direct communications with Khiva, adopting instead the proffered mediation of the Ameer of Bokhara. Accordingly the following conditions were communicated to the Ameer as the basis of a settlement of the difficulties with Khiva: (1) the surrender of all Russian captives by the Khan of Khiva; (2) that no protection should be in

future afforded to robbers; and (3) that a Khivan embassy should be sent to Tashkent. The Ameer dismissed the Khivan envoy, sending with him his own trusted Sultan Haji Urak, a man well known for his uprightness, who had voluntarily offered to endeavour to persuade the Khan of Khiva, in the name of the good of Mahomedanism, not to take upon himself a risk similar to that which the Ameer of Bokhara and the Khan of Kokan had undergone. Haji Urak was received by the Khan of Khiva on the day after his arrival there, but the Khan expressed his astonishment that Bokhara should have meddled in the matter of his relations with the Russians, and declined to receive the memorandum which was offered to him, containing the conditions for preserving peaceable relations with us. This memorandum was made over to the deliberation of a special committee formed of the Khan's chief dignitaries (the Dewan Begi, the Khooshbegi, Shekh-ul-Islam, and the Naib). The Bokharian envoy remained in Khiva two months, and during the whole of that period was only once invited to attend the sittings of the committee, and then apparently only for the purpose of listening to some not very complimentary speeches regarding himself. Before

his departure the Khan gave the envoy a farewell audience, and thus addressed him : “ In reply to the words of the Ameer and to the words of the Governor-General which have been communicated to me, I can only say this— Let the Governor-General send me an amicable letter with friendly proposals, and with a promise not to allow his troops to cross the frontiers of my territories, then I will liberate the eleven soldiers who are at present my prisoners, and then plundering and robbery shall cease. If, however, he does not pursue this course, then I will not surrender the captives. Everything will remain as it has hitherto been, and afterwards God only knows what will follow.”

The written reply of the Khan to the Ameer proved to be unauthenticated by the Royal seal, and contained a denial that any just grounds existed for our displeasure with Khiva. To the envoy who was the bearer of this letter (Murtaza Bai) the Khan entrusted the negotiations with the Governor-General.

Knowing already from experience that it was almost hopeless to expect a successful result from any negotiations, especially since such a decided tone had of late been adopted by the arrogant Khan, the Governor-General

declined to permit the Khivan envoy to come to Tashkent, considering it preferable to carry on negotiations through the Ameer of Bokhara. In the event of these negotiations falling through, it was resolved at once to proceed to extreme measures, provided that our relations with YakooB Beg and matters at Kulja should first be satisfactorily settled.

Meanwhile the Khan terrified by the simultaneous movement of the Russian detachments, one under the command of General Golovachef from the side of Jizzakh across the Bukaiñ Mountains, and another under Colonel Markozof from Krasnovodsk, resolved to make friendly overtures, despatching two envoys (Murtaza Bai and Baba Nazar Atalik), one to Tiflis and the other to Orenburg, in spite of the orders of the Emperor, which were well known to the Khivan Government, regarding the proper channel of communication, *viz.*, exclusively with the Governor-General of Turkistan.

The Khivans, it appeared, entertained doubts regarding the unanimity of the Governors of the neighbouring Russian Provinces, and hoped in Orenburg and Tiflis to gain support against the arrogance of the Tashkent authorities. Perceiving that he was surrounded by Russian

detachments at Krasnovodsk, Chckishlar, Karatamak, Irikibai and Tamdi, the Khan determined to endeavour to open communications with the Russians, but in order that this might not be interpreted as a compulsory concession on his part, he resolved to pass over the Governor-General of Turkistan, to whom after the insolent replies of his Ministers, it would have been no easy matter to address such a letter as would gain the desired result without detriment to his prestige.

The two Khivan embassies despatched in the beginning of 1872 were directed, one to His Imperial Highness the Viceroy of the Caucasus, and the other to the Imperial Court *viâ* Orenburg. In his letter to the address of the Grand Duke, the Khan wrote: "It will be well known to your friendly heart, that from time immemorial, harmony has existed between our two high Governments, our relations have been cordial, and our friendship has day by day increased; the two Governments have been as it were one Government, and the two nations one nation. How then has it happened that during the last year your troops have landed at Cheleken on the shores of the Bay of Kharism, under the pretext of commercial

objects, and that recently a small detachment of these troops was advancing towards the Sary-Kamysh, which has of old belonged to us, but retired before reaching that point? Besides this Russian troops have advanced from Tashkent and Ak-Musjid (Perovsk) as far as the well of Min-Bulak, which is situated within our hereditary dominions. We are ignorant whether the Great Duke knows of these proceedings or not. Meanwhile on our side no such action has been taken as could violate friendly relations with you. Some Cossacks (*i.e.*, Kirgiz) had seized four or five of your people, but we took charge of them and kept them in safety near ourself. If you wish to maintain friendly relations with us, then conclude such conditions as will leave each of us satisfied with our former frontiers, and we will restore to you all your captives; but if these captives are made to serve simply as a pretext for a war, of which the real object is the extension of your territories, the will of the All Powerful and Holy One must determine what shall happen,—a will which can be avoided by none.”

The envoys were stopped, one at Temir-Khan-Shura, and the other at Orenburg.

According to the instructions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, they were informed that they would not be permitted to proceed either to the Imperial Court or to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, and that no communications would be held with them until such time as the captives were liberated and until a similar embassy had been sent to Tashkent. The Khivans still showed no disposition to yield, and instead of to Tashkent despatched an embassy to British India with a prayer for help against Russia. The new Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, as might have been expected, confined himself to tendering advice that Khiva should humble herself before Russia, should fulfil all her demands, and should thereafter give no reason for further displeasure on her part. This advice had been heard in Khiva as long ago as the year 1840 from the mouth of Abbot and Shakespear.

The English were well aware that necessity alone had compelled the Russians to undertake war against Khiva, though in the interests of England it would have been better that the Khivans should not have allowed affairs to reach this pass, since it was probable that the result of hostilities would be the incor-

poration in Russian territory of the mouths of the Amu-Darya—a circumstance boding but little good to England.

Meanwhile, in September 1872, a stronger corps of observation was sent out from the Krasnovodsk side, which was construed not only by the Khivans but also by the English Government as a decided attack upon Khiva. The reconnaissance however failed to produce the anticipated results, and the attitude of Khiva remained unaltered. At the same time it gave rise to false reports regarding the occupation of Khiva, and the equanimity with which they were received by the English Press proves that the English had accustomed themselves to the idea of such a result and regarded it only as a question of time.

The retirement of the Krasnovodsk corps of observation (Markozof's) was accepted by the Khivans, as is always the case in Asia, as a sign of failure and the natural result followed. Convinced more than ever of her inaccessibility, and of her ultimate exemption from punishment, Khiva became confirmed in the line of action which she had adopted.

Cultivating the fertile basin of the lower course of the Amu-Darya by the labour of Per-

sian captives, who were every year supplied by the markets of the Turkomans, the Khivans with their population numbering 300,000 souls afforded an entire anomaly side by side with such a mighty power as Russia. When our left flank had been secured by the occupation of Kulja, and by the satisfactory settlement of our relations with Kashgar, we were enabled at last to accept the challenge given long ago by Khiva and to adopt more decided measures. Accordingly, in the spring of 1873, it was proposed to make a simultaneous advance from the side of the Caucasus, Orenburg and Turkistan, under the command of the Governor-General of Turkistan, General Von Kauffman.

It is well known how admirably this triple expedition succeeded, and how brilliantly the Orenburg and Turkistan troops stood the test which they had to undergo. Khiva hardly showed any resistance, only small parties of the inhabitants contesting our progress, and had it not been for the Turkomans, the Turkistan detachment would have had to return without firing a shot. After the close of the expedition the Khivan boundary was placed at the Amu-Darya, the eastern boundary being left as before undefined and open ; the object of which

appears to have been to entangle the Khivans by the absence of a clear boundary line into communications with our Kirgiz, and thereby to afford a pretext to the troops of the Caucasus to undertake another campaign.

To return to the progress of the campaign of 1873. The Khan continued to display the most decided reluctance to enter into communications with General Von Kauffman, and in vain had recourse to Bokhara, Turkey and England, from all of whom he received the same advice, namely, to yield to the just demands of Russia. When reports reached Khiva of the concentration of the Russian detachments, the Khan at last determined to send the captives with Bai Murtaza Khodja to Kazalinsk. Amongst them were five of the Ural troops who had been seized in 1870 on the occasion of the attack on Colonel Rukin, two Cossacks who had been Inspectors of the Postal Stations of Jhulyus and Karakuduk, and had been captured in 1869, two other Cossacks seized in the same year with some horses from under the walls of Fort Uralsk, and others, numbering in all twenty-one men, all of whom had been purchased by the Khan at the rate of 250 "tils" each. On the 22nd March (3rd April) the newly liberated captives

reached Kazalinsk, whither the Russian detachment had already arrived on its onward march to Khiva. Permission was given to them to take part in the campaign, and those who elected to do so were equipped as Cossacks, received fifteen roubles each, and were appointed in the capacity of a body-guard to the same Khivan envoy who had brought them and had received orders to accompany the detachment. The Khan, evidently expecting that this concession would be regarded as a sufficient atonement for the past, took no defensive measures whatever, and did not even seriously attempt to impede the march of the Russian troops. On the occupation of Mangyt by General Verëvkin, the Khan again endeavoured to bring matters to a peaceable termination, writing both to General Verëvkin and to General Von Kauffman, and begging them to stay further operations.

The following is an extract from the letter addressed to General Von Kauffman: "You enquired in your letter regarding the release of the captives. We certainly had in our possession five or ten Russians, but they were not captives, inasmuch as they were not seized by my troops, but were bought for money from the Kirgiz and Adayefs. Friendship towards you

has induced us to keep them in safety. You have also asked me to send with the captives a trustworthy man to enter into such negotiations as may strengthen the friendly relations between us. With this object we deputed to you Murtaza Khodja Bai, who, however, was prevented from proceeding to Tashkent *viâ* Bokhara. At this time the Governor of Orenburg sent a letter by the hands of Zagir Bai, a Kirgiz, requesting the liberation of the Russians. A similar letter was also brought from Chipilikan (*i.e.*, Cheleken) by the hands of Sari Ishan of the Chudor tribe from the Commandant of the local detachment stationed there. Having ascertained that Murtaza Bai could not proceed *viâ* Bokhara, we at once sent two of our own people to Orenburg and Chipilikan, and promised to despatch the remainder of the captives. Our letters however were not received from our envoys either at Orenburg or at Chipilikan, nor did the Russian authorities enter into any communication with them, declaring that the management of such affairs was entrusted to you only. On the return of these envoys we handed over the remaining Russians to Murtaza Bai, and despatched them to Kazala, hoping that thereafter we should

be permitted to remain in peace and quietness. We have heard that our envoy has had an interview with you and has made over to you your people, but we have up to this time received no news whatever from him. Meanwhile your troops have begun to appear from all sides in our territories, and my subjects, in order to defend their families, have used every endeavour to restrain their progress. If your wishes are confined to the restoration of the captives, they have already been carried into effect; if, on the other hand, there is something else which you require, name it, and we will to the best of our power fulfil that also. If you desire to conclude a treaty, then remain in the spot on which you have now arrived, and do not advance across inhabited tracts." In justice to the author of this letter we must confess that it was very adroitly worded, all our complaints being represented as due to a slight misunderstanding as to the action which the Khan had taken.

A reply was despatched without loss of time: "War has been necessitated by your conduct towards us," wrote General Von Kauffman, "all my friendly and peaceable overtures having met with disregard at your hands during a course of six years. At this moment I am pre-

pared to enter into conditions of peace and friendship with you, but in future my movements must depend on the guidance of God. If you wish to preserve your people and your Khanate from desolation by your soldiery, disband them, and announce to the inhabitants everywhere that they should occupy themselves in their own household concerns. Russian troops make war against enemies, but do not plunder peaceable inhabitants."

General Verëvkin, according to his instructions, sent no reply to the Khan, but forwarded the Khivan envoy to the detachment commanded by General Von Kauffman. In the evening of the 28th May (9th June) when Verëvkin was bombarding Khiva, the Khan sent his own first cousin, Irtazali Khan, to General Von Kauffman (then in camp near the Yangi Aryk) with a letter, begging that he himself, together with the entire Khanate, might be taken into the hands of the White Czar. An order was sent to Verëvkin to cease firing, provided that it also ceased from the town, and the Khan was directed to come out of the city with his retinue for a meeting with the Russian authorities. Overcome, however, by fear, he secretly left the town, where his brother Ata Jan was chosen to fill his place.

On the morning of the 29th May (10th June) the fire from the ramparts was opened on the troops of the Orenburg detachment, in spite of the negotiations which at that time were in progress between the Khivan authorities and the Commandants of our detachments. Instructions were given to General Verëvkin "not to cease hostile operations in spite of any stratagems on the part of the enemy," or, in other words, to continue the bombardment until the enemy were reduced to submission.

These instructions were carried out, and the Orenburg troops stormed the breach precisely at the time when the Turkistan troops hastened to enter the town with flying colours. At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th May (10th June) the Russian troops entered Khiva, and on the following day, which was the anniversary of the birth-day of Peter the First, services were held at which prayers were offered up for the health of the Emperor, the repose of the soul of Peter the Great, and for those who had fallen in the disastrous expedition of Bekovitch. On the 1st (13th) June an invitation was sent to the Khan to appear in the Russian camp, and on the evening of the next day, after an honourable reception, he was

reinstated on his throne, a Special Council consisting of Russian officers and Khivan dignitaries being established to act with him in carrying on the administration during such time as the Russian troops remained within the Khanate.

The first matter which came before the Council was the question regarding the liberation of the Persian slaves. The prestige of Russia rendered it impossible to allow slaves in a region conquered by the troops of the Russian Emperor. The slaves themselves, moreover, had long turned their eyes in anxious expectation towards the Russians, who had brought them liberty on the points of their bayonets.

In Central Asia a widespread feeling exists that the vocation of Russia is to abolish slavery wherever her influence may reach, and in the present instance the slaves could no longer restrain their impatience. A considerable number of them, before the Russians entered the city, united in bands and commenced to call to account their former Khivan masters, whilst those who had let slip the favourable opportunity for flight afforded by the general panic on the approach of the Russians, were

loaded with chains, and escape became impossible. In fetters, however, as they were, they were forced to labour during the day time in the fields, whilst at night they were chained to the walls of dirty hovels. Thus the mutual feeling of hatred increased to such a degree that immediate measures became imperative.

On the 11th (23rd) June General Von Kauffman invited the Khan to an interview, and by means of various arguments persuaded him to liberate the slaves, while the Russians still remained in the Khanate and could assist him by their co-operation. On the following day a regulation was introduced into the Council regarding the abolition of slavery, and the Khan issued the following Manifesto for universal publication :—

“I, Syud Mahomed Rahim Bahadur Khan, in token of deep consideration to the Emperor of Russia, direct all my subjects forthwith to give to all the slaves in my Khanate full freedom. From the present moment slavery is for ever abolished in the Khanate of Khiva. Let this humane act serve as a pledge of the true friendship and regard of all my people to the great Russian nation. I direct that this my command be fulfilled to the letter on pain of

most severe punishment. All who have hitherto been slaves are from this moment free, and must be considered as possessing equal rights with my other subjects, and as being under the same obligations and penalties for raising disturbances in this country, and I hereby call them to return to order.

“To those who have been slaves (*dugma*) is hereby given the right of living wherever they wish in the Khanate, or of going thence whither they choose. To those who desire to leave the Khanate, such special arrangements as may be made will be communicated. Female slaves (*churi*) are hereby granted freedom on the same conditions as males. Disputes between married females and their husbands will be settled by the Kazis according to the *Shariyat*.”

On the 18th (30th) May this Manifesto, the style of which alone is sufficient to show that it originated from the Russians, was for the first time publicly read in the bazaar of Khiva, but apparently it made no particular impression on the populace who were already prepared for it. The slaves liberated by private people are called “*azad*,” and those liberated by the Khan “*khanazad*” (this name is also applied to horses which pass from the

Khan's stables into private hands). According to the account of the slaves themselves, the total number of all the "dugmas" and "churis" in the 140 towns and villages of the Khanate amounted to 30,000 souls. The number of those who had previously been liberated by the Khan and by private individuals amounted to about 6,500, who had received a niggardly grant of land to the extent of 2,634 tanaps or 44 Russian "desyatins."

The Persians who wished to return to their fatherland were obliged to collect in the bazaars (of which there were thirty-seven in the Khanate), where they were registered by a Government official, after which they had to elect elders and to go to the village of Naiman, the appointed place for their gathering together. Thence in parties of from five to six hundred they departed to Krasnovodsk, where Russian vessels waited to convey them to Persia. Since, however, some time was required for collecting the slaves, a considerable number of the Persians still remained in the Khanate at the time of the retirement of the Russians, which resulted in several collisions with the Toorkomans, and the death of no small number of the Persians in the skirmishes that took place.

Thus our victory resulted not only in the liberation of the Russian captives, but also of as many as 40,000 Persians, which would alone have been a sufficient recompense for all the hardships and deprivations endured by our troops. I am of opinion, however, that the departure from the Khanate of such a mass of hardworking people could not but have an injurious effect on agriculture. It might very possibly have happened that many of the Persians would have consented to remain in Khiva if a sufficient grant of land had been offered to them from the possessions of their former masters. It would also for another reason have been beneficial to require that after being liberated these slaves should receive a small grant of land, for even if they had sold the grants thus made, they would not have had to return to their homes in a state of utter destitution. This, however, would have been possible only if we had occupied Khiva permanently, otherwise the new agriculturists would never have been able to remain for any length of time in the Khanate.

In the month of August the Russian troops began to retire from Khiva. The lands on the right bank of the Amu-Darya, *viz.*, the

regions of Shurakhan and Chimbai, were ceded in perpetuity to Russia, and formed the Amu-Daryan district, for the protection of which nine companies of infantry, four sotnias of Cossacks, and eight guns were left to garrison the Fort of Petro-Alexandrofsk (in which independently of the above there were four guns, four mortars, and four pieces of Khivan artillery).

A word should be said here regarding the Commandants of frontier detachments. These appointments fall to the lot of only a very few officers, and are seldom held more than once during the period of service. Hence they are much prized, and the officers who are fortunate enough to gain them are tempted to extraordinary activity, making every rumour a pretext for what is called supporting the prestige of the Russian name, and thus ceasing to play a purely defensive part. The enterprise of any particular officer seldom remains without results, both to himself and to the Empire, which is sometimes thereby implicated in an unnecessary war and an unnecessary extension of territory. Thus it has happened that the Commandant of the Amu-Darya district has already found an opportunity for twice crossing the Amu, and

naturally a similar proceeding will be from time to time repeated.

In the summer of 1874 it was proposed to carry out a detailed survey of the old bed of the Oxus, since the theory of the diversion of this river by means of artificial dams had been placed almost beyond the possibility of doubt. It is very possible that before many years have passed the traditional idea of Peter the Great will be realized, and the waters of the Amu-Darya will flow into the Caspian. In order to effect this, it will probably be necessary to stop up all the irrigation canals which at present spring from the river and carry off an immense volume* of water on to the fields of the Khivan oasis. If this be done, agriculture would be ruined, and the Khanate would become a desert, but in view of the inestimable benefits to Russia, the interests of Khiva must necessarily be sacrificed.

* One of these canals alone is as much as thirty Russian fathoms (210 feet) in width, five (35 feet) in depth, and some 100 versts (66 miles) in length.

CHAPTER VII.

RELATIONS WITH THE PROVINCES OF WESTERN CHINA.

Derivation of the name Dungan—Causes of the insurrection of 1864—Russian policy of non-interference—Results of the insurrection—Disputes between the Taranchees and Dunganees—Interference of Kokan in the affairs of Kashgar—Yacoob Beg sees his opportunity—Inroad of the Khutuktu Chogan Kegen—Violation of our frontier—Communications with China which arose therefrom—Immigration of Chinese and Kirgiz into Russian territory—Cattle-lifting expeditions and preventive measures taken by the Russians—Discontent of the Sultan of Ili at our administration in his dominions—Russian occupation of the Muzart Pass—The Russians contemplate assisting the Chinese to regain the provinces which had cast off allegiance—Major Zdorenko is attacked by the Kirgiz—Negotiations with Sultan Abul Ogla for the surrender of the culprits—Flight of Tazabeg—Reconnoitres of the Russian detachments—Aggressive movement on the part of the Taranchees—Occupation of Kulja by the Russians, and the request of the Chinese for the return to them of the province of Ili—Under what conditions could this request be complied with?

IN the eighth century of the Christian era, when the religion of Islam began to be disseminated throughout Turkistan, at that time a dependency of China, and made its presence apparent by a series of disturbances and disorders, the Chinese Government transplanted the newly-made Mahomedans into China, where they soon

lost their mother-tongue, their customs, and even their religion, adhering only to the traditional prohibition against consuming spirituous liquors and eating the flesh of certain animals. Misled by the statements of the Chinese, the Russian Consul at Kulja, M. Pavlinof, and afterwards also other writers on Central Asia, have expressed a belief that the Mahomedans were sent into the province of Kan-su, whence they began to penetrate into the neighbouring districts and received the name of "Tun-Kan-su," *i.e.*, the same people as live in Kan-su.

Mr. Hutton, in his work on Central Asia, endeavours to trace the derivation of the word Dungan thus:— "At the commencement of the Christian era, Turkistan was peopled by a branch of the great Uïgur horde of Toorks, called by the Chinese Hoeike, Oihor, and Hoai-Hoi. At the close of the eighth century the Chinese transplanted an immense number of families from Eastern Turkistan to Kansu and Shensi. The Tagazkas tribe of Uïgurs, many of whom were Manichœans and many likewise Nestorian Christians, moved in a body from the neighbourhood of Kashgar to the frontiers of China. Near the close of the tenth century the Kashgaree Uïgurs, with their Prince Satook

Bookra Khan, embraced Mahomedanism, and overran Mawaralnahr, bringing back with them a long train of captives of the Tourgai tribe of Toorks. Many of these subsequently returned to Samarkand, but not a few remained behind, and were called by their own countrymen Turghanies, or Tunganies, signifying 'The Remnant.' Both Chinghiz and Okkodai drove large numbers of the Uïgur and Tungani Mahomedans into China, who kept up an intercourse with Central Asia, through the medium of the caravans that travelled from Kashgar to Peking. In Eastern Turkistan a fusion was gradually brought about of the Uïgurs and Tunganis, the mixed population coming to be called by the latter name or by that of Dungen, though they were better known to the Chinese as Uïgurs or Hoai-Hoai. At a later period, however, the Chinese applied the epithet Tun-jen, or 'military people,' to the Mahomedan colonists settled on the Tun-tien, 'or military lands,' on the western frontier of the empire."

The fact that the Chinese did not apply the name of Tun-jen to the people to whom Mr. Hutton refers, ought to have been sufficient to awake his doubts, and moreover a reference to

any Turko-English Dictionary would have shown him that besides the verb "turmak" to stand, or wait, there are also the verbs "tunmak" to think, "tonmak" to grow obscure, "dunmak" to return, or deviate, and "donmak" to become frozen, the participles of which are: "tungan," one thinking, "tongan," one who has grown dark, "dungan," one who has turned away, or who has returned, and lastly, "dongan," something which is being frozen. From these words it is of course easy to select the one which is most conformable to any given view of the derivation of the name Dungan; but the word "turgan" cannot possibly have become converted by any natural process into "tungan," because the laws of the language do not admit of such a change.

In my opinion the word "dungan" is more probably derived from the appellation "Dun-khwan," which, as early as the year 111 A.C., the Chinese gave to a newly-organized district in the Governorship of Kan-su. From information given in a work called "A collection of particulars regarding the nations inhabiting Central Asia" by Father Hyacinthe, it appears that this district was in the year 570 A.D. formed into a separate circle, and

received the name of Man-sha-jhu. Those of the Mahomedans who were transplanted into the Governorship of Kan-su were probably sent to the circle of Man-sha-jhu, *i.e.*, the former Dun-khwan, and we know from experience how difficult it is to eradicate an old name. For instance, by whatever name the Governorships along the course of the Visla may be called, the natives still persist in speaking of them as the Polish Empire, while the Governorships on the Baltic are still popularly known as the Ost See (East Sea) Provinces. The conservative habits of the Chinese are proverbial, and it is only natural that they should have adhered to the name of Dun-khwan as late as the eighth century. Moreover, the name of a circle is naturally applied to its inhabitants, and a Chinese word easily becomes changed in conformity with the requirements of the Toorkee language. Thus it appears more natural to derive Dungan from "Dun-khwan" than from Turgan or Kan-su.

In the time of Chengiz Khan the authority of China in Eastern Turkistan was on the decline, but on the fall of the Empire of Chugatai it again revived. The second Chinese conquest cannot, however, be considered as

having been fully accomplished until 1758, when the Emperor Kien-lung took Turkistan from the Oirots (Eluths or Calmucks). Having divided the region into seven Ambanships, which were made subordinate to the Chiang-Chün (Military Governor) of Kulja, the Chinese left the people considerable liberty of administration; but in spite of their wide toleration, the inhabitants rose several times under the influence of their holy Khodjas and the priesthood. In 1825 the rebellion of Jehangeer Khan of Kashgar at first threatened the Chinese supremacy with serious danger, but the insurgents were quickly defeated and Jehangeer put to death. In 1847 Wullee Khan Tora, the son of Jehangeer, appeared on the scene, and profiting by the secret support of Kokan at first gained some success, but owing to the severity with which he signalized his triumphs, he estranged the people from his cause and barely managed to escape from the Chinese with his life. After having put down the rebellion of 1825, the Chinese despatched a mass of Mahomedan mutineers into the province of Ili. Thus it happened that two classes arose in Western China, the Tungans, who already enjoyed the

rights of Chinese citizenship, and were occupied in trade, and the Taranchees,* consisting of convicts recently transported, who were occupied in agriculture and were in a condition of complete slavery.

The example of the Taepings†, the arbitrary taxation,—the amount of which entirely depended on the will of the various Governors, who held the provinces, as it were, in farm from the Government,—the arrogant behaviour of the Chinese authorities, the systematic miscarriage of justice which invariably tended to the benefit of the Chinese element, and lastly, the exclusion of the Taranchees from official appointments, were the main causes which produced the insurrection of 1864.

On this occasion Russia adhered to the terms of the existing treaties with China in their integrity, and judging that the Chinese Government was capable, without assistance,

* The word Taranchee means agriculturist. I do not know how our authors obtained the idea that Taranchee means a "man of bloody sweat." The word is of Mongolian derivation, and the termination "Chi" implies doer, *i.e.*, *Malchi* a shepherd, *Tomorchi* a blacksmith, *Modunchi*, a carpenter, *Taranchi*, an agriculturist.

† The rebels who for many years overran nearly the whole of the south and east of China proper, and who were eventually checked in 1864 only by means of the assistance rendered by the British to the Imperial Government at the close of the last Chinese war. —[*Trs.*]

of crushing the rebellion, determined to observe the principle of strict non-interference; nor could all the pressing and humble prayers of the Chinese Generals induce the Governor-General of Western Siberia to deviate from this line of action. So strictly did the frontier authorities adhere to their instructions that they prohibited the export of grain to Kulja, where provisions were then much needed, thereby placing that town in a most desperate condition, which terminated in the glorious self-sacrifice of the Chinese garrison, who of their own accord ignited the magazine and perished in the end of February 1866.

Such strict non-interference on the part of the Russians doubtless facilitated the development of the rebellion. The behaviour of the Chinese towards us was not, it is true, that of sincerely friendly neighbours, and constant disputes on the frontier sometimes ended in actual collisions*. Nevertheless, our position with respect to the Government of China became very complicated, inasmuch as parties of Russian Kirgiz, having wandered into Chinese territory, took part in the insurrection and

* Thus on the 31st May (12th June) 1863 a Russian Officer, Lieutenant Antonof, was enticed to the Chinese picket under the pretext of negotiations and was treacherously killed.

sacked some Chinese towns. It was also reported that Chinese and Calmuck captives were allowed to be sold in Vernöe, though a subsequent investigation did not confirm this rumour, which was probably based upon the fact that several female Chinese were bought out of captivity from the Dungans and taken as wives by the Sarts of Vernöe. Afterwards when these women were, on the demand of the Chinese officials*, recovered from their new husbands, a considerable number of them evaded the watchfulness of the Chinese guards and fled back to the Sarts. This event showed clearly that the traffic in slaves existed only in the fertile imaginations of the Russian Consul and the inactive Chinese officials.

The results of the insurrection, so far as they concerned Russia, were the following: (1) the destruction of our Consulates and factories in Kulja and Chuguchak; (2) the entire cessation of commerce which had attained very considerable dimensions; (3) an influx of ruined and plundered emigrants into Russian territory;

* It should be added that our Consul M. Pavlinof lent his voice to the demand of the Chinese in this matter. Pavlinof warmly espoused the interests of the Chinese, and indeed appeared to neighbouring Russian authorities to represent the interests of China more than those of Russia.

and (4) perpetual disturbances on the frontier, inroads into our territory, and attacks on our subjects.

Thus it happened that our non-interference, while it led indirectly to the defeat of the Chinese in Zungaria and Kashgaria, destroyed our own commerce in those parts, and also assisted in the formation of a restless and fanatical Mahomedan Empire in our immediate neighbourhood—an Empire which was in every way less convenient to us than the peaceful and, as matters eventually proved, generally tractable Government of China.

The insurrection of the Nien-fei*, who penetrated almost up to the walls of Peking, hindered the Chinese Government from carrying into effect the scheme which had been conceived of moving troops on to Kobdo for the purpose of acting against the rear of the insurgents, simultaneously with an advance on

* This was an insurrection brought about chiefly by the widespread distress caused by the operations of the Taepings and the inundations of the Yellow river. It originated among the half-starved agriculturists of the provinces of Honan and Ngan-Huei about the year 1866, but quickly spread through Shantung and Chili, till early in 1868 Peking was threatened. Energetic and horribly inhuman measures, however, were taken by the Imperial Government, and the miserable Nien-fei were suppressed by the end of that year. It was not a political movement.—[*Trs.*]

their front in the direction of Barkul. The Chinese were compelled to limit the strength of their troops to slender detachments, reinforcing them from the Mongols and Calmucks, and to give up the idea of an attack on the rear.

Meanwhile, the insurrection had assumed a new phase. The Taranchees, who formed the agricultural body, proved to be in possession of considerable stores of grain, a large portion of which they had gained possession of by killing the Chinese owners. They refused to comply with the demand of the Dungans for a share of this grain, and hence disputes and disturbances arose between the two tribes. The Dungans were defeated at Bayanda and were forced to flee to the circle of Urumchi, the Taranchees taking possession of Kulja. In February 1867 a party of Dungans numbering 500 started from Urumchi under the mask of a deputation sent to congratulate the Taranchees on having liberated themselves from the supremacy of the Chinese. The Taranchees, however, suspecting treachery anticipated their opponents by massacring every member of the deputation.

In May 1867 the Dungans endeavoured to revenge this outrage by sending a detachment

of 2,000 men into the province of Ili. But this attempt ended in failure, as many as 1,000 men falling victims in the unequal contest, and the remainder, with difficulty, regaining their homes. Want of corn, dearth, and famine,* obliged crowds of the haughty Dungans to seek their livelihood amongst the Taranchees, and from this time their attacks were not repeated—a result which was probably to some extent due to apprehension regarding their own safety from the side of China.

The Government of China determined to take advantage of the intertribal disputes of their frontier inhabitants, and with that object let loose a horde of Calmucks in order to put down the insurrection, and especially to restrain the marauding propensities of the Kirgiz. The Calmucks having occupied the valley of the Black Irtysh subdued the Kirgiz of those parts, and on the arrival of the bands of their own Khutuktu,† Chogan Kegen, the

* The Dungans had abundance of tea and silver which they had plundered from the Chinese. In 1868 the export of tea from Urumchi was forbidden, owing to which disturbances arose and many of the Chinese merchants destroyed by fire with their own hands their stores of tea.

† One of the incarnations of the deity, of whom they have now five. (Generally known as the Deputy Grand Lama or Deputy living Buddha—a kind of Buddhist archbishop. *Trs.*)

authority of China was re-established over the whole of the circle of Tarbagatai, the Dungans being overpowered and forced to flee into the circle of Urumchi.

In numbers the Taranchees amounted to 38,000 souls.* Their Sultan, Abul Ogla, was chosen by the people and did not consequently enjoy any especial importance, but the chief influence, both morally and practically, was possessed by Alum Akhoon, the head of the priesthood. The former commanded the troops, who had a sufficient quantity of Chinese small arms and cannon, but owing to the absence of ammunition, these fire-arms were only brought into use on very rare and special occasions.

Besides Urumchi, the Dungans, whose numbers may be put at 60,000, occupy Manas or Kur-Kara-usu, and Turfan. Their Sultan combines in his person the highest dignities of the Church and State, and therefore possesses much more influence than the Chief of the Taranchees. In the event of the Chinese failing to re-establish their authority in those pro-

* Besides these there were as many as 5,000 Dungans in the province of Kulja, 3,000 Chinese, 18,000 Mongols, 15,000 Sibos, 22,000 Kirgiz and others—in all a total of 103,000 souls.

vinces the Dungans will form a living wall between us and China and will cut off, altogether, our communications with that Empire, which for the last two centuries has maintained peace and friendship with us.

Wishing in his turn to benefit by the unsettled condition of the neighbouring Chinese provinces, the Khan of Kokan sent to Altishuhr (Kashgaria) Yacoob Beg, formerly the Commandant of Ak Musjid (the present Perovsk), with a band of followers collected in Kokan, under the pretext of restoring in Kashgaria the rule of the Khodjas in the person of Buzurg Khan, the representative of the family who had stood at the head of the revolution of 1826.

At first Yacoob Beg acted under the name of this pretender and gained rapid and decided successes, but before long he threw off the mask, laid aside the Khan,—who, owing to his want of talent and inability to fill his high position, soon relapsed into nothingness—and placing him in prison, became the absolute sovereign of Chinese Turkistan or Kashgar.

Yacoob then turned his attention to the introduction of a certain degree of order into the newly conquered territory and to the

organization of his troops up to a fairly efficient standard. By these means and by crushing every sign of discontent with an inexorable severity, which was applied alike to all classes, tribes, and persons, Yacoob earned for himself the title of "Atalik" and "Ghazi," i.e., the just and the conqueror. Of all the Governments which have sprung into existence since the revolution in Western China, that of Kashgar alone promises to be firm and perhaps to some extent lasting. In the remaining provinces of Western China, which have succeeded in casting off the Chinese yoke, the supreme authority has become so enfeebled by civil discord as to be scarcely able, without the assistance of Yacoob Beg, to withstand the pressure of the Chinese troops if they should at any future time reappear on the scene.

The restoration of the authority of China over the province of Tarbagatai resulted in a violation of the Russian frontiers. As early as 1865 the Khutuktu, Chogan Kegen, had crossed the frontier line with a mixed force of Calmucks and Mongols, and had plundered the Kirgiz in front of the Cossack station of Urjar. Again, in 1867, a second inroad of

Calmucks took place under the following circumstances :—

The Chiang-Chün or Chinese Military Governor of Ili, who was living in our territory, informed the Military Governor of the Semirechye* that a detachment of the Khutuktu was approaching our territory, for the purpose of escorting a body of emigrants who were about to be transplanted to the valley of the Black Irtysh with the conjoint consent of the Russian and Chinese Governments. The Chinese Military Governor asked for permission for the Khutuktu to cross the frontier and to take charge of the emigrants at the place where they were settled, and in spite of our refusal, the Calmucks entered Russian territory and plundered the Kirgiz of the Baijigit tribe, who wandered along the course of the river Jhit-Aral in the military circle of Kokpektinsk.

This incursion of the Calmucks may be interpreted as intended for the punishment of the Kirgiz of the Baijigit tribe who, in company

(Exactly equivalent to the Punjab, which is the Persian rendering of the "five rivers," while Semirechye is the Russian equivalent of "the land of the seven rivers."—*Trs.*)

with the Dungans, had taken part in the pillage of Chuguchak. The punishment, however, was executed within our territories, the boundaries of which were defined by the Chuguchak Treaty of 1864, and although the Khutuktu justified his action on the ground that the Kirgiz had themselves commenced hostilities by attacking him while *en route* to the settlements of the emigrants, still, even allowing this statement to be true, the following facts are undoubted, *firstly*, that he crossed the frontier before the attack, by whomsoever commenced, took place; *secondly*, that he did not continue his movement towards the settlements of the emigrants but returned with his booty to Chinese territory, and consequently that his real object was connected, not with the emigrants, but with the Baijigits; *thirdly*, that replying to the Russian Emissary he asserted that he did not consider the incursion to have been fully successful, but hoped to repeat it; and *fourthly*, that he demanded from us the surrender of the Baijigits in a body.

The Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs required from the Chinese Government (1) a written apology; (2) indemnification for the losses caused by the Khutuktu; (3) that the

Chinese troops should be prohibited from crossing the frontier; and (4) the punishment of Chogan Kegen and Amban Uvan. Our Minister at Pekin, Major-General Vlangali, in reply to the letter of the Governor-General regarding the position of affairs in Western China, stated on the 14th (26th) January 1868 that Chogan Kegen "by virtue of his spiritual influence, as Khutuktu, has great power over the Calmucks, the only race of a different stock who have remained faithful to the Chinese Government in the midst of the insurrections in Western China," and that for that reason we could scarcely reckon on full satisfaction for the inroad of the Khutuktu into our territory, the more so, as the Kirgiz who had suffered from the attack had themselves evoked it owing to the part which they had taken in the insurrection.

Regarding the question as to the efficacy of existing treaties, the operation of which had been interrupted by the insurrection in the Western Provinces, the Chinese Government replied—"If the Kirgiz of the rebellious Provinces were peaceable Chinese subjects, there could be no obstacle in applying the treaty provisions, but if, on the other hand, it

is the case that insurgents and robbers conceal themselves under the guise of merchants and come by stealth into the territories of the Russian Empire, it would be inconvenient to allow them to carry on trade." It was also said that "the sedition in the provinces in question is only temporary; that the Chinese Government would restore its authority over them, and that therefore the treaty of Kulja ought to be respected as formerly, in its integrity."

With reference to the emigrants who had accepted subjection to Russia, our Ambassador expressed an opinion that the Chinese Government could demand their surrender on the principles of existing treaties, if they should be proved to belong to the military class or to the military settlements. To refuse such a request would be the more embarrassing, since the Chinese invariably display great readiness in surrendering Russian fugitives, not even requiring a demand to be made on our side. The emigrants who had become our subjects, and accepted orthodoxy, numbered in 1871 1,095 souls, while the greater portion of the remaining 15,000 had already emigrated to the valley of the Black Irtysh.

In the year 1868, and especially in 1869, the general migration of Kirgiz into our territories showed an increase. This migration may be ascribed, *firstly*, to the disputes between the Dungans and the Taranchees, and *secondly*, to the inroad of Chogan Kegen with 40,000 Calmucks. Some of the nomads who came into our territories begged to be received as Russian subjects, while others looked to our territory as a temporary asylum, and did not hesitate to indulge their vicious propensities by indiscriminate cattle-lifting and horse-stealing, respecting neither the property of the Cossacks, Kirgiz, or of Government. In order to counteract these inroads, old guns with ten cartridges per man were distributed to the frontier villagers of the Sergiopol District and to such of the Cossacks as happened to be at their homes there, while at the same time two detachments were despatched for the punishment of the Kyzais from the post of Lepsinsk (4 sotnias of Cossacks and 30 gunners) and from Borokhudzir (67 infantry, 104 cavalry, and 2 field guns). The first detachment succeeded in recapturing 15,000 head of cattle and the second 5,000.

The bold and rapid movement of our detachments produced its natural effect, and by

the end of December 6,000 kubitkas of the Kyzais had tendered their submission and begged to be received as our subjects, but at the time of the negotiations a detachment of Taranchees and Suval Kirgiz numbering 2,000 men fell on the Kyzais and carried away 40,000 sheep and 2,000 horses and horned cattle. The Kyzais, in order to pursue the robbers, moved off out of our territory, while the Russian detachment of the Southern Tarbagatai could not render them any assistance in consequence of the deep snow which had closed up the passes.

Meantime the Sultan of Kulja despatched two emissaries to the Governor of the Semirechye, who conveyed a protest, on his part, against the Russians having attacked the Kyzais. In reply, the Sultan was recommended (1) himself to take such measures as would prevent the Kirgiz, subordinate to his authority, from making inroads into our territories; (2) to surrender the fugitive Alum Beg who had fled in July 1869 with thirty kubitkas; and (3) to permit unrestricted trade with Kulja.

In the course of the year 1870 no plundering expedition of any importance occurred, the robbers contenting themselves with attack-

ing small parties of travellers and small herds of cattle. Pillage accompanied by loss of life was nevertheless committed by the mounted detachment of the Taranchees which guarded the Muzart Pass, and, at last, in May 1870, an attack made by the Taranchees on five Russian Kirgiz who were engaged in stag hunting, compelled the Governor of the Semirechye again to enter into communications with the Sultan, for which purpose the translator of the District Court of the Semirechye was deputed to Kulja.

The following demands were made from the Sultan—(1) the punishment of those concerned in the attack on the five Kirgiz; (2) the restoration of the captives; (3) a recompense in cash to one of these Kirgiz who had lost his hands owing to the frost; (4) the surrender of Kirgiz refugees who had fled from Russian territory. The Sultan replied that no news had at that time reached him regarding the attacks which formed the subject of complaint, and that therefore he had ordered an enquiry to be instituted. To the last demand he replied by a direct refusal, referring to the “Shariyat” as forbidding the surrender of guests. To a further request of the Military Governor

that Russian vessels might be permitted to sail up the River Ili in order to procure wood and coal from the mines there, the Sultan refused to accede under the pretext that the supply from the mines had fallen off, the quantity of coal being scarcely sufficient for their own requirements ; that coal had never previously been exported ; and lastly, that the inhabitants were averse from such an arrangement.

Then in order to put a stop to any further disturbances on the border and to defend the Russian Kargiz from being plundered by the Taranchees and the nomads subordinate to their authority, the Governor-General directed the occupation of the descent from the Muzart Pass, the only passage in the Tian Shan range which unites the Province of Ili with Altishuhr. This measure was carried into effect in the end of August 1870, and was rendered the more necessary from the fact that Yacoob Beg, perceiving the impossibility of making the Taranchees and Dungans subordinate to his authority by means of negotiations, had recourse to more forcible measures, and had already occupied some Dungan towns, including Karashar and Turfan. Again

the command of the Muzart Pass enabled us to prevent Yacoob Beg from occupying Kulja, and thus founding a powerful Mahomedan Empire in our immediate neighbourhood.

This move had an instantaneous effect upon the Sultan of Kulja, who at once changed his tone and hastened to give up two Kirgiz who had been captured, begging us at the same time to recall the Muzart detachment in order to avoid possible collisions which might occur if he were forced to call out his own soldiery for the protection of caravans. In reply to this General Kolpakofski reminded the Sultan of his refusal to give up the fugitives, and afterwards demanded the restoration of the third Kirgiz, counselling him at the same time not to call out the Taranchee troops if he was really anxious to avoid a rupture, and assuring him that the Russians would undertake to provide for the safety of passing caravans.

Matters, however, showed no improvement, and the conduct of the Sultan of Kulja was such as to oblige us altogether to ignore his authority until such time as more decided measures could be taken against him.

In the interests of Russia the restoration of the lawful authority of China over these

provinces, which perpetually fall a prey to anarchy, would have been in every way the most desirable. The Chinese Government in spite of its weakness was still a Government. It had always endeavored to maintain peaceable relations with us, and had invariably striven to protect the integrity of the frontier, which on account of its vast extent could not have been guarded with equal effect without its co-operation. Lastly, it had always conceded any debateable points in our favour.

Although in the beginning of the insurrection it may possibly have been good policy to adhere to the principle of non-interference, nevertheless, at a later stage, when the impotence of the Chinese Government became apparent, our own interests should have induced us to render assistance to China and to put a stop to a state of anarchy, which could only have the effect of still further desolating the provinces in our neighbourhood, to the undoubted detriment of our commerce, tranquillity, and political influence. The negotiations which were conducted in the beginning of 1870 by M. Streoukhof, Director of the Asiatic Department, with the Chinese Envoys,

Burlingame*, Chi, and Sun, had no definite result with regard to the pacification of the western districts, but the idea of Russian interference in the affairs of these provinces was clearly not distasteful to the Envoys, who, on the contrary, went so far as almost to express a wish that such interference might be carried into effect.

The fertile valley of the River Ili with its splendid climate might, if Russian intervention had not taken place, have become the prey either of the Dungans or of Yacoob Beg, who would easily have penetrated thither after the conquest of Urumchi. It was, however, impossible that either the Dungans or the Kashgarians, who are much more powerful and enterprising than the Taranchees, should be tolerated in close proximity to our frontiers, which were the scene of perpetual disturbances and robberies; for if the proximity of even the Taranchees obliged us to maintain three detachments of troops

* Mr. Anson Burlingame was United States Minister Plenipotentiary in China, who, on being offered a large sum of money, left his post and entered the service of the Chinese as a kind of strolling ambassador. In company with two inferior Mandarins he was despatched on a mission to the United States, England, France, Russia, &c., and succeeded in extracting implied promises from all these Governments of a future policy favourable to the Chinese. He died at St. Petersburg in 1870, when the Mission came to an end, and the remainder of the "troupe" returned to China. (*Trs.*)

along the short stretch of frontier between the Ala Tau and the Tian Shan ranges (250 versts), and if these were not able effectually to preserve the region from the inroads of marauders, the occupation of Kulja by a more enterprising and powerful people would naturally increase our difficulties.

In August 1870 a band, consisting of Russian and Kulja Kirgiz, attacked Major Zdorenko, who was proceeding on the regular postal road in the district of Kopal. After plundering his property and inflicting fifteen wounds upon him, the robbers, later on in the same day, plundered a postal station and carried off the horses. Again on the 18th (30th) September an attack was made on a detachment of Cossacks sent in search of a party who had, not long before, carried off two Russian soldiers.

Information having been received of the names of the robbers who had attacked Zdorenko, a letter was, on the 23rd November (5th December), addressed to the Sultan Abul Ogla, containing a demand for the surrender of the culprits and the restoration of the plundered property. The Sultan ordered the arrest of the robbers, asked General Kolpakofski for such a description as would enable him to identify the

post horses, promised to continue the enquiry, but with regard to the surrender of the culprits, was silent. This circumstance gave us the opportunity of deputing to Kulja Mr. Chistopolski, the head of the Judicial Department of the Semirechye Provincial Court, in order to make a judicial enquiry on the spot, while Baron Kaulbars, Captain of the General Staff, was associated with him for the purpose of conducting the diplomatic communications. The embassy was not attended with success. The Sultan not only declined to fulfil any one of our demands, but also insisted that we should recall the Tian Shan detachment, then stationed on the River Urten-Muzart, threatening in the event of a refusal to have recourse to arms. Thus the day of reckoning grew near. In the end of December the Kirgiz of the Kyzai tribe moved off to Kulja, plundering several "auls" on their way, in consequence of which, in the spring of 1871, it was resolved to send out a reconnoitring party towards the lake of Sairam-Nur within the Khanate of Kulja. In April 1871, a native officer, by name Tazabeg, who was in charge of the "Volost" of Mertinsk, also fled to Kulja with 1,000 kubitkas after an unsuccessful attack on the detachment which was

despatched against him. A demand was sent to the Sultan for the surrender of Tazabeg within the space of seven days, that is, before the 3rd (15th) May, on which day the three Russian Frontier detachments (of Chunjinsk, Boro-khudzir, and Ketmensk) made reconnoitres into the bordering territory and came upon the Taranchee forces. Having concluded their reconnoitres the detachments returned to their quarters, and the Taranchees misinterpreting this movement as a retreat, crossed the range of hills into our territory, and on the 14th (26th) May attacked the Ketmensk detachment. Open hostilities thus commenced. A succession of skirmishes which took place while our troops were being concentrated, followed by some engagements on a larger scale [near Alim-tu on the 16th (28th) of June, Chinchagodzi on the 18th (30th) June, and Suidun on the 19th June (1st July)], quickly brought the war to a successful termination on the 21st of that month (3rd July), on which date the Sultan surrendered himself as a captive of war, and on the following day our troops entered the capital.

After this deputations began to come in from all sides to General Kolpakofski from the

Kirgiz, from the inhabitants of the Dungan villages, and also from the Torguts, the descendants of those Calmucks who in 1770 fled from the Volga. Oppressed by the Dungans and having fallen under the authority of Yacoob Beg who had deputed Adjha Khodja as their ruler, the Torguts rebelled against the latter, liberated their fellow tribesmen who had been taken as hostages (*viz.*, their female Chief with her two sons and the chief heads of the tribe), abandoned their fields on the River Yulduz and moved off towards the mountains near Hami, far to the east of Turfan, afterwards making their appearance within Russian territory where they were allotted the locality on the River Tekis.

At the end of October 1871 a telegram was received in Tashkent from our Envoy Extraordinary at Pekin regarding the departure from Uliasutai of the Chinese Military Governor Jhun for the purpose of entering into negotiations, having for their object the restoration of the Province of Kulja to the Chinese. The Russian Government determined to treat the question in the following way:—

(1.) To explain to the Chinese Military Governor the then condition of the Ili Pro-

vince, and also what had been done by us to protect it for the benefit of the Chinese ;

(2.) To declare to him that this province could not be given over otherwise than on the arrival of Chinese troops ;

(3.) To ascertain from him what measures the Chinese Government proposed to adopt for the administration of the province ;

(4.) To make no mention whatever regarding remuneration on account of military expenses which had been incurred ; and

(5.) Not to touch on the question regarding the demarcation of a more suitable frontier line between Russian and Chinese territory.

Colonel Boguslovski, attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs, was appointed to conduct the negotiations on behalf of Russia, but as the Chinese Plenipotentiary could not guarantee the maintenance of peace in the province, and instead of regular troops, counted on the support of some thousands of Solons* and Sibos, who had survived the recent disturbances, the negotiations were abruptly broken off.

Out of the population which amounts to a total of 102,910 souls, the greater part

* Solons and Sibos are Manchu military colonists settled in Ili and the adjacent provinces. They are employed as a kind of irregular cavalry in all these western regions. (*Trs.*)

(65,685) profess the religion of Mahomedanism, the rest being Pagans. Deep-seated hatred exists between the various tribes, and force alone can keep them in any sort of order. Moreover to leave Kulja, as was formerly the case, to the authority of the Mussulmans was clearly inexpedient; while on the other hand, the restoration of the Province to China was unadvisable on account of the inability of the Chinese to maintain order; and lastly, to uphold the Chinese authority by means of our troops, would have involved the undertaking, on the part of Russia, of the entire burden for the military occupation of the region without its accompanying benefits.

For these reasons it was resolved to retain Kulja under our authority until such time as the Chinese Government should be in a sufficiently efficient position to undertake the management of affairs and to send thither a sufficiently strong force. The problem therefore which our administrators have had to solve has been to maintain such an equilibrium and equality of rights between the tribes as would be agreeable to the wishes of the Chinese Government, and at the same time not to introduce such arrangements as would, in the event of the

return of the Chinese, at once be cancelled and set aside. In a word, our object has been to act conservatively, to initiate no new reforms, and, so to speak, to follow the spirit of the Chinese administration.

The Chiang-Chün, Jhun, has established himself in Chuguchak and is gradually acquiring some importance in the eyes of the inhabitants of the Kulja region who are under our authority, and who are secretly instigated in various ways to believe that Russia will not retain possession of Kulja, but will restore it to China. At the present time the native inhabitants, ignorant as to who may be their future masters, do not know to which side to attach themselves, and fulfil the various demands made upon them by the Chinese officials. Thus not long ago they despatched some hundred "chetverts" of corn to the Chinese troops, and, as it appears, intended to send out the workmen required from them for the cultivation of the lands in the region of Chuguchak.

The rumours regarding the return of the Chinese are gaining the force of an undeniable truth, especially in view of the fact that Urumchi and Manas, which have been reduced to the last degree by famine, are prepared to

capitulate, and it is only the extremely hard conditions proposed by the Chinese Military Governor for their acceptance that restrains them from taking this final step. Jhun, on the other hand, has already declared that after the capitulation of these towns he will proceed to Turfan and Kashgar.

In view of such a reawakening on the part of the Chinese after their long slumber, our situation in Kulja is becoming very ambiguous, and every ambiguity is injurious to the prestige of a great Empire. Thus, before long, the Russian Government will have definitely to decide the question as to who shall be the future masters of Kulja. My opinion is that until the Chinese power is established on a firm and definite basis at Kashgar, we ought not to recede from our position on the Ili, from whence alone we are able to curb the enterprising spirit of Yacoob Beg and his English friends.

CHAPTER VIII.

RELATIONS WITH KASHGAR.

Relations with Kashgar or Jitishuhr*—The Kokanian General Yacoob Beg becomes an Ameer—Restrictions imposed upon our merchants—Designs of the English on Kashgar—Russia replies by erecting a fort on the Naryn—The first Embassy from Kashgar—Yacoob Beg liberates two Russian captives—Proposals of the Governor-General—Question regarding frontiers—The Torguts are made the pretext for hostilities between the Dungans and Yacoob Beg—Russia replies by the occupation of the Muzart Pass—Can the restoration of the power of China be expected? Strained relations between Russia and Yacoob Beg—The English cannot be permitted to establish themselves in Kashgar—Russia offers to conquer this country on behalf of the Khan of Kokan—Khudayar Khan prefers to act the part of a mediator—Yacoob insists upon direct communications—Embassy of Baron Kaulbars—Conclusion of a Treaty—Second Embassy of Shadi Mirza—The English are on the alert—Our Treaty becomes a dead letter.

YACOOB BEG was originally Commander of a body of Kokan troops, in which capacity in the year 1852 he succeeded in warding off an attack made by Colonel Blaramberg on Fort Ak Musjid, and was subsequently deputed to Kashgar for the purpose of restoring there the authority of the Khodjas in the person of Buzurg†

* Jitishuhr (more properly Yetti-shuhr—*Trs.*) literally signifies "seven towns." Altishuhr (or the "six towns") was the ancient name of this region. In reality there are fifteen towns and fifty-five small districts.

† The representative of the family which stood at the head of the revolution of 1826.

Khan. Acting at first in the name of the latter, Yacoob soon perceived the incapacity of his Chief, and taking advantage of the devotion of the troops to his own interests, threw Buzurg Khan into prison, and proclaimed himself absolute Ruler of Chinese Turkistan or Kashgar.*

In point of fact Buzurg Khan, whose name was associated with the exploits of Jchangeer Khan (his grandfather), and thus commanded the sympathies of the people, served only as a convenient means of inducing the inhabitants to join in the insurrection. Self indulgent by nature and incapable of action, he became a cipher in the hands of Yacoob Beg the moment that his name ceased to be of any use. He was thereupon placed under strict surveillance, and was forbidden to leave his house, guards being placed over him until the "removal of all his adherents had been effected," as a means to which end Yacoob freely resorted to the sword of the executioner.

Having at last firmly established himself in his new position and occupied the whole of

* Buzurg Khan had first made an attempt to split up the Mussulman camp, seceding with his followers, and levying war against Yacoob. This was before Yacoob had made any overt attempt to deprive Buzurg of the supremacy, excepting in so far that by his energy and capacity as Lieutenant he had carried through with success critical operations which the supineness and incapacity of his Chief would have allowed to fail.—(*Trs.*)

Altishuhr, Yacoob Beg in 1867 assumed the title of Atalik Ghazee, and afterwards on the subjection of Urumchi, the additional appellation of Badaulat, or the favorite of fortune (*daulat*, signifying good fortune, wealth). The Sultan of Turkey has also recently conferred upon him the title of Ameer—a title which we shall probably not refuse to recognize, since up to the present time we have freely acknowledged in official communications all the titles which Yacoob Beg has chosen to adopt. Having established his authority over Altishuhr, Yacoob Beg devoted his energies to obtaining his recognition from neighbouring Powers. The Khan of Kokan however could not forget that Yacoob was his *quondam* subject, and therefore declined to enter into any communications whatever with him. For a long time also the Russian authorities could not consent to accept the new *regime*, in view of the uncertainty of the continuance of Yacoob Beg's rule over a region, which was subject to periodical revolutions, and of the possible restoration of Chinese authority over Kashgar. Having regard moreover to the existing treaties with China, we were naturally reluctant to recognize Yacoob Beg, until he had first been

recognized by the Chinese Government, or until the powerlessness of China to restore her authority over the province should be placed beyond all doubt. Lastly, Yacoob Beg was incessantly striving after conquest, and therefore it would have been the more inconvenient for us to become involved in any quasi-political communications with such an adventurer. For these reasons we refused to conclude any engagements with him, or to permit his envoys to present themselves at the Imperial Court.

It is impossible to explain what was the object of Yacoob Beg in placing from the very outset every possible restriction on Russian commerce, but that he did do so to such an extent as to make its existence almost impossible is a well known fact. Our merchants were subjected to perpetual surveillance while in his dominions; their merchandize was valued at arbitrary rates, very considerably lower than the current market prices, and was taken from them, whether they wished it or not, for the benefit of Yacoob Beg himself, who gave in exchange raw silk and coarse cotton stuffs of native make, which were appraised at rates out of all proportion to their real value. To such an extent was this carried that the foreign

trade of Kashgar practically formed a monopoly in the hands of the ruler of the country, and so to speak a Government perquisite—a state of things which recalls the system adopted in the middle ages in Russia by the Grand Dukes of Moscow. It may seem strange that some of our merchants should regard this anomalous mode of trading with the Sovereign of the country as neither burdensome nor altogether devoid of profit; but this may be explained by the fact that transactions on a large scale with private persons involve long credits, whereas dealings with Yacoob Beg were free from difficulties of that kind. In the case of the merchants of Kokan this peculiar method of conducting trade was applied with such rigour that at one time commercial intercourse between Kokan and Kashgar altogether ceased, although at present there are signs of a gradual revival in this respect.

The English, apparently in the hope of gaining some benefits from this condition of affairs, as early as the year 1868 entered into communications of a semi-commercial semi-political character with Yacoob Beg by means of a Special Commissioner, Mr. Douglas Forsyth. In Mr. Forsyth's report the following passage occurs :

“English trade is evidently developing itself in Central Asia. Yacoob Beg declared that he was a protector of commerce, and therefore it is to be hoped that he will continue the Ruler of Eastern Turkistan, and that in the event of his making such a request, co-operation will be given to him.” Further on in his report, for the purpose of counteracting the influence of Russia and in view of providing for the security of India from Russian invasion *viâ* Yarkund, Mr. Forsyth advises that a friendly agreement should be entered into with Russia, and that Eastern Turkistan should form neutral territory. This arrangement appeared to him to be the more important in the interests of India, because, in the event of a Russian occupation of Altishuhr, India would be threatened by great danger from the side of the Karakoram range, and Ladak could easily be attacked by means of the admirable caravan road which runs along the Valley of Changchenmo. After enumerating all the points of preference of the new road as compared with the route *viâ* the Himalayas, where the winter is more severe and would place greater obstacles in the way of the movement of troops, Mr. Forsyth concludes that the Russians, in the

event of war, could establish their authority over the whole region, and advance to Ladak before the English would have time to collect any considerable force there; while, if the Cashmerces were to place obstacles in the way of the advance of British soldiers across the Pir Panjâl Pass, Srinugger might without impediment be occupied by the Russians.* All these arguments, however, are not of such a nature as to make us inclined to consent to the proposal of the English that Altishuhr should constitute neutral territory. Moreover, the negotiations which were conducted in 1868 by Mr. Forsyth with regard to this question were altogether barren of any result.

In order to be prepared for every possible move on the part of Altishuhr, the Governor-General considered it necessary to erect a fortified post on the Naryn, which might both protect the permanent bridge across that river and secure the safety of caravans proceeding to and from Tokmak. This fort was commenced in 1868.

* After Mr. Forsyth, a private traveller named Mr. Hayward went by the same route. He had no official position in India, and in the course of his excursions was murdered. There is also an English Colonel, named Gardner, in the service of the Maharaja of Cashmere. In this way the Agents of the English stand sentry over the outlets of the mountain passes.

The valley of the River Naryn had been acknowledged to be Russian territory according to the Pekin Treaty of 1860, but the actual occupation was not accomplished until 1863, in which year a Russian detachment took possession of Fort Kurtka which was abandoned by the Kokanians on its approach. Yacoob Beg however does not recognize our Treaties with the Chinese, and therefore considers the erection of the Naryn Fort as a violation of the frontier and as a menace to Altishuhr.

During the war with Bokhara in 1868, Yacoob entered into an agreement with the latter, according to the terms of which he bound himself to commence hostile proceedings against us simultaneously with the Bokhariots. This design was evinced by incipient disturbances on the frontier of Altishuhr, but the strengthening of the Russian detachments posted there, and chiefly our rapid successes over the Bokhariots, entirely broke up the confederation, and brought Yacoob Beg to a sense of his true position.

In the beginning of August 1868 a nephew of Yacoob Beg, by name Shadi Mirza, arrived at the town of Vernoë in company with a Russian merchant, M. Khludof, bearing a letter

addressed to the Governor-General, who had already departed for St. Petersburg. Under these circumstances General Kolpakofski did not consider it necessary to send on the Kashgarian envoy to Tashkent, especially as Yacoob Beg had addressed to him a not over respectful letter.* With reference to the restrictions placed on commerce, Yacoob put forward the following excuses:—"The territories of the Great Russian Czar are wide and extensive, and abound in men, skilled in both the moral and practical sciences, such as are only to be found in the seven great countries. Our lands on the other hand in comparison with yours are but a poor ruin. Since the overthrow of the Chinese authority, in the course of six years, every remnant of the resources which then existed has vanished. In those days there was a brisk trade, of which scarcely a vestige now remains. This is the cause why your wealthy merchants have not been permitted within our territories, for they would find nothing here except desolate ruins."

General Kolpakofski informed Yacoob Beg of the departure of the Governor-General, and

* Without the usual titles, and addressing him in the singular number.

having called attention to the non-observance of the usual rules of etiquette in his letter, demanded the surrender of Omar and Koichi, who had robbed the Russian official* in charge of the district of Tokmak, and also the restoration of the captives who had been carried off by the robbers. Yacoob Beg immediately despatched a body of troops and seized the robbers, retaining them however in Kashgar as a sort of security for the return of Shadi Mirza, regarding whose safety he appeared to entertain some apprehensions. At the same time the captives (a writer named Rozlin and a village inspector named Keldybek) were liberated and sent by Yacoob to Vernoë.

Meanwhile General Von Kauffman accorded the envoy permission to continue his journey to St. Petersburg, where he received Yacoob Beg's letter informing him that the merchant, M. Khludof, had met with a good reception at Kashgar, and that any restrictions which might have been placed upon trade were due to the poverty of his kingdom and the consequent impossibility that the Russians could derive any profit whatever therefrom. In his reply the Governor-General set forth his views

* Major Zagreshki.

regarding the benefits of commerce, independently of the wealth or poverty of any particular region, and declared the necessity for the establishment of equal commercial rights in the interests of either power. With this object he proposed that a mutual engagement should be entered into, which should contain provisions regarding (1) the free and unrestricted passage of merchants to all the towns of Kashgar on the one hand and Russia on the other; (2) the establishment of caravan-serais wherever it might be considered advantageous; (3) the appointment of commercial agents (caravanbashi) at such places as the commercial community might desire; (4) a uniform rate of taxation at the rate of 1-40th of the value or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., to be levied alike from Native and Russian merchants; and (5) a free passage through the territory of Jitishuhr to neighbouring countries. These conditions, as the reader perceives, are identical with the obligations undertaken in the beginning of 1868 by the Government of Kokan.

The envoy having gazed to his heart's content at the wonders of St. Petersburg (of all of which he gave the preference to the Cirque

Hinné), and having fortified himself with a written document from the "Akhund" (or Mahomedan reader accompanying his escort) testifying that during his stay at the Russian Capital he "had prayed to God without ceasing and had been regular in attendance at the Mosque," ultimately left St. Petersburg on his return journey in the end of January 1869. In the beginning of April a letter was received in Tashkent in which Yacoob Beg communicated his thanks for the presents despatched with Shadi Mirza, and promised to watch the interests of trade on the one condition that Russian detachments should not be permitted to cross the frontier line. "For the passage of caravans and for merchants," it was stated in the letter, "quietness and security are indispensable, and this renders necessary a demarcation of the frontier. That once accomplished, let merchants either of Russia or of other nations have free access into my dominions."

Knowing that Yacoob Beg did not recognize our Treaties with the Chinese,* the Governor-

* The same Shadi Mirza on the occasion of an interview with Major-General Krayefski, who built the fortification on the Naryn, tried to prove that we were building on Kashgarian territory, and when Krayefski referred him to the Treaties with the Chinese, declared that in Kashgar no Treaties with China were either known or recognized.

General endeavored to impress upon him the necessity for respecting Treaties generally, and in a letter dated 12th (24th) September 1869 addressed him as follows:—"You say in your letter that in order to secure the safety of merchants and caravans it is above all things necessary to demarcate the frontier between the Russian dominions and the lands under your Government. You must remember that it was only five years ago that this very frontier was defined by the White Czar and the then lawful Ruler of Kashgar, the Boghdy* Khan. Although in the meantime the territory of Kashgar has in consequence of internal disturbances passed from the power of China into your hands, nevertheless this circumstance cannot in any way be permitted to affect the established frontier. Therefore there is no room for discussion between us on this point." To this it was added that if the present frontier were unknown to Yacoob, persons, duly empowered for that purpose, would be delegated to demarcate it and to set up boundary marks accordingly. In conclusion, the Governor-General requested Yacoob to sign and return

(* Meaning in Russian the Celestial Khan, *i.e.*, the Emperor of China.—*Trs.*)

one of the two copies of the mutual engagement which had been despatched to him by the hands of his envoy Mirza Shadi.

This letter remained without a reply and produced no result. The proposed conditions were not accepted, and our merchants were subjected to the same exactions as before.

Meanwhile rumour asserted that Yacoob Beg was endeavouring to enter into friendly communications with the Dungans and Taranchees, who, however, distrusted his designs and thwarted the efforts of his emissaries. Thereupon Yacoob changed his method of action, and seizing the first opportunity in the beginning of 1870 made war on the Dungans. A pretext for this was found in the Torgut Calmucks, who to the number of 40,000 kubitkas wandered about in the fertile valley of the River Yulduz, and are descended from those Calmucks who emigrated in 1770, with their Khan Ubashee, from the left bank of the Volga. Having lived a century in peace under the authority of China, these Calmucks had lost all their old warlike propensities, and had recognized in succession the supremacy of each of their neighbours, the Dungans, Taranchees, and Kashgarians, in the midst of whose

territories the range of the Yulduz mountains is situated. The question as to whether the Torguts should be considered subject to the Kashgarians or to the Dungans formed the pretext for the war. At first the Dungans obtained some successes and seized Karashuhr, Kucha, Kol, and Sairam, but, on the approach of Yacoob Beg, they abandoned these towns, having first plundered the merchants there, murdered a considerable number of the inhabitants, and kidnapped several boys (marriage with the Sart women was prohibited by the Chinese, and this law has not to the present day lost its force). The troops of Yacoob Beg attacked Turfan, which in July 1870 fell after a siege of four months; while the Chinese inhabitants of the town of Hami, which was altogether cut off from Peking and acted independently of the Central Government, anxious to revenge themselves on the Dungans for the past, readily offered their assistance to the Kashgarians.

The Taranchees feeling themselves powerless before Yacoob Beg, and not wishing to assist their old enemies the Dungans or the Kashgarians, who had for a long time looked upon Kulja as their lawful prey, took no part in the war.

Indeed, the Taranchees would not have been able to withstand for any length of time the Dungans single-handed, if the latter had not been at that time pre-occupied in the movement of the Chinese against Hami and Barkul.

In the event of the Kashgarians being successful over Urumchi, they could without difficulty have turned their arms against the Taranchees and against Kulja, which would have fallen an easy victim, inasmuch as the province of Ili is much more accessible from Urumchi than from Kashgar by way of the Muzart Pass. To avoid such a contingency it was necessary that we should adopt precautionary measures. The Muzart Pass with its glaciers, its narrow bridle paths along the brink of rocky precipices, and its frail bridges of bare planks, offers great difficulty to passing caravans. Steps have to be cut in the ice, and on the narrow ledges, where the packs catch in the rock, the pack saddles have to be taken off the horses and carried by hand. Under these natural conditions it is clear that the Muzart Pass is entirely unsuitable for the passage of troops, but in those regions, where war usually consists in rapid raids made by slender detachments, the pass possesses a great

importance, especially since it is the only one in the neighbourhood and since the Kashgarians when acting against the Taranchees, who are conspicuous for the absence of fire-arms (the muskets and cannon which they had seized from the Chinese being practically useless owing to the want of ammunition), could almost entirely dispense with artillery and baggage. Such a move however on the part of the Kashgarians would certainly have been much to our disadvantage, and we therefore resolved to occupy the outlet of the pass which, being situated at a distance of only fifty versts from the frontier, would, if left undefended, constitute a considerable source of danger. Thus in the event of the rumours regarding the intention of Yacoob Beg to occupy the province of Ili being confirmed, the Governor-General resolved to anticipate him at this point.

To regard as a certainty the restoration of the supremacy of China over Kashgar is almost impossible, because Kashgar is cut off from China by the dominions of the Dungs, who for the last twelve years have been entirely independent of Chinese authority. On the other hand, it is not unnatural to predict that

the Chinese Empire, owing to its state of chronic disturbance, will ultimately abandon the idea of restoring its authority over these western provinces : perhaps, indeed, China may already have done so, but for self-evident reasons she does not admit such to be the case in spite of the categorical enquiries of our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On the other hand, our relations with Kashgar have always been strained to the uttermost degree. Yacoob Beg did not concede to our demand for the surrender of the robbers whom he had captured, nor did he ratify the engagements proposed by the Governor-General regarding the freedom of commerce, but on the contrary placed restrictions on Russian merchants at a time when he afforded to the English, according to their own statement, every possible privilege, receiving from them in return muskets for his army, &c.

If the English fear a Russian invasion by way of Kashgar, we certainly have equal, if not greater, reasons for being apprehensive of an invasion from India, where the position of the English is more favorable than that of the Russians in Central Asia. Having ruled over the country for more than a century,

and having at their disposal the unlimited resources of the Indian Empire, the English have already constructed a net-work of telegraphs and railroads, have established steam navigation on the rivers, developed manufacturing industry, &c., and in a word have established a firm hold upon the country. If, all these favorable conditions notwithstanding, the English consider it necessary to make Kashgar subordinate to their influence, so as to create as it were a living obstacle against armed invasion from that quarter, the Russians, who do not possess on their side a single one of the advantages abovementioned, have greater grounds for apprehension, and therefore ought to take corresponding measures against the intrigues of a nation which has always been their rival in Central Asia. In point of fact, however, there is no doubt that all the apprehensions and the outeries of the English regarding our intentions, and regarding the danger by which India is threatened from the vicinity of the Russians, are simply a stratagem for exciting general alarm and thereby restraining our movement in Asia. Far from fearing us, the English have long been prepared for every emergency.

To proceed as it were in doubt, constantly wavering and taking at every step the political bearings in Europe, not to insist firmly on our commercial interests, and not to uphold with energy the violated rights of Russian subjects, &c., would be equivalent to adopting a line of action marked out for us by the English to the detriment of our evident advantages, the loss of prestige of the Russian name, and the prejudice of our great historical task in Central Asia. It is therefore incumbent upon us by some means or other to prevent the subordination of Kashgar to the influence of England.

After the fall of Kulja, Yacoob Beg, terrified by the onward movement of the Russians and alarmed at the position of affairs in Kan-Su and Shensi, took various precautionary measures for providing for his security, such as fortifying the town of Aksu and despatching an embassy under Alhrrar Khan to British India. Finding Yacoob altogether intractable, the Governor-General offered the Khan of Kokan the co-operation of the Russians for the subjugation of Kashgar. Khudayar Khan however did not care to risk upon one card his peace and, perhaps, his throne, fearing that his troops might possibly give the preference to the

energetic, successful, and victorious ruler of Jitishuhr, who had put himself forward as the champion of Mahomedanism. The series of defeats which he had suffered, the loss of a considerable portion of his dominions, the perpetual dread of disorders within and of attack from without, had had a fatal effect on the character of the Khan.

Thus it soon became clear that the irresolute and timorous Khudayar Khan could not be used as an instrument for the punishment of Yacoob Beg, and the alternative was to adopt peaceable means and to make use of him as an agent, who, by referring to his own instructive example, might induce Yacoob Beg to come to a peaceful understanding before the magnanimous and mighty power of Russia. Khudayar Khan willingly accepted this part, and sent Sarymsak Udaichi to Kashgar with a communication, written in the spirit of our wishes. Yacoob Beg received the letter with every possible sign of respect and reverence as being from his former master, but treated the envoy with utter indifference, and both in his reply and in the return presents which he sent, placed himself on an equal footing with the Khan.

Defending himself from the reproach of haughtiness, Yacoob Beg wrote—"I accept this Embassy as a special token of your friendliness, for you have thereby shown me that you recognize my power. I rejoice in this, and am thankful to God, before whom I humble my pride. God has considered me a fit instrument to redress the grievances of the people of this country. For the protection of Mahomedanism I have fulfilled what is prescribed in the Shariyat, and God has rewarded me for so doing." To the advice given to him to enter into peaceable and commercial relations with the Russians, Yacoob Beg thus replied—"The Russians who enter my dominions come to spy out the secrets of the land; therefore it is better to prohibit them from coming hither. They are a restless and double-faced race."

Before the receipt, however, of this letter, insulting both to Khudayar Khan and the Russians, a second courier was despatched from Kokan with a letter from the Russian Governor-General. Enumerating all the unfriendly actions towards us of which Yacoob had been guilty, and also all the measures which had been taken by us to enter into closer relations, the Governor-General showed him the neces-

sity of following with regard to the Russians the example of Bokhara and Kokan, if he did not wish to be subjected to an unavoidable and heavy chastisement. Yacoob Beg hastened to send a reply, in which he expressed himself as opposed to the mediation of Khudayar Khan. "The last delegate," he wrote, "who brought me your letter was not a Russian subject, not because the Russians had no one to send, but because this is an honor of which only Kokan and Bokhara are considered deserving. If the Russians had believed in my good-will, they would have sent their own messenger, and thereby displayed to me their gracious attention, and I should have considered that as a proof of their friendly disposition towards me. If your words are really meant to express good-will, then let your merchants come hither more freely. Send also to me a Russian, or one of the Sarts of Tashkent,—even it were only one of your menials,—and I will send with him one of my people to you. The Great Governor-General—the fulfiller of the will of the White Czar—will then be able to compare the statements of the envoys of both Powers, and thereby be convinced of the truth of my words."

In this way Yacoob Beg left it to us to take

the first step towards entering into closer relations with him, which was by no means agreeable to the views of the Governor-General. Looking, however, upon the embassy of Shadi Mirza in 1868 as a previous attempt on the part of Yacoob to approach us in a friendly spirit, and in view of the difficulties which would attend any other mode of action, the Governor-General determined to send an embassy to Kashgar.

Yacoob Beg expressed his views still more clearly in a letter* addressed by a certain Ahrar† Khan to Mirza‡ Hakim. "The Governor-General," wrote Ahrar Khan, "would act wisely if in conducting friendly negotiations, he were to avoid the intervention of the Khan of Kokan. If Khudayar Khan takes any part in this affair, it will certainly fall to the ground, and future communications will never terminate in the desired

* That this letter was written at the direction of Yacoob is clear, firstly, from its contents and peculiar phraseology; secondly, from the fact that the courier received it from the hands of Yacoob himself.

† A former courtier of Khudayar Khan, who had fled to Kashgar. Our authorities thought at first of making him a secret agent at the Court of Yacoob Beg, but Ahrar Khan was thoroughly attached to that Ruler.

‡ The Kokanian Agent at Tashkent.

result. Although His Fortunate Highness " (Badaulat, a title adopted by Yacoob Beg in the place of the former Atalik Ghazee) "is well aware of the power and greatness of Russia, yet being a man of courage, he places his trust in God, and will never decline warfare, since he has no fear of death, and would consider it good fortune to die for the faith."

It was clear that Yacoob Beg, although he valued the friendship of Russia, was reluctant to lower his dignity by appearing in the character of a suppliant, and at the same time considered the intervention of the Khan of Kokan as an infringement on his independence. On the contrary in the fact of a Russian embassy despatched to his Court he perceived a proof of our recognition of Jitishuhr as being on an equal footing with Kokan and Bokhara. We on our part could afford to overlook such petty considerations, and to concede to the constitutional touchiness of the ambitious despot of Jitishuhr, which could not darken the glory of recent achievements, or diminish the effect of the Russian victories. By ourselves taking the first step to enter into nearer relations with Yacoob Beg, we exhibited only that indulgence which is inherent in superior

strength. Yacoob was, however, warned that this was the last overture which would be made on the part of the Russians, and that if he did not take advantage of the opportunity thus given of yielding voluntarily, he would be compelled to do so by force.

At the head of the Mission was placed Baron Kaulbars, a Captain of the General Staff, who had proved in the previous negotiations with Kulja that he possessed both discretion and firmness, while an officer of the Survey Department, by name Captain Scharnhorst, was appointed to the Mission for the purpose of taking astronomical observations, and also a mercantile gentleman, named Kolesnekof, in order to collect information regarding the wealth of the country and the nature of the goods, &c., most in demand amongst the inhabitants.

The instructions given to Baron Kaulbars directed him in the first place to procure the signature of Yacoob Beg to a Treaty containing conditions identical with those which were in force with Bokhara and Kokan; secondly, to collect information as to the nature of the relations existing between Kashgar and British India; thirdly, to instil into Yacoob Beg's

mind the belief that of his two neighbours, it would tend more to his advantage to rely upon the nearer and consequently the more dangerous; and lastly, to explain in detail what we considered as lawful and unlawful with regard to trade, and also the imposts which, without being prohibitory, might be properly imposed upon merchandise. Starting from Tokmak in the end of April 1872, the Mission was received on the 6th (18th) of May at a distance of thirty versts beyond Châdir-kül by officials deputed for that purpose by Yacoob Beg.

The reception of the Mission was brilliant, and the cordiality of Yacoob exceeded every expectation. After the lapse, however, of a few days, his demeanour changed, a fact which may be explained by the false reports regarding the movement of our troops in the direction of the defile of Tokmak spread by the Kirgiz couriers who had brought the letter from the Governor-General. Baron Kaulbars perceiving the endless nature of the negotiations determined to request Yacoob Beg either at once to sign the Treaty which had been proposed for his acceptance, or to dismiss the Mission. His decisive action had the desired result. Yacoob's suspicions were quickly dispelled,

and on the 10th (22nd) June our envoy received two copies of the Treaty duly ratified and antedated the 21st May (2nd June) in order to associate the act with the anniversary of the Governor-General's Patron Saint Constantine,—a European mode of conveying a compliment which clearly emanated from Baron Kaulbars.

The text of the Treaty differs in no way from those concluded with Bokhara and Kokan, provision being made for the right of free entrance on the part of our merchants, of having store-houses for merchandise (caravanserais), of establishing Consuls (caravanbashi), the lowering of imposts on goods to a uniform rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*, and lastly the right of transit. Yacoob Beg despatched his own envoy in company with our Mission on their return journey with a letter which was abundantly expressive of gratified ambition.

"At last my turn too has come," wrote Yacoob, "You have sent trustworthy people to me, who have seen with their own eyes and have heard with their own ears from my lips that I never so much as dreamt of offering opposition to His Imperial Majesty, or of causing any harm whatever."

Further on in the letter Yacoob Beg asked for permission for his envoy to proceed to the Imperial Court at St. Petersburg to convey thither an autograph letter. "This will be a great kindness," he wrote, "you would thereby exalt me, who am insignificant, to the sun, and a drop from the ocean would thereby fall to my lot." As, however, Asiatic rulers have been taught to see in the permission accorded to their embassies to visit the Imperial Court a special token of kindness and a high reward for the exact fulfilment of their engagements with Russia, the Governor-General considered it premature to accede to the request of Yacoob, but promised him to consent to it at some future time if in the meanwhile he showed himself to be deserving of such an honor. The Kashgarian envoy was flattered by an empty display of kindness, saw all our military establishments, was present at some manœuvres expressly carried out for his benefit, and at last was dismissed on his homeward journey in the company of a Russian official.

In this way it happened that our efforts, which extended over a period of five years, to bring Kashgar within the sphere of our political influence, were at last attended with

success, and it is a significant fact that this result was effected entirely by the firmness and moderation of our policy, and not by the force of arms, as was the case with Kokan and Bokhara. Yacoob Beg signed the Treaty, not on compulsion, but because he saw that its provisions tended his own advantage, though it must be left to the future to determine which kind of treaties, whether those obtained by force of arms or by peaceable means, are the more respected.

These proceedings of the Russians did not escape the notice of the English, who watched intently every movement, and immediately after the return of Kaulbars' Mission deputed Mr. Forsyth to Kashgar with a numerous and imposing suite, which naturally eclipsed by its magnificence, its gifts, and its promises, the unpretending mission of Russia. On the occasion of the State reception on the 11th (23rd) December 1873, Yacoob Beg raised his voice in praise of the Queen of England, concluding with the following words—"The Queen of England is for me like the sun, which sheds happiness when shining on such humble creatures as I am." This comparison with the sun is evidently a favorite figure of speech

with Yacoob Beg. Several thousand muskets, which, although old and out of date, were nevertheless of very great use to such a penniless nation as the Kashgarians, were presented to Yacoob in the name of the Viceroy, as a token of friendship and perhaps also in accordance with the terms of an actual alliance.

We do not of course know precisely what promises were made by the English, or what was the exact nature of the agreement concluded with Yacoob Beg, but a conjecture may safely be hazarded in view of the line of action subsequently adopted by the latter and particularly of his demeanour towards us. Yacoob began to carry matters with a decidedly high hand, and imposed all the former restrictions upon Russian trade, as though the Treaty of 1872 did not exist. The seizure and compulsory sale of goods, coupled with the confinement of merchants, were all practised as before. General Kolpakofski, the Officiating Governor-General of Turkistan, addressed Yacoob Beg a decided letter on the subject, the results of which remain yet to be seen. On the one hand, it may perhaps happen that the Treaty of 1872 will have to be signed a second time in letters

of blood, or, on the other hand, all may be pacifically arranged by the indirect influence of England, who can gain no possible advantage from letting matters come to an armed issue between Russia and Kashgar. The second expedition which, accompanied by a military escort, was despatched by the English to Kashgar, was received with the same honour as the former one by Yacoob Beg, who appears to regard these Missions as a guarantee for the maintenance of peace, and as a safeguard against all possible injury and danger. On the 12th (24th) February 1874 a formal Treaty was concluded by Sir Douglas Forsyth.

It is very possible that in view of the "cordial relations" which at present exist between England and Russia, our Statesmen may withdraw from the position which they have gained, and recognize Kashgar as neutral territory, in the same way they have already done in the case of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the English are actually apprehensive that the famous "Eastern Question" may at some future time be practically solved *in the East*, and are endeavouring to link the fate of Kashgar with that of Turkey. I have already in the beginning of this chapter said that the

Sultan has conferred on Yacoob the title of "Ameer," and thereby, as it were, saved him from the ignominy of being regarded as an insignificant adventurer. It is also an ascertained fact that a Turkish Embassy arrived at Kashgar in company with Sir Douglas Forsyth, at the head of which was Ibrahim Effendi, who made his influence felt in the matter of M. Samof—a merchant who was subjected to great oppression, so to speak, at the dictation of this Turkish Agent. General Kolpakofski demanded a pecuniary recompense for this insult, and although the Kashgarian emissaries, Mahomed Zia and Meer Kasim, who have lately been at Tashkent, brought with them the money thus demanded, they were nevertheless empowered by Yacoob Beg, in the event of any difference of opinion occurring at the time of payment, to telegraph to the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburg and to solicit his intervention. All this appears to indicate that Kashgar recognizes the protectorate of Turkey; and if further proof is required, it is to be found in the fact that the name of the Sultan, Abdool Aziz, is impressed on the Kashgarian money of recent coinage, which is in Asia a sign of complete subjection. It is said also that the nomination of a successor

to Yacoob Beg after his death has been left to the Sultan of Turkey, while at the same time the Kashgarians openly recognize the supremacy of the Sultan, the position of Yacoob Beg being rather that of a Viceroy than of an independent ruler.

There is however nothing more unlikely than that Turkey will ever make these facts a pretext for taking a direct part in any misunderstandings which may arise in the future between us and Kashgar. It might, it is true, be said that the protection afforded by such a weak power as Turkey, cannot afford any particularly reliable guarantee to Kashgar, but in cases of this kind it is not so much the actual capacity for rendering assistance which is important, as the indirect effects produced by a promise of so doing. If, for instance, it were possible for any individual to stand at the head of a Mahomedan confederation, such an individual is to be found in the person of the Sultan of Turkey alone, and the existing alliance and cordial agreement which indissolubly bind Turkey to England, render a protectorate of these two powers a serious menace to Russia. At the present time therefore we feel the especial necessity for keeping a strict watch over Kashgar, and of

establishing there a permanent Agent. The choice has been made, and, in the opinion of the author, is a most happy selection, Sub-Colonel Reinthal, a man who has more than once carried out diplomatical tasks with entire success, having been nominated for that post. Boldness, resolution, and a knowledge of the people are all on his side, and we may therefore indulge the hope that Russia will in her Agent at Kashgar find a worthy representative.



CHAPTER IX.

* RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

Communications with Afghanistan—Ethnographical and historical particulars regarding this country—History of the Kafirs—Intestine wars—Descendants of Payendeh Khan—Mahomed Azim and Dost Mahomed—Interference of the English—Shah Shujah—Invasion of the English in 1839—The catastrophe of 1841—Dost Mahomed by the aid of English consolidates his power in Afghanistan—Civil wars on the death of the Dost—Shere Ali Khan—Abdul Rahman has recourse to Russia—He is compelled by the Russians to desist from hostilities—Letter of the Governor-General to the Ameer Shere Ali—The Umballa Conference—Conditions proposed by the English—Outbreak in Afghanistan—Reply of Shere Ali Khan to the Governor-General—The English are satisfied—Our relations with Secunder Khan—Fate of that Prince—Afghanistan made neutral territory—Probable result of this arrangement—The Afghans advance to the Amu Darya—Chronic disturbances in the Khanate.

BEFORE many years have elapsed circumstances will most probably bring us into the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan, and our relations with that State, which have hitherto been limited to an interchange, at long intervals, of formal letters, will become in the highest degree important. It may not therefore be considered superfluous to give a brief ethnographical and historical sketch of Afghanistan.

* Mr. R. B. Shaw has been kind enough to annotate one or two passages in this Chapter. His notes are initialled R. B. S.—*Trs.*

The Afghans trace their origin to the Jews,* considering Benjamin, the brother of Joseph, as the root of their tribe, and apart from their mythical traditions it is certain that the Afghan features have about them something of the Jewish type.

They consider† themselves to number about 50 lakhs or 5,000,000 souls, divided into two main stocks, the Afghans proper and the Pukhtuns, who again are subdivided into the following tribes:—

I. AFGHANS.‡

Batanai	25	Kheyls or families.
Matti or Ghilzai	52	„
Ghurghustai	95	„
Sarabanai	105	„
			<hr/>	
			277	„

* The fact of their language being purely Aryan is enough, in the absence of any serious argument in favour of their Jewish origin, to render it extremely improbable. Their so-called Jewish type of face is simply the high Aryan type common to the Kashmiris, Badakhshis, Wakhs, Tājiks,—even to some families of Rajputs.—R. B. S.

† The historical and numerical data here given are founded on information taken from the 3rd Edition of the Military Statistical Journal and also from the communications of Secunder Ahmed Khan, grand-nephew of Dost Mahomed.

‡ Batan, Ghurghusht, and Saraban are said to have been the sons of Kais, a mythological individual, who was in the 7th century deputed by the nation to Khalid bin Walid at Medina to enquire into the truth of the new doctrines of Mahomed.—*Ths.*

II. PUKHTUNS

Karalanai or Argochai ... 128 Kheyls or families. These tribes are in their turn subdivided into families, branches, &c., of which the following are numerically the strongest: (1) the Duranees who dwell in the vicinity of Ghuznee and Candahar; (2) the Yusufzais, having their abode at the confluence of the rivers Cabul and Indus; (3) the Ghilzais, dwelling to the north of Candahar; and (4) the Afreedees inhabiting the British Indian Frontier. The Duranees are subdivided into two main branches, Zerak and Panjpao, from the first of which spring three clans, the Populzai, Barakzai (to which the present reigning family belongs), and Alekozai. Each of these clans numbers about 40,000 families. The Barakzais are subdivided into five branches, the Nurzai, 60,000 families; the Alizai, 40,000; the Ishakzai, 25,000; the Maku, 5,000; and the Khuginis, 7,000 families. The entire number of the Duranees amounts to about 257,000 families, or 1,285,000 souls. The Yusufzais are composed of six principal clans, the Khodozai,† 37,000 families, scattered over 116 villages; the Baczais, 30,000 families in 122 villages; the Osman Kheyls,

* Afterwards corrupted into Pathan.—*Trs.*

† Khwazozai?—*Trs.*

10,000 families; the Mohmunds (Upper and Lower), 37,000 families; the Safees 100,000 families; the Malezais and Mandezais aggregating together 65,000 families in 111 villages. The entire number of the Yusufzais amounts to about 279,000 families or 1,395,000 souls. Besides the above there are about 150,000 Yusufzais who have their abode in British territory.

It should here be explained that the termination "zai" is usually affixed to the name of some famous representative of the several tribes, whence arise all the intertribal ramifications. Immediately that the numbers of a family are sufficiently large, it invariably assumes the name of one of its members celebrated in the family archives. Thus, although by descent Payendeh Khan belongs to the Barakzai branch, it may be predicted almost with certainty that the Barakzais will at some future time assume the name of Payendehzai.

The Military Statistical Journal has transliterated these family names into Russian on a different and, in my opinion, less appropriate system. Thus the names are rendered as Barakzai-*tsee* and Khwadozai-*tsee* which are clearly formed on the model of the words

“Kityai-tsee” (Chinese), “Indyai-tsee” (Indians), and so forth, but in the latter case the names follow the countries, whereas those of the family divisions of the Afghans are derived not from the locality inhabited by the several families, but from the name of some famous ancestor. It would have been more natural to have called them Barak-zadas or Khwado-zadas, but I prefer to adhere to the vernacular names unchanged.

The Duranees estimate their own numbers at 1,235,000 souls, and the Yusufzais at 1,545,000, the total of the two tribes amounting to more than a moiety of the entire population of Afghanistan. The numbers of the Ghilzais may be put at 500,000 souls, the Afreedee branch, to whom belong the warlike Shinwarees and Khyberees, numbering some 200,000.

The Duranee tribe was formed called Abdalee, but the present name came into existence at the time of Ahmed Khan, the founder of the Khanate of Afghanistan. The branch of Berduranees (literally “on a level with the Duranees”) are also indebted both for their name and descent to Ahmed Khan. Formerly this was the appellation of Ahmed Khan’s

body-guard, which was composed of representatives of all the Afghan tribes (each contributing fifty families); but at the present time it is applied to a tolerably strong tribe occupying the town of Berduranee on the Indus and its vicinity.

The remaining nationalities of Afghanistan are the following: (1) the aboriginal Tajiks, who number about 500,000 souls; (2) the Kizilbash, numbering 200,000, who were brought from Persia by Nadir Shah in 1737 and formerly composed the escort of the Ameers—in Cabul there are 16,000 households of this tribe; (3) the Hazarahs, descendants of the Turkomans who in the time of Timur wandered about the neighbourhood of Subzwar in Persia. Timur transplanted a thousand families of these nomads to the sources of the Murgab, where they obtained the name of Hazarahs or “those of the thousand”; (4) the Uzbeks of the tribe of Kataghan who predominate in the neighbourhood to the north of the Hindoo Koosh. Besides the above, Arabs, Hindoos, Jews, Armenians, and Jats (Gypsies)* are found scattered over the whole of Afghan-

* This is a very doubtful identification. Perhaps the author is thinking of the *Nats*, who are gypsy-like wanderers in the Punjab. The Jats are an agricultural race.—R. B. S.

istan, a number of the Arabs having grouped themselves together in the neighbourhood of Kunar to the north of Kabulistan. It remains to mention two independent States situated within the natural boundaries of Afghanistan, namely, Kafiristan and Swat, our information regarding which is very meagre, since European travellers have only on rare occasions, and not for many years past, penetrated thither.

The name of Kafirs or "unbelievers" has been attached to the people of Kafiristan by the Mussulmans with whom the former have a deadly feud, not permitting a single Mahomedan to enter their territory. Every traveller, desirous of entering Kafiristan, is subjected on the frontier to a minute bodily scrutiny hardly pleasing to a follower of Mahomet, and, although generosity and hospitality are the virtues held by them in highest esteem, Mahomedans are rigidly excluded. The Kafirs moreover are not content with simply keeping Mahomedans out of their country, but the youth of Kafiristan repair every year with bows and arrows to hunt for the heads of the neighbouring Mussulmans, and any one of them who returns without a trophy is subjected long after to the derision of his fellow-tribesmen.

Another name given to the Kafirs by their neighbours is that of Siahposh the Persian equivalent of Black-vested, which owes its origin to the short fur jackets of black goat's skin which form the usual clothing of all members of the tribe. They style themselves "Bolor,"* which is derived from the word "boli" signifying "glory," and thus it happens

* The only trace of the name Bolor in modern use is its application (under the form *Palor*) by one old Kirgiz to the upper part of the valley of Chitral. (See Colonel Yule's Art. in J. R. G. S., XLII.) No other man in the tribe knew the name; nor have any of our recent travellers in Turkistan and Wakhan succeeded in getting any native of those regions to recognize such a name. But Mirza Hajdar of Kashgar, the author of the *Turikh-i-Rashidi*, who overran Baloristan some 300 years ago, gives as its limits the following provinces which he says adjoin it: Raskam, Taghdumbash (near Sarikol), Wakhan (Sarigh-Chaupan), Badakhshan, Kabul, Lughman, Swat (?), Kashmir, and Baltistan. (I put a query against Swat, because it is a doubtful reading). Now the country contained within those limits is a definite entity comprising the whole region which is the home of the Dard tribes, and no more; (that is, taking the Kafirs as Dards, which is most probable). We can therefore say with certainty that Belor or Bolor (بلور) is the old name of Dardistan, and comprised the following chief divisions: Hunza, Naggar, Gilgit, Yassin, Chitral, perhaps *Kafiristan* (whose language has been recognized as probably a Dard dialect; Captain Trotter, R.E. informs me that, according to the reports of his explorers, the Kafirs have precisely the same type of face and body as their neighbours the Chitralis (Dards); so that when dressed in Chitral costume it is almost impossible to distinguish them from the latter), Chilas, Astor, with several smaller valleys. It seems that in the time of Marco Polo, and even of Mirza Hajdar, the whole of this region was non-Mussulman or *Kafir*. But the religion of the Prophet has since spread (probably from Baltistan in the East, where the same form of the faith is professed) westwards as far as Chitral, leaving the Siah-posh people alone unconverted; and therefore the once more general name of Kafiristan has now contracted until it designates only the western extremity of the old *Beloristan*. The name used by the Dards for *Balti* is "Palolo," which may or may not be connected with *Bolor*.—R. B. S.

that we find in a remote corner of Asia a people deriving their name from a similar root to that from which the Slavonians derive theirs, namely, "slava" or glory, or in the language of the Kafirs "boli."

Regarding the Bolors very little is known, but I append here in a concise form such particulars as serve to show the general character of this people. Mr. Hutton* in his "Central Asia" gives the following description of the appearance of the Bolors:—"They are all fair complexioned, with blue eyes, and are remarkably handsome, with a fine open forehead, bushy arched eyebrows, black hair and whiskers, and a lithe active figure." Such an exterior draws a sharp line between the Bolors and their dark-complexioned neighbours, whose hatred and jealousy appear to have been aroused thereby.

The dress of the Bolors, as has already been stated, consists of fur garments reaching to the knee which are worn by both sexes. These jackets are made of four goats' skins sown together, two for a vest and two for a petticoat, which are worn with the long hair outside, girded round the waist with a broad

* Mr. Hutton takes his description from Mountstuart Elphinstone's *Account of the Cabul Empire*.

belt of leather. They are made without sleeves, resembling the Russian "poddofka."* The men shave their heads, leaving only one long tuft of hair on the crown (as the Russians did in the reign of Svyatoslaf) and a curl over each ear. The women do not shave their hair, but wear it plaited and twisted round on the top of their head, surmounted by a small cap, round which a light turban is wound. Both males and females wear earrings, necklaces, and bracelets.

The houses are built of wood with cellars for storing milk, butter, cheese, wine, and vinegar, while low wicker work stools made of willow, and wooden tables constitute the furniture of their rooms. Here we see another distinction between the Bolors and their neighbours, for Asiatics build their houses principally of mud,† only mosques and in some cases houses of the higher classes being constructed of burnt brick. Moreover, they do not usually make use of any

* A cloth garment resembling a Bengalee "chupkan" without sleeves.—*Trs.*

† Here the author is generalising from his Central Asian experience. In the plains of Turkistan stone and wood are scarce, while the clay is remarkably tenacious and forms excellent and lasting walls. But in all the hill countries north and east of the Punjab (until one gets to barren Tibet) wood and stone are plentifully used in constructing the houses of the peasantry.—R. B. S.

furniture, but seat themselves on carpets spread out for that purpose, or simply on the ground, eating their meals from trays placed beside them.

A fish diet is distasteful to the Bolors,* who live chiefly on bread, milk, butter, and cheese, while half-cooked goat's flesh and game is met with on extraordinary occasions. Both men and women freely indulge in wine, which is home made, while the small cups and bowls out of which they drink it are chiefly of silver.

This happily disposed and hospitable people are passionately fond of dancing and social amusements. The dancers beat time with their feet to lively and ever varying tunes, executing different steps and accompanying their movements with songs which call to mind some of the country dances of Europe. The Bolor villages bear a strong resemblance to those of Russia, and in the evening when the young people collect and indulge in their village pastimes, the illusion is complete.

Regarding the religion of the Bolors, all that we know is, that they believe in the unity of the Deity. They also believe in Saints of both

* The Tibetans have also a superstitious objection to eating fish.—R. B. S.

sexes,—glorified mortals who after death are supposed to perform the offices of mediators and intercessors between the living and the Deity. The Bolors make images of their Saints of stone and of wood, representing them both on foot and on horseback. They do not attempt to picture the Deity for the simple reason that they do not know how to do so. As Mr. Hutton writes—“They erect a stone and say, ‘this stands for God, but we know not his shape.’” Thus the stone serves as an altar on which are placed the offerings for the Deity. The ceremony connected with these offerings is as follows:—A fire is kindled in front of the stone, into the flames of which are thrown flour, butter, and water, while the blood of a slaughtered cow is sprinkled upon the stone itself. Part of the flesh is burnt, and part eaten by the priests, whose office is hereditary but who are devoid of influence. The idols representing Saints are likewise sprinkled with the blood of the cow.

From this brief description we may conclude that the Bolors are idolaters, as indeed the Mahomedans too regard them, in common with the Christians, on account of their images and other visible signs of invisible things.

The nearest approach to the religion of the Bolors is perhaps Roman Catholicism, and it is very possible that at one time the Bolors may have been Catholics,* but that owing to their entire isolation, various pagan rights have been engrafted on the Catholic observances.

Marriage amongst the Bolors is not so much a religious ceremony, as an excuse for eating, drinking, singing, and dancing. A man is permitted to marry on reaching the age of twenty years, a woman at the age of fifteen. Polygamy is much practised, and all the drudgery is done by women. A mother and her new-born babe are put away in a house outside the village and are considered impure for twenty-four days, at the expiration of which they are escorted back with singing and dancing.

The language of the Bolors, if English accounts may be believed, is derived from the Sanskrit.† Our Academy of Sciences is in

* Any resemblance of their rites to those of the Catholics (which however does not appear at all clearly) is more probably due to the influence of the Buddhist Tibetans, whose observances and even doctrines (originating before the Christian era) so resemble those of the Catholic Church, that the Missionaries Huc and Gabet bring in Satanic agency to account for the resemblance.—R. B. S.

† “.....Kafiristan, Chitral, Wakhan, Shaghnan, and Roshan the most probable way of accounting for their peculiar dialects is by supposing them forced into their present fastnesses at a very early era, antecedent or at least coeval with the first spread of Islamism. Of these several States, the Kafirs alone have success-

possession of three hundred and twenty-four translations of the Lord's Prayer, and amongst these is one into the language of the Kafirs. Without vouching for the accuracy of the translation I give it here for what it is worth :—

“Babo* vetu osezulvini. Malipatve egobunk-vele egamalako. Ubukumkani bako mabuphike. Intando yako mayenzibe. Emkhlya beni, nyengokuba isenziva ezulvini. Sipe namglya nye ukutiya kvetu kvemikhla igemikhla. Usik-colele izono zetu, nyengokuba nati siksolela abo basonaio tina. Unga singekisi ekulingveli, zusisindise enkokhlakalveni, ngokuba bubobako ubukumkani, namandkhla nobungkvalisa, kude kube igunapakade.—Amene.”

fully held out against the progress of that religion.” Wood's *Oxus*, Edition 1872, p. 193. The dialects of Chitral, Gilgit, &c., and probably Kafiristan, form a group whose resemblances with one another and with Sanskrit are greater than those of the other group consisting of Wakhi, Shaghni, Roshani, Sarikoli, &c., which however can also claim kindred with them. The former group alone is entitled to the name of Dard, and seems to be a relic of the passage of the early Aryan tribes down towards India (Dr. Leitner even ventures to consider the Dard language as that out of which Sanskrit was formed); while the other group bears a somewhat similar relation towards the Persian family of Aryans, both in position and in dialectic character; while the two groups form connecting links between those two now widely dis severed branches of the Aryan race—the Persians and the Hindus.—R. B. S.

* I have failed to procure any particulars regarding the language of the Kafirs and have simply transliterated this from the Russian.—*Trs.*

Besides this the expression “*imbra boli*” or “*imboli*” meaning “glory be to God” may be mentioned, and also the peculiar name of one of the mountains “*Imbra Embra*,” literally “the Seat of God.” The name of a cemetery is “*Immerumma*.”

The most remarkable point is that the Bolors by the one word “*boli*” signify either “glory” or “word,” the equivalents for which in the Slavonic languages (“*slava*” and “*slovo*”) are phonetically nearly identical.

The Bolors however declare that they know nothing of the Slaves, but pride themselves on descent from the Greeks. The English consider them to be idolaters, who have transplanted themselves in their present mountain homes from Candahar. It appears to me however that the tradition regarding the connection of the Bolors with the Greeks,* if true, proves that they must have passed through Byzantium. The Arab writers have preserved some traces regarding the Slaves who went over voluntarily to the Arabs from the Greeks and settled in Asia Minor, Syria, &c. It is very possible that these

* The Kafirs if they have this tradition have it in common with all tribes between the Hindu-Kush and Pamir. Every Chief of a petty valley, as far north as Shighnan and Roshan and south to Chitral, traces his descent from Alexander. This of course is no indication of their having come from Greece, but rather of the Greeks having come to them. See Wood's *Oxus*, new Edition, pp. 244 and 245.—R. B. S.

Slaves wandering from place to place may have ultimately lost their traditions and forgotten their descent. In the absence of any written literature, it is not unnatural that oral traditions should by degrees have been lost, the facts of the past have become confused, and every successive movement have obliterated all that preceded it. Thus the knowledge of their true origin may have faded away, leaving only a faint tradition regarding Greece, though that need not necessarily have been their original fatherland.

Dr. A. Harkavy in his work entitled "The accounts given by Mahomedan authors of the Slaves and Russians" states that according to the Byzantine historian Theophanes, 20,000 Slaves, whom he terms Σκλαβινοι (Sklabinoi), emigrated in the year 664 to Syria. Other historians term them Σκλαβοι (Sklaboi). This unnecessary insertion of the letter "κ" by the Greeks was adopted for a long time in many other European languages, the word Slaves being spelt "Sclaves" or sometimes even "Esclaves."

Since however the Greek letter β is to the present day in many languages pronounced "beta" and not "veta,"* the word Sklaves

* The two first letters "alpha" and "veta" have to this time been preserved in their purity in the Russian language, *e.g.*, "alphavit" (alphabet).

became Sklabes, while the Arabs, following the genius of their language, which does not permit three successive consonants in the beginning of a word, changed the word Sklab into Saklab, the plural of which in Arabic is Sakalib.

Writing of the year 6156 (A. M.) Theophanes says—"In this year there was a mistake made in the number of the fast days, and Abdul Rahman bin Khalid crossing the frontier of the Roman Empire with troops, stayed there through the winter, and laid waste many districts. The Slaves, however, in order to save themselves" (from the Byzantines, went over) "to him, and with him came to Syria" (in number) "5,000 and settled in the district of Apama in the settlement of Skevokovol."

Twenty-seven years afterwards 20,000 Slaves of the army of Justinian II. changed sides, and went over to the Arab Commander, Mahomed, who, by their assistance, seized a number of captives. The son of this Commander, by name Marwan bin Mahomed, settled the Slaves along the frontier of Syria for the protection of the border against the Byzantines, and they fulfilled this task so admirably as to gain great renown thereby.

The well-known Al-Baladori (an Arabian author of the 9th century) adds his testimony regarding the transplantation of the Slaves. In his work entitled the "Conquests of Empires," Baladori writes, "Salman and Ziyad belong to those Slaves whom Marwan bin Mahomed settled on the frontier." After the names of these two Slave leaders the Arabs named two forts in Armenia, which had fallen into their hands, Husn-Salman and Husn-Ziyad. Afterwards, in the same work, mention is made of the attack of Marwan on the Slaves dwelling in the country of the Hazarabs, and also of the transplantation of 30,000 more of them to Khalita, *i.e.*, in Kahetia. Mansur in the course of his preparations in the year 140 for war with the Slaves, dwelling in what is now Russia, endeavoured in the first instance to procure the removal from the Caucasus of the Slavonian settlements, and succeeded in transferring them to Masisa, which is now known as Mapsuyest in Syria.

Al-Tabari, an author of the 10th century, in his "History of Kings" (written in the year 915) confirms the fact that Marwan pursuing the King of the Hazarabs penetrated as far as the *Slavonian* river,* and "fell on the abodes

* Another author, Shamsooddeen Dimeshki, calls this river, the "Russian" river. The river meant is the present Don.

of the *unbelievers*" (Khânaha-i-Kâfir), "killed them all and demolished 20,000 houses." Who are these Kafirs, who had settled abodes? That they were not Hazarabs* is proved by the fact that the latter were nomads and consequently had no settled abodes, and secondly, the Hazarabs professed the Jewish religion and could not therefore be numbered amongst the idolatrous Kafirs. In the year 22 (644) when the Arab Chief Abdul Rahman made war against the Hazarabs, the King (Shahryar)† from Bab-al-Abwab (Derbend) appeared before him with the following proposition:—"I stand

* The Hazarabs here referred to have of course no direct connection with the Hazarabs near Herat, who are a Mongolian race from the East, a relic of Chengiz Khan's invasion (see Erskine's History of India, Vol. I., pp. 14 and 221). This name is given them by their neighbours and seems to be used not as distinctive of a particular race, but as a common name for barbarous tribes. It is applied to the home of the Aryan tribes on the head-waters of the Oxus (see Erskine's India, Vol. I., p. 287); also to our own district of Hazara in the Punjab; and here again we meet with it as the name of a nomadic people near the Caucasus. It is possible, however, that in the latter case it may have some connection with the *Hazûresh* or *Hazvâresh* form of the Pehlevi language. Dr. Haug describes the *Hazûresh* as a Semitic (Chaldee) element introduced into the popular language of Western Persia and prevailing until about 700 A.D. Here the time and place agree very fairly, for the author tells us that it was in 644 A.D. that the Arabs made war against the Hazarabs who apparently lived to the south of the Caucasus (for the King of Derbend says that his country lies between the Hazarabs and the Rus). Moreover they are said to have professed the Jewish religion, also Semitic.—R. B. S.

† The word Shahryar means *King* or *Potentate* in Persian.

between two enemies, the Hazarahs and the Roos, who are the enemies of the whole world, especially of the Arabs, and no one knows how to make war against them except the people of these parts. Instead of paying tribute to you, I will make war with the Roos, and with their own weapons will keep them back that they may be forced to remain in their own country. Consider this as our tribute that we may yearly pay* it." Caliph Omar agreed to these conditions, and from that time "this custom was introduced amongst all the people of the mountain passes of Derbend that they should not pay either taxes or tribute, on condition of preventing the unbelievers from harassing the Mahomedans." The above reference therefore to the "dwellings of the unbelievers" clearly refers to the Roos, who fulfilled both conditions since they had settled abodes and were idolaters.

After settling in Syria the Slaves rapidly grew attached to their newly adopted fatherland, and in the second half of the 8th century took an active part in the internal disturbances which occurred owing to disputed succession in

* Harkavy, page 74. I should have preferred to translate it thus: "you may reckon this as our yearly tribute."

the Caliphate. The fact of the warlike Slaves having taken part in these disturbances is sufficient to explain their removal to considerable distances from their original settlements, and it is very probable that the Caliphs took every possible opportunity to dislodge these presumptuous strangers, who dared to meddle in the matter of the succession to the throne. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that the Slaves, being strangers to their surroundings, despised and persecuted by the Mahomedans on account of being "unbelievers," and never having been permitted to settle permanently, should have wandered from place to place until at last they found a refuge in mountains where they could without difficulty assert their independence.

Perhaps, on the other hand, the Slaves may have been transplanted by force, since in those times such a proceeding was by no means of rare occurrence. For instance Nadir Shah in 1737 brought a large number of Persians to Cabul, and Timur in 1396 forcibly drew out of Persia 1,000 Turkoman families, settling them on the sources of the Murgab. There is nothing improbable in the fact that a similar lot should have overtaken the Syrian Slaves, and on this

hypothesis the present tendency of the Bolors to exclude all Mahomedans from their territory is easily explained, since it is not unnatural that they should still remember the endless wanderings to which they were formerly subjected.

If we bear in mind the peculiarities which separate the Bolors from other Asian nationalities, the conclusion appears natural that the Bolors are simply Slaves, who found their way to their present abodes either by way of Byzantium and Syria, or Armenia and Syria.* Isolated from the rest of the Slavonian world, the Bolors in the course of 1,700 years may naturally have acquired many words of speech from the different nationalities with whom they have come into contact, and on the other hand, may have, little by little, lost all traces of their original language.

* It is scarcely necessary to treat this hypothesis seriously. The Slavonian colony is not traced nearer to Kafiristan than Syria, and they would almost have been as near the Hindu-Kush before leaving Europe. The only link given as connecting the Kafirs with the Slaves rather than with any one else, is that the latter call themselves by a name signifying in their own language "glory"; while the former have a word for "glory" in their language which resembles (very faintly, *viz.*, *Boli* and *Balor*) the old name of a nationality of which *perhaps* the Kafirs formed a part. Even if Balor were the name given to themselves by the Kafirs (which it is not), and if its derivation could certainly be traced to the word for "glory" in their dialect and not (as is quite as probable) to any other similar sounding word in any other of the Dard dialects, this

In any case the Bolors afford a very interesting subject of study for Russians; and Kafiristan is the country to which our travellers should make their way instead of wasting both time and money in fruitless excursions on the railways of British India.

In the neighbourhood of the Bolors another interesting people have their abode, called the Swatees. They are governed by a spiritual master styled Akhoond, who eats neither bread nor flesh, but lives upon the milk of seven

would prove but little. Nations are often found to give themselves a self-glorifying name in their several tongues. That only shows their human nature. The common name of the Aryan race is traced by scholars to a word meaning "excellent, high-born." The *Ire* of Ireland while connected with the above, signifies "noble" (see Pictet's *Origines Indo-Européennes*, Vol. I., pp. 28—32). There is nothing in the mere possession of self-glorifying names (not otherwise connected) to prove relationship between two tribes or nations.

The other supposed marks of connection would prove too much. Wooden houses are common to all the forest regions of the Himalaya, and stools and tables are common to the Chinese as well as to all the European nations; wine to all non-mussulman grape-growing countries; Catholic observances to the Buddhist Tibetans (and could certainly constitute no link with the orthodox Slavonians), traditions of Greek origin are common to all the petty States north of the Hindu-Kush, &c.

On the other hand the Siah-posh Kafirs fit so well into their place geographically, ethnologically, and philologically, as an unconverted remainder of a group of kindred and neighbouring tribes, from which they were until lately in no way distinguished; that we have no need to call in Slavonians from Syria to account for them.—R. B. S.

goats, who must be pastured upon the Sacred Mountain. The goats are even said to be muzzled when driven out to the jungle, lest they should become defiled by taking a sly nibble at a neighbour's crop in passing. The taxes are paid to the Akhoond, not in money, but in kind, at the rate of one-tenth of the crops and livestock. The method of life amongst the Swatees calls to mind the ancient Spartans, tables shared in common and strict moderation being the two chief characteristics. As many as 6,000 people take their daily meals with the Akhoond himself, for which purpose three huge cook houses have been erected. The authority of the Akhoond is so great that hitherto he has been impervious to the influence of the English. The Bunneers, whom the English paid for making war on the Swatees, fought badly and unwillingly, being restrained by dread of the sacred Chief, and the appearance of a certain epidemic, which carried off only twenty-five victims, but which was ascribed to the curses of the Akhoond, was sufficient to cause them to sue for peace. At the present time the Swatees, Bunneers, and Khyberees, in all about 640,000 souls, recognize the Akhoond's authority. The

Khybercees live in the mountains surrounding the celebrated Khyber Pass, where in the year 1841 all the English fugitives from Cabul perished. This tribe lead a life of robbery, in turn guarding the pass and plundering the caravans. Their clothing, amongst other things, includes boots made of cord and caps of reeds. The English pay them a subsidy and thereby secure their postal communication and the safety of caravans.


To turn now to a brief historical account of the Afghan nation. Afghanistan up to the close of the first half of the 18th century formed a part of the Persian Empire,* although owing to the powerlessness of the Persian rulers the Afghans were, from time to time, enabled to assert their independence. In 1722 the Afghan nation threw off the Persian yoke, and succeeded in extending their conquests within Persia itself; but this success was only short lived, for the Persians rapidly recovered themselves, and under the leadership of Nadir Shah expelled the Afghans from their territory. Nadir however had no particular

* It was only "in the early part of the 16th century that the Abdalee tribes of Afghans, hard pressed by the Uzbeks, consented to pay tribute to the Sufawi Kings of Persia." Markham's Persia, p. 315.—R. B. S.

regard for the lawful heirs of the Safi dynasty, but on the contrary, having succeeded in usurping the entire authority, was in the year 1737, after a successful war with the Turks, raised to the throne with the universal consent of the people. The whole life of Nadir was devoted to war, and during his reign Persia advanced beyond the Amu Darya and the Indus. On his return from India Nadir Shah was killed in Meshed in 1747, and the fruits of his labours perished with him. Bagdad fell to Turkey, Georgia to Russia, Turan became independent, while Western Iran or Persia proper after a succession of internal troubles fell, at last, under the authority of Aga Mahomed, the founder of the Kajar dynasty. As regards Eastern Iran, *i.e.*, Afghanistan, Seistan, and Beloochistan, these provinces became subordinate to one of Nadir's Generals, an Afghan named Ahmed Khan, the head of the family of the Abdalees. Ahmed Khan with an escort of 10,000 of his Afghan troops was in charge of the spoils which Nadir had gained in India, but learning at Candahar of Nadir's death, the Afghans divided the booty while Ahmed Khan seized the treasure and proclaimed himself Shah under the title of

Dur-i-Duraneh (pearl of the Durances). On this occasion the inhabitants of Candahar were not spared, for the Afghans carried off 10,000 of their women.

The following genealogical table will make more clear to the reader the changes which afterwards occurred in the successions to the throne of the Duranees :—



In 1773 the succession devolved upon Timur Shah, the son of Ahmed Shah, after which in 1793 it fell to Zeman Shah, son of Timur. Placing the entire administration in the hands of his Wuzer, Surfaraz Khan, who was also known by the name of Payendeh Khan, the new Ameer, abandoned himself to pleasure, but his suspicions were afterwards aroused, and in 1799 he put his Wuzer to death. The Mahomedzais, to which family Payendeh Khan belonged, rose as one man, and their rising was followed by that of the Barakzais, while the royal tribe of Populzais adhered to the cause of Zeman Shah, and thus the seeds were sown for a civil war.

As the avenger of Payendeh Khan there appeared his eldest son, Futteh Khan, who, taking advantage of the campaign of Zeman Shah in India, succeeded by the assistance of Mahmud, Zeman's brother, in asserting his authority over Herat and Candahar. Zeman hastened back to Cabul, but was defeated, taken captive, and his eyes immediately put out. Mahmud ascended the throne, but his younger brother, Shujah-ool-Mulk, made himself master of the Capital, and in 1801 declared himself Ameer, but was afterwards defeated by Mahmud and compelled to flee to India. Subsequently, in 1803, a religious war between the Sunnis and Shias, the latter of which sects Mahmud patronized, afforded Shah Shujah the opportunity of again asserting his authority over Cabul, Mahmud and Futteh Khan being taken prisoners. The latter however escaped to Herat, where he incited the people to rise, and for some years made war against Shah Shujah, who in 1809 was finally overthrown by him. The throne again passed to Mahmud, but the entire authority was centered in the hands of Futteh Khan, who was appointed Wuzeer with the title of Shah-Dost or friend of the Shah. Futteh

Khan's principal supporters were his numerous brothers, amongst whom the most celebrated were Sherdil Khan, Azim Khan, and Dost Mahomed Khan. The son of Mahmud, Kamran, however resolved upon the overthrow of Futteh Khan, and having ordered his arrest made him over to a death of torture. His limbs were disjoined one by one, and finally he was decapitated; but Futteh Khan, true to his character, did not utter a groan and died a hero. This execution entailed the fall of the dynasty.

In order to make clear later events, it is necessary to describe the relationship amongst the descendants of Payendeh Khan, inasmuch as the throne of Afghanistan passed to his family, the members of which were perpetually involved in disputes for the supreme power.

(1.)—*Sons of Payendeh by his first wife.*

PAYENDEH KHAN.

Futteh Khan. | Mahomed Azim Khan. | Timur Koolee Khan.

Sultan Ahmed Khan. | Mahomed Sadik Khan. | Mahomed Oomur Khan.

Shahnawaz Khan. | Secunder Ahmed Khan. | Abdulla Khan. | Fatima (daughter).
(2.)—*By a Persian concubine.*

PAYENDEH KHAN.

Ata Mahomed Khan. | Dost Mahomed Khan.

Mahomed Akber. | Bedishah (daughter). | Ghulam Aidar Khan. | Shere Ali Khan. | Mahomed Ameen. | Mahomed Shurreef.
Yacoob Khan. | Abdulla Jan. | Ismail.

(3.)—*By his second wife.*

PAYENDEH KHAN.

Sherdil Khan. | Kohandil Khan. | Rahmdil Khan. | Azad Khan.
Nawab Mahomed Zeman. | Shujah Daulat Khan.


Payendeh Khan had several wives by whom he had twenty-one sons and several daughters. From his first and lawful wife is descended the elder branch, and the present ruling family springs from a Persian concubine. Of the remaining sons of Payendeh Khan, I shall only mention those who in some way or other made themselves noteworthy, or whose names occur in connection with the narrative of later events.

At the time when the influence of Futtch Khan was supreme at the Court of Cabul, his half-brother, Dost Mahomed, was made a "Pansad," *i.e.*, Commandant of 500 horse, and received the Governorship of the district of Kurram. There, with the object of creating a party of adherents, Dost Mahomed entered into close relations with the influential Chiefs and married several of the Kurram women. Afterwards on the death of his brother, Azeem Khan, he married the widow of the latter and also a dancing girl.* Thus the Dost's harem consisted of seven chief wives independently of concubines. In the foregoing table only his children from his favorite wives have been

* This dancing girl belonged to Azeem Khan by virtue of inheritance from Shah Mahmud.

given. The others are shown in the following:—

DOST MAHOMED KHAN.



The Dost had no children by the widow of Azcem Khan, but adopted her son, Sultan Ahmed, to whom he was much attached, giving him the name of Jan (equivalent to "my favorite"). This Sultan Jan was afterwards Governor of Herat and married a daughter of the Dost by name Badishah. In this way Sultan Jan's sons, Shahnawaz and Sekunder Khan, are grandsons of the Dost and nephews of the present Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

It will not now be difficult for the reader to follow all the phases of the disputes of the Afghan Sirdars, and we therefore return to our narrative.

Before the murder of Futteh Khan took place, his half-brother, Dost Mahomed, fled to Cashmere, where at that time Azim Khan, the full

brother of the imprisoned Wuzeer, was in power. Azim was very much provoked at the Dost for having abandoned his brother to the will of the blood-thirsty Amecr, and for a time it appeared not unlikely that Dost Mahomed would be visited with the customary penalty of losing the sight of the eyes. At this juncture however came the news of the execution of the Wuzeer, and retaliatory measures were imperative. The Dost had the reputation of being an adroit man, who had already by means of his marriage connections attached to himself a strong body of partizans. Hence Azim resolved to use him as an instrument for his vengeance. Setting him at liberty and placing him in command of a body of troops Azim despatched Dost Mahomed to Cabul. The town fell without a blow, but the Dost resolved not to declare himself ruler, preferring to choose one of the Suddozais named Sultan Ali. Azim, on his part, at first declared for Shujah-ool-Mulk, whom he summoned from India, but afterwards attached his sympathies to the cause of Ayooob Khan.

Sultan Ali was soon put to death and Dost Mahomed was obliged to recognize the prior right of Azim. Receiving Ghuznee as his appanage, the Dost, a year afterwards, rose

against his brother, but on the appearance of the latter with his troops, fled for sanctuary to the sacred tomb of Fâtteh Khan. To put him to death was, under these circumstances, impossible, and Azim pardoned his half-brother, and in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship made him swear to take to wife his (Azim's) daughters.

All this however led to nothing. The perfidious Dost again rebelled, and on this occasion with complete success. Azim was killed, and in 1823 Dost Mahomed proclaimed himself Ameer. The Duranee kingdom was divided into portions amongst the brothers, Dost Mahomed governing Cabul; Sherdil Khan, Candahar; Kohandil Khan, Ghuznee; Kamran, Herat; and Ata Mahomed Khan, Peshawur.

With regard to the Punjab, that province had become detached from the Afghan kingdom as early as the time of Shah Zeman, who distrustful of the Afghans, made over its administration to the hands of the famous robber and marauder Runjeet Sing. Within the space of a year Runjeet ceased to pay tribute to Zeman Shah and became independent.

Afghanistan remained in this state of dismemberment until 1839, when the English

appeared upon the scene. I do not propose to discuss here in detail the reasons which induced the English to interfere* in Afghan affairs, but I confine myself to mentioning the two principal causes which were (1) the eastward movement of Persia on Herat, and (2) the southward movement of Russia on Khiva. These two movements almost coincided in point of time. Influenced by the fear of a combined Perso-Russian invasion of India, the English contemplated forming a friendly kingdom on the frontier which might protect their valuable colony. They therefore resolved to take up the cause of the exiled Shah Shujah, to bring to an end the existing arrangement under which Afghanistan was split up into a series of semi-independent Governorships, and to restore the family of the Duranees to the throne.

To penetrate into Afghanistan from India by way of the Punjab appeared at that time impossible, and hence the English entered into an alliance with Runjeet Sing, the co-operation of whose army of veterans appeared to make success a certainty.

The invasion of Afghanistan was carried on in three columns. The chief or Bengal column, consisting of 9,500 English and Native troops,

6,000 Sikhs, 38,000 camp followers, and 30,000 camels, advanced to Shikarpoor, where it joined the Bombay column numbering 5,600 men, and proceeding in company with the latter marched *viâ* the Bolan Pass and occupied Candahar and Ghuznee. Here a detachment separated from the main body for the occupation of Cabul, on which point a third column, consisting of Sikhs and a small detachment of British troops, had also moved.

The easy successes, which marked the opening of the campaign, demoralized the English who, in spite of their promise to the contrary, resolved to take up a permanent position in the region which they had occupied. Shah Shujah was declared Amcer, and Dost Mahomed, who at first had recourse to flight, voluntarily surrendered himself, as a captive, to the English. Thus the power of the Durances was re-established and the objects of England appeared to have reached their fulfilment. All however was soon undone by the excesses of the British soldiery. In 1841 visible discontent was excited in Cabul owing to the treatment to which the women were subjected, and this was followed by brawls with the foraging parties, and at last by an open rebellion.

Besieged within their own fortifications, the English were forced to consent to an ignominious capitulation, and marched out under the escort of an Afghan detachment. The reader will find some details of the catastrophe which followed in the Chapter regarding our relations with England. It is sufficient in this place to say that the whole of the English army was cut to pieces to the last man in the well known Khyber Pass.

Abandoned to the will of fate, Shah Shujah gave way to despair, and the entire authority passed into the hands of the Wuzer Nawab Mahomed Zeman Khan (son of Azad Khan, and therefore grandson of Payendeh Khan). His reign was not destined to be of long duration, for he was after a short interval murdered by Shujah Dowlat Shah, the son of the Wuzer; Futteh Jung, the second son of the murdered Shah, being proclaimed King. The new ruler was however forced to save himself by flight and only returned with the British troops who had marched to Cabul for the purpose of effecting the delivery of the English captives. The party however at the Capital which was hostile to Dost Mahomed proclaimed as Ameer a youthful son of Futteh Jung, named

Prince Shahpoor Mirza, who was only with difficulty afterwards saved from death. The throne again passed to Dost Mahomed, who had recently been exchanged for the English captives at Cabul, while Kohandil Khan, a brother of the Dost, who had returned from Persia, re-occupied Candahar.

Although nominally Ameer, the Dost possessed little or no real authority. Born, as was well known, of a nameless concubine, Dost Mahomed had but a small chance of gaining influence over a nation whose highest boast (which is productive of endless internecine feuds) is that of a distinguished origin and an untarnished pedigree. As opposed to his low-born origin, the grandsons of the lawful wife of Payendeh Khan enjoyed the reputation of being high-born aristocrats, and when in addition to this fact it is remembered that the outlying districts, the administration of which was conducted by the Dost's brothers, were scarcely more than nominally dependent on the Central Government, and that he had moreover to contend against the animosity of Mahomed Akber Khan, his eldest son, it can hardly be wondered that the Dost's authority rested on a slender basis. Powerless in his own

kingdom, the ruler of Afghanistan, in spite of his wishes to the contrary, was compelled to enter into an alliance with the Sikhs against the English, the result being the loss of Peshawur which, with the Punjab, had been, as early as the year 1840, annexed to the dominions of the East India Company.

Subsequently however the Dost resolved to change his line of action and to consolidate his kingdom into one united whole. Acting upon this principle he effected the subjugation of Balkh and the petty independent States of Andhkoi and Maimena, and, taking advantage of the first favorable opportunity, gained possession of Candahar.

In 1854 Kohandil Khan died, and his eldest surviving brother, Rahmdil Khan, asserted his right to Candahar. The children of Kohandil had recourse to arms, and ultimately the rival parties, unable to settle their own differences, invited the interference of Dost Mahomed. The Dost immediately appeared with his troops, occupied all the approaches, and reconciled the disputants by declaring Candahar to be his own property. Discontented with this arrangement, Rahmdil proceeded to Herat, the administration of which province was then entirely

disorganized, but failing to effect his objects there, had recourse for aid to Persia.

The disturbances at Herat commenced with the murder of Shah Kamran by his Wuzeer, Yar Mahomed Khan (Alekozai). Kamran's son, Syud Mahomed, met with a similar fate and was killed by the Commander of the Body Guard, Isa Khan (of the Berduranee tribe). The murderer however did not long enjoy his authority, for Herat was soon afterwards besieged by the Persians, and Isa Khan, being invited outside the walls on the pretext of negotiations, fell a victim to an ambushade.

This Eastward movement of the Persians was regarded as a menace both to the English and to the Dost, who on the 1st January 1857 entered into a treaty, according to which the British agreed to pay to the Dost a monthly subsidy of one lakh of rupees during such time as the war with the Persians might continue, and also to supply him with arms. In order to force the Persians to evacuate Herat, the English also despatched a body of 15,000 men for the occupation of Bushire and Karrack.

The result of these proceedings was the ratification of a new treaty between England and Persia in 1857, under the terms of which the

latter renounced all claims to sovereignty over Herat, which thereupon became independent and was made over by the Persians to Sultan Ahmed Khan (Sultan Jan), the step-son of the Dost. The want of cordiality then existing between Sultan Jan and Dost Mahomed appeared to afford a guarantee for the actual independence of Herat, but nevertheless both the Dost and the English considered it necessary to keep a sharp watch on the position of affairs there. The British Agents, Major Taylor and others, endeavoured to persuade Sultan Ahmed to throw off every vestige of dependence on Persia and to change the impression on the coins which then bore the name of Nasir-ud-din Shah. Sultan Ahmed however replied that he had received Herat from Persia and not from England, to which the English retorted that Persia had been forced to do this against her will, owing to the pressure of British troops, and that therefore if the Sultan was unwilling to impress his own name on the coinage, it should more properly be struck in that of the Dost. These arguments however produced no effect, and Sultan Jan, placing the English Agents under an armed escort, dismissed them from Herat. The conse-

quences of this conduct on the part of the Sultan were not long in showing themselves under the following circumstances:—In 1862 Mahomed Shurreef, one of the sons of the Dost, taking advantage of the inability of Sultan Jan to coerce several towns which refused to recognize his authority, seized the town of 'Taebarah,* and declined to surrender it on the demand of the Sultan. The Dost interposed in the dispute and attacked Herat, which fell after a siege of eleven months and fifteen days. In spite of privations and sickness the garrison showed an obstinate resistance, and it was only owing to the ingenuity of the Sappers and Miners (who appear to have been English) that at last the city was taken. The garrison lost 1,000 men killed, while as many as 1,500 perished from the effects of a disease called “Syahpae” (black foot), to which pregnant† women and new-born children especially fell victims. The daughter of the Dost, who was married to Sultan Jan, died in the early part of the siege, and Sultan

* A chief place of the Taemuni tribe.—*Trs.*

† The sickness consisted in a swelling of the feet which afterwards turned black. It resembled scurvy.

Jan himself at a later period. About two weeks after the capture of the town, Dost Mahomed also paid the debt of nature at the age of seventy-three years.

The death of the Dost was the signal for intestine disputes, produced by the ambition of his rival sons and nephews. Shere Ali Khan, nominated by the deceased Ameer as heir-apparent to the throne, began by treacherously seizing the greater part of his brothers, who conducted, as vassals to the central authority, the administration of the different outlying provinces. His eldest brother, Mahomed Afzul Khan, who had held the Governorship of Balkh for a period of eleven years, displayed a strong opposition, and the civil war which broke out in the spring of 1864, in spite of its indecisiveness, ended in the recognition of Balkh as an independent province. Afzul Khan, however, trusting to the promises of Shere Ali, joined him without a retinue at Tashkoorghan, where he was immediately seized and placed in confinement. After the imprisonment of Afzul, Abdul Rahman, his son, then nineteen years of age, fled to Bokhara, but a year afterwards, taking advantage of Shere Ali being engaged in military

operations against one of his brothers who was Governor of Candahar, returned, occupied Balkh, collected a force of 12,000 troops, and after a siege of ten days' duration, gained possession of Cabul.

Shere Ali having by this time settled matters at Candahar, hastened to the Capital, but was met by Abdul Rahman at Saidabad, four marches from Cabul. A battle ensued, which resulted in the defeat of Shere Ali, while all the captives, whom he had carried about with him during his previous campaigns, including the father of Abdul Rahman and the sons of the late Governor of Herat, namely, Shah-nawaz, Sekunder Ahmed, and Abdulla Khan, escaped and fled from Ghuznee, where they had been left on the day of the battle. Afzul Khan, owing to the successes of his son, was proclaimed Ameer and ruled at Cabul up to the time of his death in 1867, during which interval Abdul Rahman subdued Candahar and inflicted two further defeats upon Shere Ali. On the death of Afzul Khan the throne passed to his eldest surviving brother, Mahomed Azim, who however retained possession of it for only one year, for in 1868 Shere Ali, taking advantage of the absence of Abdul Rahman,

subdued Balkh * without opposition, occupied Candahar, and afterwards succeeded in regaining possession of Cabul. The English entered into communications with Shere Ali and resolved to give him material support, with which object a sum of Rupees 2,50,000 was placed at his disposal for the pay of his troops. The natural result followed. A large number of supporters were attracted to the cause of Shere Ali, and his chances of permanent rule were much increased. On the other hand Abdul Rahman applied for assistance to the Russians. His messenger arrived at Samarcand in August 1868, but the Governor-General held aloof from all communications with him and agreed only to one request, *viz.*, for a receipt showing that the letter from Abdul Rahman had reached its destination. The receipt consisted in a currency note of the value of one rouble and one twenty copeck piece.

Whilst he was awaiting a reply to his application to the Russians for assistance, Abdul

* In the *Military Statistical Journal* for 1868, page 37, Abdul Rahman Khan is styled the Governor of Balkh, to which it is added "the only surviving brother of the Dost and consequently the head of the whole family." The reader will observe that this is an error, and that Abdul Rahman is the son of Mahomed Afzul Khan and consequently the grandson of the Dost.

Rahman continued to advance on to Cabul, laid siege to Ghuznee, and defeated two bodies of troops despatched for the relief of that town. Afterwards however emboldened by his constant successes, he divided his forces and advancing with a slender detachment was surrounded by the entire army of Shere Ali, suffered a disastrous defeat and fled to the mountains in company with his uncle, Azim Khan. Cut off from Balkh, Abdul Rahman begged for the protection of the English, but was informed in reply that he would only be allowed to remain in British territory on condition that he promised to renounce all his claims and to desist from opposing Shere Ali. Abdul Rahman and Azim then fled to Meshed. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Teheran, M. Zinoviyef, when communicating this intelligence (in his despatch dated 17th (29th) April 1869) added "it is doubtful whether a renewed effort on the part of Abdul Rahman will be attended by success, inasmuch as Shere Ali owing to the liberality of the English, has paid off the arrears of salary due to the troops, and also his debts to the local merchants; and therefore enjoys considerable popularity."

In the course of his wanderings to Meshed,

Khiva, and Bokhara, Abdul Rahman despatched several letters to the Governor-General, begging that assistance might be given to his uncle Azim. to regain the throne. In the end of July 1869 one of Abdul Rahman's relatives came to Samarcand with a request that permission might be given to his master to come into Russian territory with his retinue of three hundred men. The Governor-General directed the messenger to be informed that if Abdul Rahman Khan was homeless, Russian hospitality would not be denied to him, but that he was not to imagine that the Russians would interfere in his disputes with Shere Ali. Meanwhile the Ameer of Bokhara summoned Abdul Rahman to meet him at Hissar where he happened at that time to be in connection with an expedition against the outlying Begs. After a cool reception, his maintenance allowance was stopped, and the Ameer appeared even to contemplate surrendering him to Shere Ali. This ungracious treatment Abdul Rahman ascribed to the displeasure of the Ameer at the unsatisfactory nature of his recent correspondence with the Russians.

In December 1869 Abdul Rahman, writing from Hissar, stated that in consequence of the

universal discontent prevalent in Afghanistan against the Ameer Shere Ali, he had hopes of gaining a rapid success, in furtherance of which he made the following requests: (1) that some point should be arranged on the Amu Darya, where he might live and carry on correspondence with his partisans; and (2) that he might be supplied with funds, inasmuch as the mercantile community, to which class his supporters belonged, had fallen under the power of Shere Ali and his means were in consequence at their lowest ebb. "Then will Afghanistan and her wealth belong to the White Czar" wrote Abdul Rahman. Nevertheless the Governor-General adhered to his previous decision, and directed Abramof to reiterate the former reply regarding the unwillingness of the Russians to interfere in Afghan disputes.

Abdul Rahman could not however feel secure so long as he remained in Bokhara. Having from the first declined to receive the fugitive Katta Torah, the eldest son of the Ameer of Bokhara, Shere Ali naturally expected similar treatment with regard to Abdul Rahman at the hands of the Bokharian authorities to whom he had moreover promised the aid of the English arms and money. Under these circumstances

Abdul Rahman was compelled to beg the Governor-General to effect, by some means or other, the release of himself and his Afghans from Bokhara, where they lived under strict surveillance and in a state of extreme want. "You know" wrote the Prince, "that our country has been given over to the protection of the English. I place my hopes upon you because I well know that the dominions of the White Czar are far more extensive than those of the Germans, the French, and the English all added together. On my arrival at Meshed I discovered that Iran ('Persia') had become subordinate to the protection of the White Czar, and I therefore travelled across the steppe of the Tekke Turkomans to Urgenj (Khiva) with the object of making my way to you." Considering himself therefore as the guest of Russia, Abdul Rahman Khan begged us to demand, on his behalf, a free passage from the Ameer of Bokhara. In reply the Governor-General on the 7th (19th) September 1870 promised Abdul Rahman a hearty welcome, but cautioned him that any expectations which he might entertain of material aid for the realization of his views with regard to Afghanistan, were altogether vain and misplaced. "The present ruler of

Afghanistan," it was explained, "has been recognized as the rightful ruler of that country by a power on terms of friendly relations with Russia, *viz.*, England, and until such time as Shere Ali breaks the peace and destroys the tranquillity on the Bokhara frontier, I have no foundation for regarding him as an enemy of the Russians."

Before receiving this letter Abdul Rahman left Bokhara, and on the 13th (25th) February 1870 arrived at Samarcand accompanied by a retinue of 221 men.* The Governor-General permitted him to proceed to Tashkent for a personal interview, on which occasion Abdul Rahman brought forward the following fresh requests: (1) that we would give him 3,000 muskets and seven pieces of artillery, even if it were only such as we had taken from the Bokhariots; (2) that he might be permitted to form a detachment of the Afghans and Persians who had at different times emigrated from Bokhara; (3) that permission might be procured from the Ameer of Bokhara to his settling for a short time in Kerki or Sherabad, in order that he

* This number included his nephew Ishaq Khan, 3 Generals, 9 Kumedans, 2 Azidans, 4 Rissaldars, 5 Sartips, 3 Captains, 14 Serkards, and 180 Allamans.

might thence distribute proclamations to his adherents in Afghanistan; and (4) that he might be permitted to retain his suite. Abdul Rahman declared that the Ameer, his uncle, was perfectly well aware of the fact that he was in communication with his friends, and that even if a letter happened to be intercepted, it would disclose nothing new, as Shere Ali had long been familiar to abuse. Lastly he urged that Shere Ali was certainly no friend of Russia and deserved no special indulgence at her hands. In reply to all these representations the Governor-General reiterated that he would not interfere in his disputes with Shere Ali, neither by providing funds nor by assisting him with arms, and that the Russian authorities could not regard with favor his communications with his adherents in Afghanistan. Abdul Rahman was at the same time offered permission to retain the members of his retinue in Samarcand, supporting them from the maintenance allowance which would be granted to him* by Government.

* Afterwards Abdul Rahman was allowed for the support of himself and his retinue 18,000 roubles a year. As this sum was too small for the maintenance of 221 men, the Khan dismissed the greater part of his retinue. In 1873 he received 25,260 roubles, and in 1874, 24,300, that is 960 less in consequence of two Afghans having left him (each was paid at the rate of 40 roubles per mensem).

'These proceedings entirely coincided with the views of the Imperial Government, and the Director of the Asiatic Department, Councillor M. Stremoukhof, wrote (on the 16th (28th) May) that in order to avoid all future difficulties, it might be better to send Abdul Rahman into the interior of Russia; adding—"After the friendly exchange of sentiments which has taken place with the English Cabinet in regard to Central Asian matters, our Government is endeavouring to avoid everything which, without offering us any substantial advantage, might tend to excite feelings of distrust."

In order to obviate any possible risk of misunderstanding with the Ameer of Afghanistan and to forestall the distorted reports by which every passing event in Central Asia is accompanied, the Governor-General in a letter dated 10th (22nd) March 1870 informed Shere Ali of the arrival of Abdul Rahman Khan within Russian territory, and of the hospitality which had been shown to him. The opportunity was also taken of explaining to the Ameer the system upon which the Russian Government acted. "The dominions of the White Czar in Turkistan," wrote the

Governor-General, "have no common limits with the country now subject to your supremacy. They are separated by the Khanate of Bokhara whose ruler, the Ameer Syud Muzaffar, having concluded a Treaty of peace with Russia, stands in friendly relations with, and under the protection of, the mighty Emperor. Therefore no misunderstandings or collisions can possibly occur between us, and, although distant neighbours, we can and ought to live in peace and harmony. I am by no means desirous of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, not only because you stand under the protection of the English Government, with which as you know the Russian Government has friendly relations, but also because I perceive that you do not interfere in the affairs of Bokhara. Afghanistan and Bokhara ought not to have any point of contact together and each of those Khanates ought to go their separate ways, neither troubling itself as to what is happening to its neighbour."

This letter coincided with the views of the Russian Imperial Chancellor expressed about the same time (18th (30th) March) in a letter to the Governor-General. Prince Gortchakof wrote that in view of the visible change in

public opinion, which had latterly taken place in consequence of the frank interchange of sentiments between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, it was necessary for the Russians to take all possible measures with the view of removing false reports in Central Asia. Baron Brunnow, our Ambassador at the Court of St. James, however expressed his opinion (in a despatch dated 18th (30th) March 1870) that direct communications between the Governor-General of Turkistan and the Ameer of Afghanistan ought not to be permitted, that all such correspondence ought to be conducted solely in St. Petersburg, inasmuch as the head of the Russian Imperial Cabinet alone could properly decide what should be said and what left unsaid in such cases. This opinion however is clearly opposed to the full authority in political matters which has been vested by the Emperor in General Von Kauffman and cannot therefore be accepted.

Meanwhile popular feeling in Afghanistan was by no means favorable to the nearer relations that were springing up between Shere Ali Khan and the English, and the discontent thus caused was increased by Shere Ali's endeavours to weaken the influence of the

powerful Sirdars, who formed the Provincial Governors, by depriving them both of authority over the troops and of control over the finances. At the Umballa Conference, as we know from Afghan sources, an agreement was made with the following* conditions: (1) that Shere Ali should deport into British India some of the more influential Sirdars who were unfavorably disposed towards the British; (2) that he should disarm the Afghans and in future prohibit the carrying of arms in Afghanistan; (3) that he should organize a regular army of 40,000 men, whom he should distribute throughout Balkh and Herat to counterbalance Russia and Persia; (4) that the regular troops only should receive pay; and (5) that an English delegate should accompany Shere Ali on his return journey to Cabul. The English on their part undertook (1) to allow the Ameer twelve lakhs of rupees per annum; (2) to maintain on their own account a force of 15,000 troops, to garrison Cabul and Balkh, paying the infantry at the rate of Rupees 10 and the cavalry at the rate of Rupees 30 per mensem; (3) to depute some British officers for the purpose of drilling the

* It is scarcely necessary to say these conditions are incorrectly described.—*Trs.*

Afghan army; (4) to send to Cabul some gun-casters and armourers; and (5) to send 12,000 muskets and 10 pieces of artillery for the use of the Ameer's troops.

Almost all these conditions have been, as a matter of fact, carried into effect, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that the others also will not be fulfilled. Shere Ali on his return to Cabul commenced by disarming his subjects, issuing a proclamation that in future it was forbidden to carry arms, and ordering all weapons to be surrendered on payment of their value. This measure however evoked such discontent and opposition that it was ultimately abandoned, but to such an extent were the populace agitated by it, accompanied as it was by the arrest of several influential Afghans and their deportation to British India, the stoppage of pay to the cavalry, and, last but not least, the raising of recruits for the new regiments, that many of the provinces broke out into open revolt. "Every one sees that the object of the English is through the instrumentality of Shere Ali Khan to make us pay the price of the English blood* which we have shed," wrote the relatives of

* Referring to 1840.

Abdul Rahman, while the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Teheran in a despatch dated 18th (30th) March 1870 said—"The majority of the Afghan Chiefs have refused to contribute the required number of recruits, declaring that nothing will induce them to serve their deadly enemies, the English."

The insurrection of 1870 included various tribes, chiefly the Ghilzais and Suleyman Kheyls, and the rebels at its very commencement numbered as many as 50,000 men. The Ameer's troops met at first with some reverses and lost as many as 1,200 killed with four pieces of artillery, but the insurrection was ultimately put down.

In the end of August 1870 a reply was received from the Ameer to the Governor-General's letter, of which the following is an extract:—

"When I received from you such assurances that the Russian Government will neither openly nor secretly, by means of its troops, interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, and that the enemies of Afghanistan will not receive any assistance from you, I was immeasurably delighted." Further on in his letter the Ameer stated that on the receipt of the Governor-

General's communication, he had asked the advice of the Viceroy of British India, and had issued orders to all his frontier officers not to interfere in the affairs of their neighbours, not to molest them, and not to permit armed parties to cross the frontier from Afghan territory. "All that I have stated above," added the Ameer, "has been determined upon not by myself alone, but after consultation with the representative of the English Government, the Viceroy of India, who is fully aware of the friendly relations which exist between his Government and the Emperor of Russia. From conversations with the Viceroy, I am now fully convinced of the friendship existing between the two Governments, and I feel assured that tranquillity will be established in my Empire."

In this way the object of the Governor-General was gained. Our political programme was made clear both to the British Indian and Cabul Governments, and obtained their full approval. On the other hand, it met with the same favourable reception from the Government of Great Britain. The Private Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a communication dated 29th July (10th August) 1870,

informed the Governor-General that a copy of his letter to Shere Ali Khan had been communicated to our Chargé d'Affaires in London, and that "the Government of Great Britain being informed by the Chargé d'Affaires of the contents of the letter referred to, had instructed their Ambassador at St. Petersburg to express to the Imperial Government their acknowledgments for this expression of the entirely amicable disposition of Russia towards England."

Even before this the English Government had suggested to the Ameer the advisability of curbing his spirit of enterprise in the north and west of his kingdom; Lord Mayo having informed Shere Ali that England and Russia were fully agreed as to the method of action in Central Asia, and that henceforth Afghanistan ought not to undertake anything which might be construed to be hostile to Russia. To this Shere Ali replied that not only had he no intention of acting in any way contrary to the interests of Russia, but also that he would not give a refuge within his dominions to people whose disposition towards the Russians was unfriendly.

The desire of Shere Ali's nephew, Secunder

Khan, a Sub-Colonel in the Russian service, to return to Cabul served as a pretext for further correspondence with the Ameer. The Governor-General communicated to the Ameer Secunder Khan's wish to return to his country, and begged Shere Ali to give him a kindly reception and to take advantage of the information which he had acquired in Russia.

I propose here to say a few words regarding this Prince. Secunder Khan undoubtedly is a man of great capacity, as is shown by his retreat from Nurata to Jizzakh over a distance of more than 200 versts with a handful of followers in the teeth of a mass of Bokhariots. His perseverance and tenacity of purpose are proved by the rapidity with which he mastered the Russian and French languages. Subsequently being attached to the Hussar Regiment of the Empress' Life Guards on an allowance of 4,000 roubles, he suddenly found himself in idleness and without promotion in the service. His pride was deeply wounded, and on the 3rd (15th) June 1871 he wrote the following lines to the author of this book, who enjoyed his intimate friendship:—"I have hitherto been attached to a regiment which has no trophies to boast of, and thus

I have received no promotion. Yet I do not consider myself as unfitted for actual duty, nor am I an invalid. I occupy an honorable position but an empty one, to which no active duties belong." He was, in fact, regarded as a man of an inferior race to whom it was impossible to entrust any responsible task, and whom it was useless to endeavour to instruct. Secunder was deeply hurt by his position, added as it was to the circumstance that one of his followers, Rahmdil Khan, who held the rank of an Ensign, had been, on the occasion of some parade, insulted by the Adjutant.

It should be explained that in the Militia which I commanded at the close of the campaign of 1868, Rahmdil Khan occupied the post of the Commander of 100 men,* bearing on the rolls the honorary rank of Captain. As a recognition of the admirable service which he rendered in connection with Bokhariot matters, I recommended him with a few others for the highest reward which a volunteer could gain, namely, the Military Order of Merit, and it was only owing to the fact that this Order could not be granted to people other than Christians, that the Governor-Gen-

* The strength of the troops under my command was 300 men.

eral refused his consent, granting him instead a gold medal which he was allowed to wear on the ribbon of the Order of St. George.

Secunder Khan naturally took up the cause of his friend, and demanded from the Adjutant an apology in presence of the troops. A difference thus arose with the Commandant of the escort which resulted in a challenge to a duel on the part of the Afghan Sirdar. The challenge was of course not accepted, but as Secunder declared his intention of chastising his antagonist on the first occasion when he might meet him in the palace, he was placed under arrest for six days, while Rahmdil Khan and his fellow Ensigns, who had witnessed the incident, were likewise arrested and sent under a guard to their homes. Secunder Khan immediately resigned his post, after which he entered into communication with the English Legation, received permission to leave the country, and went to London, where he was received as a Prince.* Wealthy England in cases of this kind is fond of displaying great liberality, and the Russian Sub-Colonel, instead of 4,000 roubles, was immediately granted an allowance of £4,000 sterling.

* Rahmdil Khan was recalled and permitted to depart with him.

As a friend I congratulate Secunder Khan on this change of abode, since the protection of England will be more advantageous to his career than that of Russia, but as a Russian, I regret deeply that our want of tact should thus prevent us from attaching to ourselves the services of useful agents. Secunder Khan was no worse than the majority of our Staff Officers, and even if he had been considered unfit to hold such an appointment, he would certainly have made an excellent vassal had he been appointed as a Beg of Shahr-i-Sabz, Karategin, Kashgar, or even of Bokhara, Kokan, or Khiva. In addition to the fact of his natural qualifications for such a post, it should not be forgotten that Secunder Khan belongs to a family which, after having been ruined by England, avenged itself in the year 1840, and this fact would have been the best possible security for his conduct towards Russia.

To the Governor-General's letter regarding Secunder the Ameer of Cabul replied by a full consent to receive the Prince, and General Von Kauffman thereupon offered his congratulations to Shere Ali on the cessation of civil discord in Afghanistan.

From the above account of our communica-

tions with the Ameer, it is abundantly clear that Shere Ali has placed himself entirely under the influence of the English in whose hands he serves as a willing tool. This fact however cannot be regarded as a guarantee for the permanency of Afghan politics or for the perpetuation of peaceable relations between Afghanistan and Russia.

Whilst endeavouring to form Afghanistan into a living wall against Russia, the English have forgotten their disastrous war, and their old scores against the Afghans; they have moreover for ever renounced all attempt at extending their conquests in that direction, and do not hesitate even to supply their former enemies with arms and money. The Afghans understand very well what has produced such a change, and receiving money, arms, and military stores from the English, are becoming by degrees accustomed to the idea that sooner or later these will have to be used against the Russians. There is no doubt that in the course of time the expectation will produce the wish for war, and the hope of direct assistance from the English, combined with the possibility of an extensive confederation with our Mahomedan neighbours, will inspire the Afghans with boldness and self-confidence.

The perpetual tendency of the Afghans to move towards the Amu Darya, the banks of which river were formerly only on rare occasions visited by their horse patrols; the desire to advance across the Amu and to erect a fortification on the right bank; the perpetual communications with, and also interference in the affairs of, the tributary Bokharian dominions—all these facts afford no great promise that Russia is likely to find in Afghanistan a peaceable neighbour. Its warlike population, incapable of labour and despising agriculture and trade, will naturally endeavour to find an outlet from the charmed circle of peace and tranquillity, in which the English fancy that they will be able to confine them by their project of making Afghanistan neutral territory. Even if the internal disturbances which constitute the normal state of affairs in this country should at some future time cease, the inhabitants, who are so addicted to robbery that in the absence of strangers they plunder each other, will inevitably find an outlet for their energy in external undertakings.

The authority of the Ameer is powerless to coerce the members of his own family, who take advantage of every prolonged absence of

the ruler to satisfy their ambition or to compass their private objects. Nor is his authority yet strong enough to risk popular opposition, as was shown by the withdrawal of the proclamation prohibiting the carrying of arms. All these considerations prove the want of solidity, and the liability to change, of the foundations on which the English have erected a neutral wall, dividing British from Russian territory. Sooner or later this wall will naturally incline to one side or the other, if indeed it is not first demolished by the pressure of one or the other of its powerful neighbours.

The diplomatic correspondence which took place between England and Russia in connexion with the last Khivan expedition produced, as is well known, a recognition on our part of the neutrality* of Afghanistan, including Budukshan and Wakhan, which at that time were under some sort of imaginary dependence on Shere Ali, and in this way England has stretched forward her hand as far as the Amu Darya. Shere Ali gave his own daughter in

* Afghanistan was not accepted by the British Government as fulfilling the conditions of a neutral zone: and the idea of a neutral zone was eventually abandoned.—*Trs.*

marriage to the ruler of Budukshan, and sent him as a gift several thousand muskets and a few boats—presents which were clearly English, inasmuch as Shere Ali has not such an oversufficiency of arms as to distribute them to his neighbours.

In 1873, simultaneously with the movement of the Russians to Khiva, the Afghans advanced to Budukshan, and thus it happened that both powers reached the banks of the Amu Darya. The Budukshees however do not show any special inclination to bend their necks to the yoke of foreigners, and at the time of the occupation of Budukshan by the Afghan troops, that is in 1873, there were two insurrections there, incited by Jehander Shah, the former ruler of that State. After another unsuccessful attempt in August 1874, Jehander Shah took refuge with the Turkomans; but it may nevertheless be expected that the insurrections will be periodically repeated, and that disturbances in other provinces will ultimately compel the Ameer of Cabul to recall his troops from Budukshan.

In Afghanistan itself disturbances, more or less serious, are perpetually breaking out in consequence of the heavy taxes and the

military conscription to which the people are subject, combined with incessant disputes amongst the members of Shere Ali's family. His eldest son, Yacoob Khan, up to a recent date governed the province of Herat and was regarded as Shere Ali's successor. A true Afghan, he did not conceal his displeasure at the politics of his father, who was the obedient servant of the English. The future succession, however, of Yacoob would have been fraught with danger to the English, and therefore the submissive Shere Ali nominated Abdulla Jan, a youth of immature years, as his heir-apparent.

In all the Khanates of Asia the eldest son of the ruling Ameer invariably has his own special circle of partisans, who seek the good graces of their future sovereign in the expectation of receiving substantial marks of his favor. The fact of having such a party often induces enterprising Princes to strive after the supreme power, and causes sons frequently to raise their hand against their fathers. So it happened in the case of Yacoob, who marched from Herat at the head of troops for the purpose of deposing Shere Ali from the throne. The Ameer moved against him, and

the hostile forces met at Candahar, where Shere Ali resolved to adopt the usual Asiatic tactics, *viz.*, under the pretext of holding a conference, to allure his antagonist into an ambuscade. The device succeeded, and Yacoob Khan was taken to Cabul and thrown into prison. Every one expected that the extreme punishment of death would be inflicted upon him, but the intervention of the circumspect Government of British India changed the whole matter. The English, and with good reason, feared that the execution of Yacoob Khan would produce a universal rising in Afghanistan and would be followed by the deposition of Shere Ali, who was hated by the nation, and who on his own shoulders alone bore all the weight of the English friendship.

There is no doubt that on the fall of Shere Ali a host of rival pretenders will flood the country who at present are only restrained by the powerful autocrat at Cabul. The English are aware that the traditions regarding Payendeh Khan still exist; that Dost Mahomed and his descendants are still looked upon as usurpers; that the energetic Abdul Rahman, who, on the necessity arising, knows how to elude the vigilance of the Russian authorities,

is pining for want of action at Samarcand, and that to possess Herat has long been the ambition of the sons of Sultan Ahmed, amongst whom there are such men as Shahnawaz Khan, who has been cautiously and patiently biding his time at Teheran, and Secunder Khan, a man of considerable education and perseverance.

These considerations compelled the English to intercede on behalf of Yacoob Khan, but as yet the result is not known. It is very possible that Yacoob may be blinded, or that he may suddenly disappear, but at all events it is authentically stated that Herat has been already occupied by the troops of the Ameer.

Sir H. Rawlinson in his last work (England and Russia in the East) mentions in page 352 that General Von Kauffman addressed a letter to Shere Ali Khan, in which he expressed his abhorrence of Yacoob Khan's rebellion, and congratulated the Ameer on having at length received his submission. "This language," says Rawlinson, "it appears, gratified the Ameer exceedingly and was contrasted by him with the Viceroy's intercession in Yacoob Khan's behalf, 'the English,' as he remarked, 'supporting sons against fathers, while the Russians upheld the authority of fathers over sons.' It is

possible that this trivial circumstance may have further contributed to the Ameer's ill humour with his English allies."

Such is the present position of affairs in Afghanistan. There can be no doubt that the future of that country is threatened by serious disturbances, which England will certainly turn to her advantage if she follows her usual line of policy, *viz.*, that of promising support to one of the rival parties on condition of future obedience and submission.

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